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The 

BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

31 Ma\,..J June 191 6 



I — "The T'pJo White Nations," a nar- 
rative b]? Commander V. Hase, 2. — Notes 
from O. N. L Publications. 3. — Narra- 
tive of the Battle of Jutland bp Arthur 
Pollen and others. 4. — Account bj) Ad- 
miral Scheer. 5. — Account by Admiral 
jellicoe. 



Monograph No. I 

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 

NEWPORT, R. I. 

Deetmber. 1920 



5- 






CONTENTS 

Page 
I. "The Two White Nations," 

By Commander George Von Hase 5 

II. Notes from O. N. I. Publications 47 

III. Narrative of the Battle of Jutland 

By Arthur Pollen and others 61 

IV. The Battle of the Skagerrak 

Account by Admiral Scheer 73 

V. The Battle of Jutland 

Account by Admiral Jellicoe 105 



The 

BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

31 Ma})— I June 1916 



I 
'THE TWO WHITE NATIONS" 



(Extract from, containing a narrative of the Battle of Jutland.) 



By Commander George von Hase of the German Navy 



Severe hardships is in store for the German nation. Our 
youth will grow up in a subjugated Germany in which foreign 
officials will compel them to do statute labor for them. We shall 
be made to feel the contempt with which the Anglo-Saxon regards 
us. Even the French and Italians, and other nations, who are 
mentally, physically and morally inferior to us, will regard us as 
crude and justly punished barbarians. 

I am firmly convinced that our German youth will not be dis- 
concerted thereby. Strong-hearted Germans, young and old, 
must and will devote their efforts to prevent oiu*. people from al- 
lowing their national characteristics to perish in a weak, un-Ger- 
man, bondsman's view of life and the world. It is the duty of we 
older men to aid the German youth in this struggle both by pre- 
cept and example. We must keep alive the memory of all that has 
made the German people strong and proud; the deeds and times 
in which the German people have proved themselves to be of true 
nobility. 

Two walks of life have been familiar to me during the 22 yeiu's 
in which I have been permitted to serve the Fatherland as a naval 
officer, that of the German officer and that of the sailor. When today 
I look back upon the past, revolution and defeat having almost 
utterly wiped out these two phases of our culture, I do so with 
a feeling of gratitude toward the profession, in which I lived and 
worked with German men and youths who were true Germans at 
heart and who in war and in peace devoted their efforts and 
their lives to the greatness of Germany. And I am thankful to my 
profession for bringing me into association with almost all the 
nations of the earth under conditions which always gave me reason 
to be proud that I was a German and a sailor. 

I hope that what I shall now relate concerning the period of 
my former calling may contribute toward filling the German youth 
with the same enthusiasm for the Fatherland as filled the men of 
Germany before they were forced to draw their swords jigainst 
a world of enemies; and with the same pride with which we fought 



6 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

and advanced from victory to victory for four long years, and 
with the feeling of a nation in no respect inferior to any other, 
until we finally succumbed when our weapons were struck from 
our hands at a most critical moment by men of our own nation v^iho 
in their nature were not true Germans. 

My little book will treat of two historical meetings between the 
Germans and the English. 

The first meeting occm-red shortly before the outbreak of the 
war it was highly characteristic of the relation in which we Ger- 
mans at that time stood toward our present deadly foes, the Eng- 
lish. It was in June, 1914, when a large English squadron visited 
Kiel. I was detailed as personnel aide to Vice Admiral Sir 
George Warrender, who was then commander in chief of the fleet, 
for the duration of the stay of the squadron at Kiel. During this 
time, in which the murder of Serajevo occurred, I, together with 
the English ambassador. Sir Edward Goschen, and other guests 
of the admiral, lived on board his flagship, the King George V. 
Early in July, 1914, immediately after the departure of the Eng- 
lish squadron, I wrote down my experiences and the impressions 
received during this period on board the King George V," from 
notes kept in the form of a diary. 

The second historical meeting of which I shall speak was the 
battle of the Skagerrak. In this battle I had the good fortune, as 
chief gunnery officer of our largest, fastest, and most powerful ship, 
the battle cruiser Derflinger, to participate in the hottest part of the 
iattle, as well as in all the other phases of the conflict and to play 
a decisive role in the destruction of the two English battle crmsers, 
the Queen Mary and the Invincible. As no report of the battle 
has thus far been published in which a participant describes and 
passes judgment upon the engagement in a wholly impartial spirit 
and not handicapped by the censor, I have endeavored, while des- 
cribing my own experience, to portray what happened solely from 
an historical and absolutely unprejudiced point of view, and to 
depict the battle, so far as I was able to observe it, as it actually 
took place. 

Before I describe these two meetings, which have now be- 
come historical, I should like to cite briefly here a typical example 
of how, before the war, in spite of all envy and rivalry, no true 
Englishman thought of regarding a true German as other than a 
representative of an equal and related nation. 

This was in the year 1913. 

Off the coasts of Albania ships of almost every nation were ly- 
ing at anchor. The commander of the German cruiser Breslau had 
invited the admirals and commanding officers of all nationalities to 
dinner. Next the German commander sat the English admiral, and 
all around, between Germans and Englishmen, sat Italians, French, 
Russians, Spaniards, Turks, Greeks, and Albanians, in a motley 
assemblage. Toasts had been proposed and the political situations 
were being animatedly discussed in all possible languages. The 
English admiral and the German commander had seen each other 
furtively examining the members of this strange round table, and 
they exchanged their observations regarding the highly diversi- 
fied types of people. 

Suddenly the English admiral raised his glass, gazed straight 
into the blue eyes of the German commander, and as their glasses 
touched, softly whispered: "The Two White Nations." With 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 7 

flashing eyes the two men regarded each other the representatives 
of the two greatest seafaring Germanic nations. They felt that they 
were of one stock, originally members of one and the same noble 
people. 

Thus and not otherwise did every true German and every true 
Englishman feel before the war. 

And now? Now, the English people and their imitators dare 
to call us "Huns." The other of "Two White Nations" gives to 
our noble nation which has fought for right and freedom, for 
hearth and home, as no other people in the world have ever 
fought before, the name of a Mongolian tribe of the lowest civiliza- 
tion. 

German menl German youths 1 do not permit yourselves to be 
disturbed by stupid arrogance of this sort. Prove daily to our 
enemies by your actions that our civilization is not inferior to 
that of any other nation in the world; and see to it that the woiJd 
recognizes the truth, that we have fought the war in a no less 
knightly fashion than our opponents, who forced us to harsh re- 
taliatory measures solely by their own cruel methods. 

tHE HISTORICAL VALUE OF PERSONAL NARRRATIVES OF 
NAVAL BATTLES 

Anyone wishing to narrate his war experiences may do so in 
two ways: First, the narrator may enlarge upon his own experi- 
ences, which in many instances would be of little interest to his 
hearers or readers, by material derived from other sources, thus 
producing not so much an accurate account of the events in which 
he participated but a more or less vivid picture of the entire con- 
duct of the war. Second, one may simply narrate his own ex- 
periences, however undramatic and unimportant they may be in 
comparison with the war as a whole, thus making oneself respon- 
sible for the historical accuracy of his narrative even to the smal- 
lest detail. In describing the battle of the Skagerrak, it will be my 
endeavor to follow this latter method. 

The day of Lowestoft had plainly demonstrated to me that it is 
almost impossible even immediately after a battle to write down 
in chronological order the events of the battle from the verbal re- 
ports of the participants. It was the custom in the Navy to keep 
no records during the engagement, this to insure that each man 
would be absorbed only in the duties of his particular station. 
This fact made it impossible for me even after the battle of Lowes- 
toft to determine satisfactorily at what ranges and in exactly 
what directions we had fired when we were bombarding cities and 
later when the British cruisers and torpedo destroyers were under 
our fire. In the official account of the battle, the statements as to 
whether the enemy torpedo boats fled toward the west or toward 
the east differed materially. I therefore took steps to make certain 
that in any future battle all gunnery commands and occurrences 
and my own observations would be carefullv recorded. I directed 
an old reliable petty officer in the central station of the main bat- 
tery to write down each order as given by me. As his telephone 
headpiece was connected with mine, he was able to hear every 
order that I gave. This phone also enabled me to maintain com- 
munication with the observation officer in the foretop and with thr 
officer at the range telephone clock in the central station. In ad 



8 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

dition to writing down my orders, lie also recorded the range ior 
each salvo of the main battery and in what direction the gunb 
were trained for each saivo. The train was reported in degrees, 
beginning with zero degrees for dead ahead. The guns were 
therefore at 90° when trained on the starboard beam, 180° when 
trained astern, and 270° when trained on the port beam. In the 
central station was an electric fire-control device from which one 
could read at any instant the positions of each turret in azimuth. 
In addition to the above, an accurate record to within 10 seconds 
was kept of the time at which each order was given and each shot 
fired. 

The courses and speeds of a ship during a naval battle are 
recorded by a quartermaster stationed in the central station, who 
obtains his readmgs from the compass and speed indicator. With 
this data as plotted on the navigator's chart, it would be easy to 
plot tne enemy position at any phase of the battle, knowing one .. 
own course and speed and the direction of fire and range of one's 
own guns. After the battle of Lowestoff, I developed in detail this 
system of keeping records of both battle target practice and clear 
ship for action exercises. In addition to the above, I also had 
recorded at other important battle stations, such as the gun tur- 
rets and centrals of the secondary battery, all orders and announce- 
ments which were received at or transmitted from these stations. 
I also had a record kept of all important events occurring at their 
stations by the following, viz, the second gunnery officer and the 
fourth gunnery officer, who were stationed in the after conning 
tower. I emphasized constantly in our drills that is was of the 
greatest importance to keep these records during the battle. Hence 
in the battle of the Skagerrak, a good record was kept at all the sta- 
tions mentioned above, thus enabling me to give an accurate ac- 
count of almost every shot fired by the ship's batteries. By knowing 
the direction and range of those salvos which we knew hit the tar- 
get or fell in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, it was not diffi- 
cult to draw a mathematically correct diagram of the battle. These 
diagrams, which are still in my possession, together with ray diary 
and letters written to my people, form the basis of my report on this 
battle. Unfortunately the records made in the 30.5 centimeter tur- 
rets, Caeser and Dora, were completely destroyed when those tur- 
rets were demolished. 

* * * * 

The Spectator of 9 June, 1916, published an article on the value 
of official and personal narratives of naval battles and in particu- 
lar the battle of the Skagerrak. The author, Bennet Copplestone, 
gave an excellent opinion concerning the value of all such narra- 
tives in which, as can not happen otherwise in war, the censor and 
military interests have a controlling effect. The author of the arti- 
cle, in mv opinion, had at that time taken great pains to ascertain 
the true story of the battle from both the English and the German 
reports. Naturally he could not altogether refrain from viewing the 
matter from an English standpoint, and, in some instances, he fur- 
nished us with absolutely new details, especially concerning the 
tactics of the leader of the English battle cruisers. Admiral Beatty, 
who by utilizing his ships, which far surpassed ours in speed, exe- 
cuted a very typical encircling maneuver. There follows a trans- 
lation of the article from English into German, the publication of 
which in German papers was not permitted by the German censors 
in the year of 1916: 

This article in the Spectator gives a very clear idea of the 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 9 

difficulties met in accurately describing a naval battle after its oc- 
currence. In order to be able to describe the battle of the 
Skagerrak with perfect accuracy, it would be necessary for the 
historian to have at his disposal all the official and personal rec- 
ords of both sides. But the English will find very little interest 
in transmitting to posterity the exact details of this for them in- 
glorious battle. And shall we, after the collapse of our Navy 
and with a pacifist government at our head, undertake it? I 
trust so. Meanwhile, we who took part in that battle must do 
our utmost to insure that this duel between "The Two White Na- 
tions," maritime nation against maritime nation, shall be handed 
down to our descendants as it actually occurred. 

ON BOARD THE "DERFFLINGER" ON ITS WAY OUT TO THE 

SKAGERRAK 

On 31 May, 1916, the battle cruisers weighed anchor at 3 
o'clock in the morning. They were the Luetzow (the llagship of 
Vice Admiral Hipper, comanding the scouting ships), Derffling- 
er, Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von Der Tann. We had passed the night 
anchored In Schillig Roadstead off the entrance of Jade Bay. 
Ahead of us were the small cruisers and several torpedo-boat 
flotillas. It was a beautiful clear night, which was soon fol- 
lowed by a glorious morning. The sun in all its majesty ap- 
peared over the horizon and flooded the sea with its golden beams, 
and soon there was visible to us that unforgotten picture for 
which we had so often longed — the entire high seas fleet steam- 
ing toward the enemy. Some distance ahead of us were the small 
cruisers in column surrounded by a screen of torpedo boats that 
constantly circled around the cruisers in search of hostile sub- 
marines, like shepherd dogs caring for their flocks. Next came 
the battle cruisers, five powerful ships with defiant names, the 
pride of the fleet. The Luetzow and Derfflinger, sister ships, were 
both completed during the war. The Luetzow joined the fleet just 
two months before the battle. One of the first cruises of the Luet- 
zow was the raid against Lowestoff. The Derfflinger and the 
three other battle cruisers were together in the battles of Scar- 
borough, Doggerbank (24 January, 1915), and Lowestofl". All of 
the battle cruisers were manned with picked officers and veterans 
crews and at that time untainted by sinister influences. On the 
31st of May we numbered on board the Derfflinger 1,398 men; 
not one was absent on leave, but there were a few on the sick 
list. Those to whom leave had been granted were to have de- 
parted on the orevious dav, but upon receir/t of the order to be in 
absolute readiness their leave was held up. The fact that none 
of our men were absent on leave was a great advantage to us 
as it insured absolute coordination in the battle. 

The Derfflinger was commanded by Cant. Hartog, with Lieut. 
Commander Max Fischer as executive officer and Lieut. Com- 
mander von Jork as navigator. The gunnery officers under my 
command were Lieut. Lamprecht, second gunnerv officer; Lieut. 
Hauser, third gunnery officer; smd Lieut, von Mellenthin, fourth 
gunnerv officer. The turret officers were Lieut. Freiherr von 
Sneth-Schuelzburg and Lieuts. (Junior Grade) Hankow and von 
Boltenstern. The observation officers were Lieut, von Stosch and 
Li-^ut. (Junior Graded of Reserve Schulz. The order transmitting 
officer was Ensign Hoch and the range officer Ensign Friedrich. 
The torpedo officers were Lieut. Kossak and Ensigns Schilling 
and von der Decken; adjutant and signal officer. Ensign Peters; 



10 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

wireless officer. Ensign Thaer; ship's surgeon, Dr. Freyer. The 
chief engineer was Statf Engineer Kohn. Ail the officers, with the 
exception of Lieut, von Mulienthin, who had been detached for 
a course of study, were present on l3oard. 

The battle cruisers also were surrounded by a screen of 
torpedo destroyers that cruised about us like a swarm of bees. In 
our numerous sweeps through the North Sea and the Baltic many 
a torpedo had been fired at us from the English submarines, but 
up to this time only the Moltke had been hit. The Seydlitz ran 
into a mine in the raid on Lowestoft and was forced to return 
after the admiral had shifted his flag to the Luetzow. It was nec- 
essary that we should exercise all precautions, so that all five of 
us should reach our rendezvous on the Norwegian coast. 

Astern of us on the clear horizon we made out our main body 
of battleships; 22 battleships stood in line, a proud armada. At 
the head was the third squadron comprising our most modern 
ships, with the flaghip Koenig leading; then came the fleet flag- 
ship Friedrich der Grosse, with the commander in chief, Admiral 
Scheer; then came the first squadron containing ships of the 
Helgoland and Nassau class and bringing up the rear, the second 
squadron containing the obsolete battleships of the Deutschland 
class, among which was my old ship, Hessen, on board which 
during my five year's tour of duty as gunnery officer I had con- 
ducted so many target practices. 

The battleships were surrounded by a large number of small 
cruisers that acted as a screen. The°re were also the usual num- 
ber of submarines and mine-sweepers surrounding the battleships. 
West of Helgoland and Amrum Bank the course was changed to 
north. Half of the gun crews were at their stations, the other half 
were sleeping in their hammocks near their guns or near their 
battle stations, in the ammunition rooms, gun-control stations, 
etc. I remained on the bridge during the night. I had no par- 
ticular duties while cruising. The second and third gunnery offi- 
cers took turns as senior watch. My commanding officer followed 
the principle that the executive officer, the first gunnery officer, 
and the first torpedo officer should have as much sleep and rest 
as possible while cruising, that their nerves might be in good 
condition when the ship went into action, an excellent regula- 
tion which was carried out by us not only in theory but also in 
practice. In my case a cruise of this sort was a genuine pleasure 
trip. If we had news of the enemy, there was something out of 
the ordinary to see. If the weather was specially fine, I remained 
on the bridge; otherwise I slept, read, or played chess in the mess. 
About once every two hours I made an inspection of all the guns, 
questioning the officers on watch and the gun captains to make 
sure that everything was ready. I was usuallv accompanied by 
the Heinzelmaennchen in mv rounds through the shio, and as a 
matter of fact we a^wavs found something that needed immedi- 
ate attention. The Heinzelmaennchen then summoned his gang, 
comorising electricians, artificers, and voice-tube men, and within 
a very short time I wouM receive the report: "Port range tele- 
graph on the third 15-centimeter gun is ready"; "Left ammuni- 
tion hoist of Caesar turret repaired," etc. 

Naturallv I was always on the bridge when we entered a re- 
gion in which submarines or mines had just been reported and on 
dark nights when toroedo boats were to be expected. But I 
ifonld arrange this as I wished and such occasions were usually 
most agreeable ones to me. 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 11 

I had a large room on the top deck. This room was divided 
into two parts not directly next to ship's side but set somewhat 
inboard. Except in stormy weather, I was able to have my side 
ports open and thus gain a good view of the sea from my cabin 
and immediately became aware if anything unusual was going on. 

It thus happened that on 31 May after enjoying the sunrise — 
which to me on the high seas had always a fresh charm but which 
seen while lying at anchor in the brown waters of the Jade could 
not induce me to leave my bed. I turned over for a couple of 
hours' more sleep, then rose, shaved, made my toilet preliminary 
to breakfast in the mess. Most of the officers were compelled to 
go without the luxury of a careful toilet at sea as they were vin- 
able to use their cabins on the lower decks, as all the approaches 
were securely closed owing to the danger from mines. 

After I had breakfast, I sat down in my comfortable room, 
did a little writing, and enjoyed a view over the sea. Before noon 
I had made another tour of inspection of the battery and at dinner 
there arose the usual topic of conversation "I wonder if we shall 
see anvthing of the enemy." The extent of our cruise was far- 
ther out than had been the case previously and torpedo boats 
were to make a search in the Skagerrak waters on the night of 31 
May for hostile and neutral merchant ships. It was therefore as- 
sured that on this night our presence in the Skagerrak would be an- 
nounced, that the English fleet would start out from England soon 
after receipt of this information and that we must count upon a 
meeting with the English main body on 1 June. Moreover groups 
of English armored cruisers and light cruisers had been reported 
off the Norwegian coast and it was probable that we would come 
up with these during the night of 31 May, or perhaps during the 
afternoon of that day. No one in the German fleet, not even 
the commander in chief, dreamed that the entire English Grand 
Fleet was at sea and steaming toward the same point that we 
were. Similarly in the English fleet, according to all reports, 
no one knew that the German fleet was at sea. There was no 
reason in the world to doubt the truth of this and yet ashore it 
was repeatedly asked "How did the English know that we were 
standing off the Skagerrak?" or "How did we know that the 
English were going to enter the Baltic?" 

All this is idle talk. The battle of the Skagerrak was as re- 
ported by both admiralties, the result of a chance meeting of the 
two fleest while engaged in their frequent cruises into the North 
Sea. If one considers that the North Sea is larger than the whole 
of Germany and how easy it would be for two fleets to cruise 
in so vast a region without meeting, the remarkable chance which 
brought our advance scouts and the advance scouts of the English 
together was truly remarkable. The battle of the Skagerrak in its 
first phases developed exactly like a carefully prepared methodi- 
cal batt'e in which first the small cruisers, then the battle cruisers 
and finally the main body made contact. 

At our noondav meal from which half of the officers were 
absent on watch duty, an excited enthusiastic spirit prevailed. 
Almost everyone believed that this time we would use our guns, 
but no one talked of anvthing but the light forces or a squadron 
of the older armored cruisers. No one considered the possibility 
that the entire British fleet was standing toward us only a fev; 
hours awav. A few^ were pessimistic and thought that we would 
soon be turning back without having accomplished anvthing. 
The chief surgeon while at sea always carried a large pocket com- 



12 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

pass with him which lay on the table beside him. As the armor 
porthole covers of the officers' mess were closed and we there- 
fore had no view of the sea and we were unable to tell when a 
course was altered, we called him our lower deck strategist. We 
kept constant check on his compass while at table. On the whole 
there was a feeling in the mess that we were on the eve of some 
unusual experience. As was the rule when we were making one 
of our excursions into the North Sea, no one at the table drank 
a drop of alcohol. Nevertheless, not one of us was a scorner of 
wine, woman, and song. But on every excursion we were as 
strict with ourselves as a sportsman is during a contest. From 
the moment of weighing anchor until we returned in the liOiue 
roadstead, we were almost total abstainers. 

We smoked our cigars and then the younger officers went on 
watch while those released from duty appeared at the table. I 
went to my room, stretched myself out on my bunk and watched 
the blue rings of my cigar and dreamed of battle and victory. If 
only we could fight it out with our guns this time. My whole 
professional career seemed to me so meaningless and so emot> 
unless I could at least once know what it was to be engaged in 
battle on the high seas. Blow for blow, that is the way it would 
go. I knew from 12 hours of gunnery practice that I had 
learned to fire. That was sport that I could understand. If I just 
had the target in my periscope and the first crashing salvo had left 
the gun, nothing could then disturb my peace. Nevertheless I did 
not as yet know how I should feel in the thick hail of enemy 
shells, but that did not bother me; I would soon find out. 

At 2 o'clock the drums sounded a long roll throughout the 
ship, the signal to "clean guns." Every one except the officers 
must immediately take their battle station. This is the most im- 
portant hour of the day for the gunnery officer. During the clean- 
ing of the guns, the entire mechanism is tried out, cleaned, and 
oiled and all the apparatus is checked to make certain that all 
adjustments are correct. I would go from gun to gun accom- 
panied by the Heinzelmaennchen. In the Bertha turret a belt of 
the ammunition hoist had slipped off the drum. Upon placing 
it back in position, I found that one part of the cable was badly 
damaged. I decided that it should be replaced by a new cable. 
This would take about an hour. For a whole hour then we 
would be unable to do anything if we should engage the enemy. 
I checked up to make certain that the gun crew was provided 
with everything they should have during the battle. On the 29th 
of May after long waiting, the fleet had received about a thousand 
gas masks from the Army. By order of the commander in chief, 
these masks were to be issued to the battle cruisers and the latest 
battleships. On the 30th of May they were hastily distributed and 
tried out in a short battle practice. It was necessary to make cer- 
tain that each man had his gas mask within easy reach of his 
battle station. The readv ammunition lay in the gun turrets along- 
side the guns in amounts prescribed by regulations. The guns 
of the main battery were lo^ed and ready to fire a salvo at any 
submarine appearing on the surface. 

The executive officer who regulated the details of dutv on 
board had turned over to me the gun crews for the period be- 
tween 3 and 4 o'clock, and had given orders that this time was 
to be utilized in gun drills and fire-control exercises, much to the 
disgust of my officers and men. But I knew only too well how 
great was mv responsibility. I knew that I could count only 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 13 

upon a proper operation of the entire battery when each device 
and each piece of mechanism was working as if in actual battle. 
The third gunnery officer who had charge of the secondary bat- 
tery occupied the forward gunnery station for fire-control prac- 
tice. Something attacted our attention. We buckled on our head 
telephone and then we heard "Normal switch stations for bat- 
tle on the port side." In the subcentral station about 40 levers 
were moved over to the position ordered. The order "Switch for 
battle on port side" penetrated to all stations in the ship. I had 
my periscope directed on one of our small cruisers and gave Ih 
order "Man the range indicator." All the other gun periscojjes 
and all the guns brought their electric indicator in line and were 
therefore accm-ately aimed at the position of the target at which 
I myself had my periscope aimed. I called "Question E-U?" That 
means in German that the first gunnery officer wishes immedi- 
ately to be informed by the gunnery observation officer what 
change he estimates should be made in the range per minute ;ic- 
cording to his range indicator. It is the duty of the range finder 
officer to anounce the difference in range per minute from the 
measured range. "Report from fore top; new range indicator lack- 
ing from fore topi" "Great heavens! The indicator will have 

to be brought from the gunnery officer. Gunner's Mate 

will report to me after this drill. The fore top must work for 
the present with the old range indicator!" 

I should like to say here a few things about the range in- 
dicator. The latest type was perfected by Lieut. Commander 
Paschen, first gunnery officer of the Luetzow. It is used to as- 
certain simultaneously the difference in range per minute ajnd to 
determine the proper setting for the deflection scale. I will not 
weary the reader with a description of how the setting for the 
deflection scale was ascertained. It will suffice for the reader 
to know that a correction is applied to the sights in order to neu- 
tralize all the influences tending to divert the projectile from its 
path by means of a slide adjustment called the deflection scale. 
The influences which tend to deflect the projectile from its ori- 
ginal path are wind, speed of ship, and rifling of the gun. There 
is still another correction which must be made for the speed of 
the enemy. The excellent device designed by Lieut. Commander 
Paschen enables one to ascertain without calculation the proper 
deflection scale setting after the indicator has been adjusted for 
the estimated course and speed of the enemy. The principal ob- 
ject of the range difference indicator was to ascertain the dif- 
ference in range per minute. First the apparatus is set for one's 
own speed which is communicated to the forward gunnery sta- 
tion from the conning tower for each change in speed. The 
speed and course of the enemy is then estimated and the mdica- 
tor is then set for that. The difference in range can then be read on 
the indicator without any calculation. We had devices of this kind 
in all parts of the ship but mostly of an older type, and which 
did not permit reading off the deflection scale setting. If the for- 
ward gunnery station was disabled, the gimnery officer could 
have the difference in range computed at other stations of the 
ship, the operator at the range difference indicator himself bemg 
unable to see the enemy. 

This, of course, would make it necessary for the gunnery of- 
ficer to keep the range difference indicator operator constantly 
informed during battle of changes in course and speed which are 
very important in fire control. The gunnery officer himself also 



U THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

had an apparatus of this kind at hand and checked off by its 
means during battle the announcements of the observation officer 
or himself computed the difference in range in case the communi- 
cation with the observation officer v^as interrupted. 

The fire control exercises continued. "150 hundred! Salvo — 
firel" This command was transmitted from the central station 
by means of telephone and gong to the 30.5 centimeter turrets. 
At the instant of the order "Fire!" — meaning the order and not 
the report of the discharge — the spotters stationed in the fore- 
top of the order transmitter station, central and subcentral sta- 
tions, pulled back the lever of the impact indicator. Expectant 
silence. At the end of the period of flight corresponding to the 
range, a loud-toned gong should sound at each impact indicator. 
The tone of this gong can be compared only with the dull sound 
made by a flock of sheep. I should hear simultaneously in my 
head telephone the impact announcers with the main battery in 
the foretop, the forv/ard gunnery station, and the main central, 
but I heard only one gong, that in the foretop. I asked, "Why 
have the impact indicators not been manned." Reply: "Impact 
indicators have been manned but do not function." More work 
for the Heijizelmaennchen. I give the order, "Put new batteries 
in all impact indicators at once!" And so we go on until finally I 
am convinced that all defects have been eliminated and that the 
battery is actually ready for battle. With this comfortable feel- 
ing I went into the mess to enjoy a cup of good coffee while sil- 
ting on the leather sofa. 

I was not permitted to enjoy this pleasure very long, for ai 
4.28 p. m. the general alarm sounded throughout the ship, the 
two drums played the general march, and the watch piped "Clear 
ship for action!" 

FIRST PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF THE SKAGERRAK (5.48 p. 

m. TO 6.55 p. m.) — ENGAGEMENT WITH THE QUEEN 

MARY— TORPEDO ATTACK AND ITS DEFENSE 

When I reached the conning tower, I learned that it had been 
announced that the Frankfurt had sighted individual ships to the 
westward. The battle cruisers were already proceeding in col- 
umn at maximum speed for the designated rendezvous. We saw 
ahead of us the small cruisers with their torpedo boats follow- 
ing rapidly, at the same time making a great deal of smoke. We 
couM no longer see our own main body. Our torpedo boatr; 
could scarcely keep up as they lost much headway owing to the 
heavy swell. Otherwise, the sea was quite smooth and only a 
light northwest wind (force 3) was blowing, I climbed into the 
forward gun station. I say "climbed" because it required some 
climbing to reach the point where the gun periscopes were sit- 
uated after one had passed the armored door on the top landing. 
Reoorts were already arriving: "The secondary battery ready; 
Order transmission ready; Foretop after gun station, main top 
readv," etc. When all the battle stations had reported, I reported 
to the commanding officer, "Guns ready." 

We officers put on our telephone headpieces and the dance 
was readv to begin. I will ask the reader to glance at the dia- 
gram on the opposite page. The first time record in the diagram is 
4.28 p. m. Ut) to that time the battle cruisers had been steering? 
north. At 4.28 t). m. they altered course to the westward, whic^i 
was held until 5.22 p. m. Thev then changed course to the north 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 15 

until 5.33 p. m.; then to south until 6.53 p. m.; then to the north 
again until 7.55 p. ra.; then frequently changing course until 
9.22 p. m.; then a westward course until 9.45 p. m., and then 
chiefly a southerly course until the end of the day's battle. 

By the aid of this sketch it will he possible for the reader to 
follow my description of the different phases of the battle and the 
course of the Derfflinger. The course of the Derfflinger was the 
same as that followed by the other battle cruisers as well as the 
enemy ships which came under the fire of the Derfflinger. 

In the course shown as followed by the Derfflinger is indi- 
cated in red dotted lines the direction and range (in hectometers) 
of the salvos which were recorded as hits or at any rate as hav- 
ing covered the enemy. In these salvos the range therefore cor- 
responds to the actual distance. The range at that moment shows 
the position of the enemy at the moment the saivo struck. The 
course of the enemy at whom we were firing against is indicated 
by a red line. This course is mathematically correct so far as 
it could be determined by the hits of our salvoes. The other dis- 
tances shown can not make the same claim to mathematical ac- 
curacy but deviate only slightly from the course actually steered 
by the English ships. At first, therefore, w^e ran for about a half 
hour almost due west and then for a half hour to the northwest. 

All our periscopes and telescopes were trained on the enemy, 
but the heavy smoke of our cruisers obstructed our view. About 
5 o'clock we heard the first shot and so learned that the Elbing 
had been hit and that the fire was being vigorously returned. 
My recorder in the central station recorded as the first item of 
information that I had given to the guns: "5.05 p. m., Our small 
cruisers report four enemy small cruisers not yet visible from 
the Derfflinger!" Later followed the orders: "5.30 p. m., Our 
small cruisers have opened fire! Train on the second small 
cruiser from the right! Load with armor-piercing shell and sirsnd 
by! Point of aim right edge water line! 180 hundred! Dis- 
tribute fire from the right! Deflection scale left 20! 170 hun- 
dred!" 

It was already beginning to get hot in the gun station. I re- 
moved my coat and had it placed in the charthouse behind the 
gun station. I never saw it again. Up to this time not one of us 
had believed that we were attacking an enemy of equal nower. 
This led me to say to the commander in the gun station, "Enemy 
battle cruisers have been reported." I also gave this information 
to the gun crews. It now became clear that in a very short time 
a life-and-death struggle would take place. For an instant it be- 
came noticeably more quiet in the gun station, but this lasted 
for onlv a few moments: then the din became again. Now every- 
thing moved along in faultless order and calm. I had the guns 
trained where I supposed the enemv must be. I had set my 
periscope for the maximum magnification of 15 times, which wns 
tlie prescribed adiustment for clear, bright weather. But still 
I could see nothing of the enemy. Now, however, a change took 
place ahead of us: The small cruisers and tornedo boats had 
countermarched and w^ere seeking cover behind the battle cruis- 
ers. We were now at the head of the line. The horizon was 
free of smoke, and we couM now make out some small Eng- 
lish cruisers which had also countermarched. Suddenly I saw 
large ships in mv periscope — six large ships steaming in two 
columns. They were still a long distance off, but stood out clear- 



16 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ly on the horizon, and even at this distance they appeared pow- 
erful and menacing. We continued on our northerly course 
but a short time longer, and at 5.33 p. m. our flagship, Luetzow, 
behind which we were following as second ship in the line, 
turned to the south. The enemy likewise turned to the south 
on a converging course, and thus the two lines approached ever 
nearer as both squadrons steamed to the south at a maximum 
speed. The intention of Admiral Hipper was clear. He wished 
to lead the enemy battle cruisers toward our main body. 

The recorder at this moment recorded my command: "5.35 p. 
m. Ship turns to southward. Prepare for battle on the starboard 
hand. 170 hundred. 165 hundred. Main battery armor-piercing 
shell. Train on the second armored cruiser from left 102 degrees. 
Ship's speed 26 knots, course ESE. 170 hundred. Our opponent 
has two masts and two funnels, also a small funnel close up to 
the foremast. Deflection left 10. Difference in range, — 1. 164 
hundred." Still there was no order to fire from the flagship. 

It suddenly became clear that both sides were seeking a de- 
cision at medium range. Meanwhile I obtained a good view of 
the enemy. The six large ships reminded me of the day on which 
I went out to meet the English squadron in Keil Bay to carry 
greetings to the English admiral. Again a haughty English squad- 
ron was approaching, but this time the greeting would be quite 
a different one. How much larger and more ominous the hostile 
ships appeared, especially when magnified 15 times. I now rec- 
ognized ttiem as the enemy's six newest battle cruisers. Six bat- 
tle cruisers against our five. About this same proportion pre- 
vailed throughout the fight. It was an elevating and a majestic 
sight to witness these gray giants in the role of fate steam toward 
us. 

The six ships, which at first had been steaming in two columns, 
now formed line. Like mammoth creatures of prehistoric days, 
they pushed each other aside with slow, measured movements. 

But there was something more important to be done than 
to stand gazing. The measured ranges constantly grew smaller. 
When the range was 165 hectometers, I gave the order "Armor- 
piercing shell." That was the shell for short-range engagements. 
Everyone in the ship now knew that it was going to be a close- 
up fight, for I had often explained to the men how the two types 
of shell should be used. I continually sent out to the guns the 
ranges received by the range takers. Immediately after the 
change in course at 5.35 p. m. the signal was hoisted on board the 
flagship, "Fire distribution from the left." That meant that each 
German ship should take an English ship under its fire, counting 
off from the left wing. Accordingly we five German battle cruis- 
ers had to bring five English ships under fire, and the second 
ship, which I identified as of the Queen Mary class, fell to the 
Derfflinger. She proved to be the Princess Royal, a sister ship of 
the Queen Mary. Everything was ready; the tension increased 
every second; but still I did not dare to give the first order to 
fire, as I had to wait for the signal "Open fire" from the flagship. 
The enemy, too, stiU'waited, approaching ever closer and closer. 

"150 hundred" was my last order. Then a dull crash, and I 
looked forward: The Luetzow was firing her first salvo and sim- 
ultaneously the signal "Open fire" was run up. At the same mo- 
ment I called "Salvo — fire," and then our first salvo thundered 
forth. Our followers immediately fell in, and we saw among the 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 17 

enemy everywhere the flash of guus and rolling clouds of smoke 
— the battle was on. My recorder in central wrote down: "At, 
5.48 p. m. ship turns to starboard. Range dift'erence, minus 2. 
150 hundred. Salvo — fire." Almost 30 seconds passed before 
our impact indicators — this time all three sounded together. 
The new batteries have worked well. The points of impact lay 
close together, but were "over"; that is, fell behind the target and 
too far to the right. "Deflection scale 2 points more to the left. 
4 back. Again." Those were the commands for the next salvo. 
"4 back" meant that the ensign at the sight telegraph should shift 
the indicator of the telegraph 400 meters. "Again" meant that as 
soon as he had made his adjustment, he himself, should give the 
order from the gunnery central, "Salvo — fire." This relieved the 
gunnery officer and, furthermore, it prevented the order to fire 
from being given when perhaps the gun had not yet been adjusted 
to the new sight. The ensign in the central was able to tell by 
means of an electric indicator, in the case of each gun, whether 
the sight has been correctly adjusted or not. 

At the sight telegraph in central sat Ensign Stachow, a 
young chap 17 years old, who served the sight telegraph and 
sight indicator, transmitted my orders to the gun turrets, and 
regulated permission to fire. His telephone headpiece was con- 
nected with mine and in this way I could keep track of all orders 
given by him. Up to the close of the battle the young ensign 
coolly and skillfully regulated the fire discipline of the main 
and secondary batteries; only at the beginning of the firing did 
he make a mistake. 

The second salvo burst forth. Again it was "Over." "4 back," 
I commanded. The third and fourth salvos were also over, al- 
though after the fourth salvo I had ordered "8 back." "Great 
heavens. Ensign Stachow, what is the matter? I roared. "Once 
more 8 back." The firing list showed later that the first "8 back" 
had probably not been understood by the ensign; in any case he 
had not made the corresponding adjustment. Now the "8 back" 
came into effect. The sixth salvo, fired at 5.52 p. m., straddled 
the target, three shots over and one shot short. Meanwhile, we 
had approached to 119 hectometers as the sight indicator had at 
first run with 2 hectometers and then with 3 hectometers de- 
crease in range per minute, and I had already traversed 16 hecto- 
meters. We had now been four minutes in the fight and had just 
succeeded in getting on our first salvo. That was not very satis- 
factory work. At first all the shots went beyond the target. This 
was due to the inaccurate measurement of the initial range and 
a delay in first reports of the measured range. I explained these 
great errors in measuring in the following manner: The range 
takers were deceived by the first view of the enemy monsters. 
Each one saw the hostile ship in his range finder magnified 23 
times. At first all thoughts were concentrated on the appearance 
of the enemy. Each one was busy trying to determine in his own 
mind where the enemy was. Thus, when the order "Open fire" 
suddenly came, the measured range was not accurately set. The 
mistake can not be charged to a lack of ability, for during the 
rest of the battle the ranges were measured very accurately; nor 
can any doubt be entertained as to the efficiency of our range 
finders, as, on the contrary, our Zeiss stereopticon base-line ap- 
paratus during the battle thoroughly proved its worth. The 
range-finding officer reported to me later that the measurements 
on all range finders, even at long ranges, seldom varied more 
than 3 hectometers. 



18 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Precious moments had been lost, but now I had my aim and 
at 5 hours 52 minutes 20 seconds the recorder wrote down my 
order "Good; fast." "Effect." "Good; fast," means that Ensign 
Stachow in central gave the command every 20 seconds for the 
main battery "Salvo — fire," and the word "effect" means that 
the secondary battery should immediately after each salvo of the 
main battery fire two salvos as quickly as possible. An ear-split- 
ting, defeaning roar began. We fired on the average one powerful 
salvo, including the secondary battery, every seven seconds. 
Whoever had witnessed firing on board a dreadnaught with ser- 
vice ammunition will be able to form some idea of what that 
meant. It was impossible to obtain any information while the 
salvos were being fired. Thick masses of power smoke contipu- 
ously rolled about the muzzles of the guns forming huge smoke 
clouds, which for seconds at a time hung before us like an im- 
penetrable mask and then passed over the ship through the ac- 
tion of the wind and the speed of the vessel. It thus happened 
that for seconds at a time we were not able to see the enemy, and 
that our conning tower was enveloped in very thick smoke. 
Naturally, rapid fire of this kind from both calibers could be 
maintained for only a short time. It demanded almost super- 
human effort on the part of the gun crews and the ammunition 
crews. Moreover, it finally became impossible to distinguish the 
points of fall of the main and secondary batteries from each 
other. I then commanded "Secondary battery silent," and for 
a time checked only the fire of the main battery. As a rule, it 
did not take long before the shots passed over or fell short of 
the target, owing to some movement of the enemy, and then the 
fire was again slovv^ed down. Each sslvo then had to be gauged 
anew, and the shells again fell about the target until one of the 
shells covered it. Then began again "Good, fast." Once more a 
salvo crashed forth from the heavy guns every 20 seconds, and 
in the intervals the secondary battery fired. Unfortunately the 
secondary battery could shoot only at a range not over 130 hec- 
tometers. 

It seemed to me amazing that apparently we had not as yet 
been hit. Onlv at rare intervals did a stray shot pass in our vi- 
cinity. I examined the gun turrets of our target more closely and 
realized that this ship was not firing at us. She was joining in 
the bombardment of our flagship. For a moment I observed the 
third enemy ship; she was firing at the ship following us. No 
doubt about it. Through some error we had been passed over. I 
smiled erimly. And now, quite calmly, as if we were in target 
practiceT I brought the enemv under our fire with increasing ac- 
curacy. All thoughts of death or drowning were forgotten as it 
were." The sportsman's joy awakened and evervthing within me 
danced with glee during the wild delight of battle and all thoiight 
was concentrated on the one wish, to hit the target rapidly and 
accuratelv, to land telling shots on the haughtv enemy, wherever 
and whenever it was possible. It was not going to be easy for 
him to prevent mv return home. I had merely whisoered to my- 
self "We are being skir>ped," but in an instant the whisper passed 
from mouth to mouth in the gun station, and filled everyone with 
unbounded iov. Besides we two gunnery officers onlv the two 
pettv officers at the aim indicator and range finder cou'd see any- 
thing of the enemy. Nevertheless, we had left the lookout slits 
open — not an altogether sagacious nrocedure — but one cou'd 
scarcely see the enemv with the naked eve. The men in the gun 
stations were therefore eager to learn what they could from us. 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 19 

And so the battle went on. Huge columns of water, from 80 
to lOO meters in heigtit, rose where our shots iell; they were aimost 
twice as high as the enemy's masts. Our joy at being passed oyer 
did not last long. Ihe mistake had been detected by the other 
side and we were now otten covered with weil-aimed salvos. 
I again examined the gun turrets of our opponent on which I 
had directed my glass and saw that the guns were now aimed 
directly at us. At the same time I suddenly made a discovery 
which filled me with surprise. At every salvo which the enemy 
fired I clearly saw four or live projectiles approaching through 
the air. They looked like long, black points. 'Ihey gradually be- 
came somewhat larger and suddenly — boom — they reached us. 
They exploded on impact with the water or the ship with a deaf- 
ening roar. Finally, I could quite plainly see whether the shelis 
were going to fall in front of us or pass over us, or whether they 
were going to honor us individually. Impact on the sea always 
raised a huge column of water. Some of these water columns up 
to half their height were poisonous, greenish yellow in color, and 
doubtless produced by lyddite sheJs. They lasted fully 5 or 10 
seconds before they collapsed. They resembled giant fountains 
and in comparison with which the famous jets of Versailles were 
mere child's play. During the later phases of the battle, when 
the enemy had gotten our range better, it frequently happened 
that columns of water of this sort fell over the ship, Hooding 
everything, even putting out the fires. The first hit on our ship 
which came to my knowledge struck above the casemate. It 
first penetrated a door with a round glass window. Back of this 
door stood an excellent petty officer, Boatswain's Mate Lorensen, 
who had been stationed under deck with the reserves, but re- 
mained there in order to be able to observe the battle. His curi- 
osity was severely punished; the shell neatly separated his head 
from his bodv. We approached our opponent to within 113 hecto- 
meters. At 5.55 p. m., however, I was again firing with a sight 
setting of 115 hectometers, after which the range rapidly in- 
creased. At 5.57 p. m. the range indicator was running with an 
increase in range of "plus 6." At 6 p. m, the range was 152 hecto- 
meters, at 6.05 D. m. the range was 180 hectometers, and the enemy 
then passed out of reach of our guns, as 180 hectometers was our 
maximum range. 

We were able to increase our range slightly beyond this 
amount by directing the gun pointer to fire no longer at the water 
line of the enemy but at the upper edge of the funnels, or mast 
head, and finally at the very top of the mast. But that amounted 
to only a few hundred meters. After the battle of the Skagerrak 
our rancrs were considerably increased by all kinds of improve- 
ments. Now, however, we were powerless in front of the enemy 
and could return his fire. This condition lasted up to 0.17 p. m. 
At 6.10 p. m. our flagship executed a turn of several points to star- 
board. The enemv had apparently also turned and thus we were 
rapidly approaching each other again. At 9.19 p- rn. the range 
was again only 160 hectometers; 16 kilometers is in fact a pretty 
good distanre. but the good visibility and the verv clenr points 
of fall made these ranges appear to us really small. The Zeiss 
lenses in our periscopes were excellent. I was ab!e to make out, 
even at the greatest ranges, all the details of the enemv ships, 
for example, all the movements of the gun turrets and the indi- 
vidual toxins whif^h were brought to an annroximatelv horizontal 
position for loading after each shot. Before the war no one in 
our navy believed that it would be possible to fight efTectively 



20 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

at ranges above 150 hectometers. I recall clearly various war 
games which we had played before the war in the Casino at 
Kiel, under the direction of Admiral von Ingenolh, in which all 
effect from shots above 100 hectometers was ruled out on princi- 
ple. 

How did things seem to be going with the enemy at this 
time? At 6 p. m. his rear ship, the Invincible, was blown into 
the air. I did not see her, as my attention was fully absorbed in 
directing the fire against the second ship. It was also impossible 
to hear the noise of the explosion, which must have been great, 
owing to the internal uproar in our own ship and the noise made 
by the exploding enemy shells in our vicinity, though we were 
able to hear the report of the enemy salvos as a dull roar when 
our own guns were silent for a moment. In the after gun station 
the explosion of the Indefatigable was observed and recorded. 
The Indefatigable had been taken under fire by our end ship. Von 
der Tann, and destroyed by the excellent direct fire of that ship. 
The successful fire control officer of the Von der Tann was the 
first gunnery officer of that ship. Lieutenant Commander Mah- 
rhols. 

With the English ships, the northwest wind carried the 
smoke of their guns past their ship to windward.* In this way 
the view of the English was often obstructed and their firing 
made difficult. But as the conditions of visibility were still more 
unfavorable toward the east than toward the west, the English 
battle cruisers had decided to take up a position which was tacti- 
cally unfavorable. We were but little disturbed by the smoke 
from the enemy's guns, as it was sufficient with our stereoptical 
range finders if the range taker could see merely a little bit of the 
top of the mast. 

At 6.17 p. m. I again took the second battle cruiser under fire 
on the port hand. I supposed that it was the same ship, the 
Princess Royal, at which I had already been firing. As a matter 
of fact it was the Queen Mary, the third ship in the enemy Ime. 
This came about through Admiral Beatty's flagship, the Lion, 
dropping out of the enemy line for a short time just at the mom- 
ent that I was selecting my target, and owing to the smoke cover- 
ing the enemy line in its withdrawn position, this maneuver \vas 
not in any way visible to us. From the reports published later 
in the English papers, it appears that Admiral Beatty changed 
over from the Lion, whose conning tower had become useless, 
to the Princess Royal. He must have changed his flagship, there- 
fore, exactly as our own Admiral Hipper did somewhat later in 
the battle. Our flagship, the Luetzow, had kept the Lion con- 
tinuously under a vigorous and effective fire of explosive shell. 
The gunnery officer of the Luetzow had preferred to use up all 
his explosive shell before changing to another type of munition, 
owing to the unfavorable ballistic effects which this might have. 
The Lion had been forced to leave the line for a considerable 
time in order to extinguish the fires raging in her. It thus hap- 
pened that I was firing at the Queen Mary from 6.17 p. m. pn. 
Certain difficulties in conducting the fire now arose, owing to the 
thick smoke from the powder and from the funnels collecting on 
the glasses of the periscope above the deck of the gun station, so 
that it became almost impossible to see anything. At such mom- 

*The term "feuer luv" is used in battle to indicate the side from which 
the firing is done. The side turned away from the enemy is called feuer lee. 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 21 

ents I had to depend entirely upon the observations of the gun- 
nery observation otlicer in the lore top, Lieut, von Stosch. This 
excellent oliicer observed and reported the tall ot the shot with 
astonishing coolness and self possession. And his excellent spot- 
ting ot the shot, upon the accuracy of which I could absolutely 
depend, contributed not a little to the success of our guns. Wtiile 
we could see nothing, Lieut, von Stosch in his airy perch, 35 
meters above the suriace of the water, kept his periscope accur- 
ately trained on the enemy. A control system indicated on my 
periscope the bearing of the fore-top periscope. My gun pointer 
followed this bearing with his indicator and in this way we 
aimed all our guns on the enemy without being able to see him. 
Naturaly this was merely an expedient. Ensign Bartels, who 
stood near me in the gun station and who aided me during bat- 
tle by calling out the averaged ranges by the aid of my range- 
difference indicator and by observing the enemy through the 
lookout slits was always very quick in coming to my aid by wip- 
ing off the glasses from the gun station with cleaning rods which 
he had specialy prepared for that purpose. In later phases of 
the battle, as the water thrown up by the enemy shell frequently 
broke over the ship and the thick smoke constantly adhered to the 
wet glasses, he had to clean the glasses almost after every shot 
Finally, the cleaning rods themselves became soiled, and with a 
heavy heart I frequently had to send a man to the roof of the 
conning station to clean the glasses, where he was fully exposed 
to the danger of being hit by the enemy's shells or fragments of 
explosives. This duty was generally performed by my orderly 
(messenger) from the gun artificers' crew, Aitilicer Meyer, who 
had remained on the forward bridge near the gun station during 
the entire battle until finally fate overtook him and a fragment 
of shell shattered his leg below the knee. 

As I have stated above, from 6.10 p. m. on both lines were 
steering a slightly converging course toward the south. At 6.15 
p. m. we observed that the enemy was sending out his torpedo 
boats for attack. A little later ovu- torpedo boats and the small 
cruiser Regensburg broke through our line and rushed forward 
for attack. A small independent naval battle now developed be- 
tween the two lines of contending battle cruisers. About 25 Eng- 
lish destroyers and an equal number of German destroyers en- 
gaged in a stubborn fight with their guns and thus prevented 
either side from making successful use of the torpedo boat against 
the battle cruisers. About 6.30 p. m. both sides fired a few tor- 
pedoes against the line, but without results. For us this battle of 
the torpedo boats was a magnificent sight. 

The two lines constantly drew nearer to each other during 
this torpedo-boat battle, and now the most interesting gunnery 
duel of the entire day took place. I saw that the Queen Mary 
had selected the Derfflinger as target. The Queen Mary fired 
more slowly than we, but to make up for this usually fired full 
salvos. As she was armed with eight 34.5 centimeter guns, this 
meant that she usually discharged at us simultaneously eight of 
the enormous shells which the Russians called "trunks" in the 
Russo-Japanese war. I saw the shells approaching and must 
state that the enemy fired very well. All eight shots usually fell 
very close together, but almost always were either over or short; 
onW twice did the infernal hail descend fully on the Derfflinger, 
and even then only one shell hit each time. 

We fired as if we were at target practice. The head tele- 



22 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

phones worked beautifully. Every one of my orders were cor- 
rectly understood. Lieut, von Stosch; announced with deadly 
certainty the exact position of the impacts. "On; two hits!" "On; 
the entire salvo hit the ship!" 

I endeavored always to fire two salvos for the enemy's one. 
I was not always able to do this, as the enemy fired his full sal- 
vos with marvelous rapidity. I observed that the gunnery officer 
on the Queen Mary was firing with central control by means of 
the celebrated Percy Scott "firing director," as all the guns were 
fired absolutely simultaneously and the shell therefore fell at the 
same moment. The English gunnery officer was apparently 
standing in the foretop where he was able to see over the svi^' ^ 
of the guns and from there fired by electricity. This possibility 
meant a great advantage for the English ships. Unfortunately 
we had not devised arrangements for indirect firing from the 
foretop until led to do so by the lessons of the battle. I myself 
later contributed not a little of the introduction of indirect shoot- 
ing in our navy, and also conducted the first indirect firing from 
the Derfflinger in accordance with the process invented by me 
which was later generally introduced under the name of the "Der- 
fflinger process." 

The Queen Mary and the Derfflinger waged a regular gun- 
nery duel above the torpedo battle raging between us, but the 
poor Queen Mary had a hard time of it. In addition to the Der- 
fflinger, the Seidlitz was also firing at her. The gunnery officer 
of the Seidlitz, Lieut. Commander Foerster, was one of our ablest 
gunners, who had been tested in all the previous engagements of 
the ship and was cool-blooded and of quick decision. The Seid- 
litz had only 28-centimeter guns on board. These projectiles 
could not penetrate the thickest armor of the Queen Mary. But 
each ship had thinly armored portions, the perforation of which 
by the 28-centimeter shell, could produce great damage. 

The good functioning of our impact indicators prevented Lieut, 
von Stosch and me from ever confusing our points of all with 
those of the 28-centimeter guns of the Seidlitz. As the ranges 
were always greater than 130 hectometers, the 15-centimeter guns 
of both ships could not then be used in the fight against the 
Queen Mary. A simultaneous bombardment of the same enemy 
by two ships was only possible when each ship used only its 
heavy guns. If both the 15-centimeter batteries had meanwhile 
ben firing, no one could have distinguished the impacts from each 
other. 

About 6.26 p. m. ocurred the historical moment in which the 
Queen Mary, the proudest ship of the English fieet, met her end. 

From 6.24 p. m. on, each one of our salvos had landed on 
that ship. The salvo fired at 6 hours 26 minutes 10 seconds p. m. 
fell after the terrific explosion had begun inside the Queen Mary. 
At first a yellowish red flame appeared in the forepart of the 
ship. This was followed by an explosion, which in turn was 
succeded bv a much more violent explosion amidships, which 
hurled black pieces of the ship into the air, and immediately 
therafter, the entire ship was shattered by a terrific explosion. 
Enormous clouds of smoke were developed. The mass fell to- 
gether amidships; the smoke covered everything and rose higher 
and higher. Finally, nothing remained where the vessel had been 
but a "thick black cloud of smoke. At the water line this cloud 
of smoke was of small extent but it broadened as it leaped into 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 23 

space and seemed almost like a huge pine tree. The column of 
smoke, according to ray estimate, was trom 300 to 400 meters 
in height. 

In the Times of 9 July, 1916, a gun captain on board the Tiger, 
which ship was astern of the Queen Mary in the battie, wrote 
ihe following description of the sinking of the Queen Mary: 

"As the German squadron again engaged us it concentrated 
all its guns on the Queen Mary. They had tried in vain for the 
correct range for several minutes, but suddenly something re- 
markable happened; each sheil which the German fired seemed 
suddenly to hit the battle cruiser. It was almost as if a cyclone 
was devastating a forest. The Queen Mary seemed to roll over 
slowly to starboard; her mast and funnels were gone; a huge hole 
yawned in her side. She listed still further. The hole in her 
side disappeared under the water which now rushed in, and the 
ship capsized. A minute and a half more and all that could be 
seen of the Queen Mary was her keel; then that also disappeared." 

Later in the day our torpedo boats picked up two survivors 
of the Queen Mary and took them as prisoners to Wilhelmshaven; 
one was an ensign and the other a seaman. According to them, 
more than 1,400 men were on board the Queen Marv, amon^ whom 
was a Japanese prince, the naval attache at London. The com- 
mander of the Queen Mary was Capt. C. J. Prowse. The Eng- 
lish Admiralty stated in its report of officers lost on board the 
Queen Mary: "With the exception of four ensigns, all officers 
present on board were lost." 

No sooner had the Queen Mary disappeared in a cloud of 
smoke than I looked about with my periscope for a new target. 
I swung the periscope to the left and to my surprise saw that 
tv/o battle cruisers were still there. I then realized for the first 
time that I had been firing at the third ship. The Lion had in the 
meantime placed herself at the head of the enemy line. Our tar- 
get was once more on the Princess Royal. 

One minute and five seconds had therefore elapsed since the 
last salvo had fallen on the Queen Mary to the first salvo fired at 
the Princess Royal. I had had the range of the latter ship meas- 
ured by the range taker in the gun station. The measured range 
was only 122 hectometers. I fired the first salvo with this ran^qe, 
but it fell short; likewise the next two salvos, so that I increased 
the range considerably for the fourth salvo. The range taker 
had apparently not at once realized that the range was no longer 
decreasing but on the contrary was rapidly increasing after the 
sinking of the Queen Mary. It appears in the record from the 
constantly changing deflections that the ship was steering a very 
irregular course, and that she turned out to port. The enemy 
was taking his bearings now somewhat more carefully. There 
was no prospect of a succesful rapid fire. As a rule a full min- 
ute elapsed between salvos. We had to wait each time to ob- 
serve the points of fall. When we had observed them, new com- 
mands had to be given usually for deflection and range, and for 
the sight periscope. 

At 6.36 the range was 168 hectometers. 

Meanwhile we saw that the enemy was being reinforced. 
Four large shins appeared behind the line of battle cruisers. We 
son recognized them as shins of the Queen Elizabeth class. We 
had often discussed these ships in the navy. They were battle- 



24 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ships powerfully armed with eight 38.1 centimeter guns, with 
a displacement of 28,000 tons, and a speed of 25 knots. Their 
speed, therefore, differed very little from ours — 26 knots — but 
they fired projectUes almost twice as heavy as om-s. They en- 
gaged in battle at enormous ranges. We now received a violent 
fire and henceforth steered continuously a zigzag course. From 
6.36 p. m. to 6.45 p. m. I did not fire at all with heavy guns. This 
was chiefly due to the smoke produced by the torpedo-boat en- 
gagement, which kept up between the two lines and our torpedo 
defense guns which were now brought into use by the third gun- 
nery officer, Lieut. Hausser. Some of the English torpedo boats 
were now pushing their attack to devilishly close quarters. As 
I could see nothing of the large ships, I had ample opportunity to 
observe the surging of the battle. It was a marvelous picture. 
Now the Regensburg, with Commander Heinrich on board, the 
former commander of the Derfflinger, surged ahead of our lines 
at the head of the flotilla, maintaining a rapid fire at the same 
time our torpedo boats and the enemy boats closed in to the 
shortest ranges. I saw two of our boats lying dead in the water. 
They were looking badly and it was clear that they were doomed. 
Other boats came alongside in the midst of the fire, and took off 
the entire crews. One English destroyer sunk, others lay dead 
in the water unable to move. Our 15-centimeter salvos crashed 
forth incessantly. Lieut. Hausser got the range of several boats 
which he attacked one after the other with telling effect. On one 
boat he made visible hits; the boat stopped suddenly, and then 
disappeared in a ploud of smoke. 

What a pity that we had no marine painter on board with 
us. The celebrated painter of marine views, Kaus Bergen, had 
often accompanied us on our sweeps in the North Sea. This time 
something had prevented him from doing so. He regretted this 
very much, but nevertheless he has become the most successful 
painter of the battle of the Skagerrak. Unfortunately, we were 
also strictly forbidden to take photographs on board. No appa- 
ratus for this purpose was allowed on board ship. This was done 
in an effort to protect ourselves against spying. That is why not 
a single picture was taken in the entire German fleet during the 
battle of the Skagerrak. 

The recorder in the secondary battery central. Ensign Hauth, 
who had kept excellent records throughout the entire fight had 
noted the following, while the torpedo boat defense guns were 
being used: 

"6.36 p. m.. Secondary on the torpedo boats. By aim indica- 
tor. 60 hundred. On the torpedo boat farthest to left. Fire. 
70 hundred. Fire. 64 hundred. Fire. 60 hundred. Fire. Fire. 
Good; rapidity. Fire. Fire. Fire. 

6.42 p. m.. Secondary battery stand by (abwarten). 68 hun- 
dred. Fire. 55 hundred. Fire. 50 hundred. Fire. Fire. 56 
hundred. Fire. Fire. 70 hundred. Fire. 68 hundred. Good; 
rapidity. Fire. Fire. Fire. 70 hundred. Fire. Fire. 

6.45 p. m., Shios turns to port. Fire. 80 hundred. Fire. 84 
hundred. Fire. Fire. 

6.48 p. m., secondary battery stand by!" 

At 6.48 p. ra., the torpedo boat defensive fire ceased and at 
6.50 the entire formation altered course to north-northwest. This 
maneuver brought Admiral Hipper, with the battle cruisers about 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 2S 

7 miles to the fore of the head of our battleships which were 
steering a course about north-northwest at maximum speed, and 
whose head immediately thereafter engaged in the attack on the 
ships of the Queen Elizabeth class. 

We learned later froui the numerous hits with 10.5 centimeter 
shell that the English torpedo boats also had sujected us to a 
pretty intense fire. In the general confusion of the battle this 
had escaped me. The 10.5 centimeter shell naturally exploded 
without effect against our armor and only on unarmored portions 
of the ship did they do any damage, especially in the rigging 
where they destroyed our radio antennae and some gun telephone 
connections. One officer found an unexploded 10.5 centimeter 
shell in his bunk after the battle when he was about to turn in. 

Between 6.45 p. m. and 6.50 p. m., I had fired eight salvos 
at 180 hundred with heavy guns, at the Princess Royal, but ap- 
parently without any noticeable success. 

Our sudden turn to north-northwest course brought the head 
of our third skuadron into view, the proud ships of the Koenig 
class. Everyone breathed somewhat more easily. Having had 
in addition to the battle cruisers the five British dreadnaughts 
in front of us with their 38's, it had not been so very comfortable 
for us. , , 

At 6.50 p. m. I announced to the guns "Ship is turning slowly 
to starboard! Our third squadron is herel" 

Thus ended the first part of the battle. We had seen an 
English dreadnaught fly to pieces under our fire like an exploded 
powder cask. The Derfflinger, however, emerged from the battle 
with her fighting powers undimished. 

What wonder that we thought of new battles with the high- 
est courage and full confidence of victory. We were in close 
battle contact with our best battleship squadron and we believed 
that we had opposite us only the four remaining battle cruisers 
and the four ships of the Queen Elizabeth class. Flushed with 
the pride of victory, we hoped to demolish the entire enemy 
force opposing us. We had acquired unshaken confidence in pur 
ships. It seemed to us absolutely impossible that our proud ves- 
sels could be smashed to pieces in a few minutes like the Queen 
Mary and the Indefatigable had been. On the contrary, I had 
the feeling that we could cause each English vessel to explode 
in a very short time. If only our ship would steer a constant 
course for a time and the range was not too gi'eat; if possible, 
not over 150 hundred. We were eager to win new laurels. The 
high enthusiasm running through the ship was perceptible to 
everyone. The gun crews had done marvelous work by always 
having their guns ready, even during the most rapid fire, immed- 
iately the gong sounded. At the end of an hour of continuous 
firing, the gun tubes were already very hot, and their gray paint 
began to smoulder and turn brown and yellow. The calm man- 
ner in which the commanding officer had managed the ship also 
had an excellent effect. He had often helped me with information, 
but on the whole had given me a free hand, especially as to the 
choice of the enemy ship at which I was to fire. 

The Second Phase of the Battle of the Skagerrak (6.55 p. m. to 
7.05 p. m.) — Engagement with the Fifth Battleship Squadron — 
Beatty's Flanking Maneuver. 
The first phase of the battle was gratifying and from the 



26 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

gunnery point of view interesting; the second gave us as great 
For dissatisfaction as the first did for rejoicing. The enemy had 
come to have a profound respect for the effect of our shots, and 
now in the wild chase to the north had held himself as far as 
possible beyond our range, keeping us meanwhile within the 
reach of his own long-range guns. It will be seen from Sketch 
I that the ranges during the second phase of the battle scarcely 
fell below 180 hectometers. I fired only for the purpose of as- 
certaining whether or not the enemy was really out of range. In 
doing this I limited myself to individual shots from a single turret, 
in order to save ammunition. The upper edge of the funnels or 
masts were used as the point of aim for our guns. The enemy's 
fire also was not good at these long ranges. It is true, his saiyps 
fell close together with a dispersion at most of from three to four 
hundred meters, but the fire control was not very successful, per- 
haps owing to poor visibility; at any rate, saivos as a rule fell 
at very irregular distances from our ship. Nevertheless, we al- 
ready had received some bad hits, and two or three heavy shells 
struck us during this phase of the battle. Whenever a heavy 
shell struck the armor of our ship, the crash and detonation was 
followed by a vibration of the entire ship, and even our conning 
tower trembled. The explosion of the shell inside the ship pro- 
duced a more muffled report which was propagated throughout 
the ship by numberless speaking tubes and telephones. 

The four English battle cruisers were running to the north- 
ward, and because of their superior speed we were not able to 
keep up with them. At 7.21 p. m. the commander in chief made 
the signal "Take the battle cruisers in pursuit!" Our battle crui- 
ser squadron, however, could not maintain more than 25 knpts 
for any length of time, and the English were fleeing easily at 28 
knots. We did not at time entirely understand the object of the 
enemy's maneuver. We supposed that he was hastening to join 
his main body, which the maneuver of the English cruisers had 
led us to understand was somewhere near. As a matter of fact, 
Admiral Beatty, by fully turning our flank while we were run- 
ning at a maximum speed, and finally encircling us, had executed 
a magnificient maneuver, and his ships had shown a marvelous 
tactical efficiency. He had succeeded in crossing the T in an 
absolutely perfect manner. By capping us, he had compelled us 
to turn out, and thus finally brought us entirely within the circle 
of the English battleships and battle cruisers. In the latter phase 
of the battle, we could no longer as a rule distinguish individual 
enemy ships that happened to be in front of our guns; I can not 
therefore sav with certainty at what time or if at all we later 
engaged Beatty's four battle cruisers. 

After the gradual disappearance of the four battle cruisers, 
we were still confronted by the four powerful ships of the fifth 
battle squadron, the Malaya, the Valiant, the Barham, and the 
Warspite. 

They could not have been making very much speed at this 
time, as they soon came within range of our third squadron and 
were taken under fire bv its leading ships, especially by the flag- 
ship Koenig. The four English battleships thus at times came un- 
der fire of at least nine German ships, of which five were battle 
cruisers and perhaps four or five battleships. According to my 
firing record, we fired from 7.16 p. m. at the second battleship 
from the risht, thence at the ship following the enemv leading 
ship. I had the guns fired at this great range with explosive shell. 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 27 

The second phase of the battle passed without any great in- 
cidents for us. In certain respects this engagement with an en- 
emy inferior in numbers but superior in fighting power, who held 
us under fire at ranges at which we could not reach him, was in 
the highest degree depressing, nerve racking, and harrowing. 
Our only means of defense was to drop out of the line for a 
moment when we observed that the enemy had gotten our range 
accurately. As the enemy could not foretell these movements, y/e 
quickly escaped from the hail of shell. I should state here that 
these small changes in course for the purpose of evading the 
enemy's rain of shell are not entered in the sketch, as we always 
immediately returned to our former position in the battle hue at 
maximum speed. 

Very soon after this conditions were greatly changed. 

The Third Phase of the Battle of the Skaggerak (7.50 p. m, to 9 
p. m.) — Hot Engagement with Battleships, Cruisers, and Torpedo 
Boats— Destruction of the "Invincible"— The "Derfflinger" 
Forced to Stop to Clear Away her Torpedo Nets. 

At 7.40 p. m. enemy small cruisers and destroyers started an 
attack with torpedo boats. We were steering a course north- 
northeast at the time; that is, about six points to starboard. 

The visibility was now quite poor, so that it was difficult 
to see the English ships. We fired at the small cruisers and tor- 
pedo boats. At 7.55 p. m. we turned to the east, and at 8 o clock 
the entire battle-cruiser squadron moved off in echelon on a south- 
erly course as the torpedo boats attacked us. In this way we 
avoided the enemy's torpedoes very successfully. At 8.12 p. m. we 
again turned toward the enemy. During this time we had hred 
only occasionally with the main and secondary batteries. At 
8 15 p m. we received a heavy fire. All about us were flashes of 
light. We could make out the ships' hull only indistinctly, but 
everywhere I could see along the horizon were enemy ships. As 
I could not see which was the beginning and which was the end 
of the enemy line, I could not take "the second ship from the 
right" under fire, but selected a ship which I could see particularly 
well. And now a bitter fight began. In a short time the uproar 
of battle reached its height. It was perfectly clear to us now that 
we had opposing us the entire English fleet. I realized at once bY 
its huge huU that I had taken a giant battleship under fire. 
Cruiser and torpedo-boat engagement still raged between the two 
lines. Suddenlv I saw in my periscope a German small cruiser 
nass by me in flames. I recognized the Wiesbaden. She was 
almost entirely shrouded in smoke, with only her stern showing, 
and the gun stationed there was firing incessantly at a small 
English cruiser. Brave Wiesbaden. Valiant crew of this good 
shin Only a fireman, Zeene, was rescued by a Norwegian hshing 
boat, after he had drifted for three days on a raft; all the rest, 
including the poet, Gorch Fock, who loved the sea so deeply, had 
crowned their service to Emperor and country with a seaman s 
death The Wiesbaden was eff"ectively shelled by an English 
small cruiser. Again and again the shells hit the poor Wiesbaden. 
Furv seized me, and I abandoned my previous target, had the 
range of the English small cruiser measured, announced the range 
and deflection, and "Bang"— a salvo wWstled over the tormentor 
of the Wiesbaden. One more salvo, and I had him. A high column 
of fire shot up to heaven. Apparently a powder room had ex- 



M THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ploded. The cruiser turned out and fled at high speed during 
which time I sent two or three more salvos after him. At this 
moment Lieut. Commander Hausser, who had been firing at the 
torpedo boat with the secondary battery, asked me: "Sir, is this 
cruiser with the four funnels a German or an English cruiser?" 
I directed my periscope at the ship and examined it. In the 
gray light the color of the German and the English ships looked 
almost exactly the same. The cruiser was not at all far from us. 
She had four funnels and two masts exactly like our Rostock, 
who was with us. "It is certainly English," exclaimed Lieut. 
Commander Hausser; "May I fire?" "Yes; fire away." I became 
convinced that it was a large English ship. The secondary guns 
were aimed at the new target and Lieut. Hausser commanded: "60 
hundred." At the moment in which he was about to order 
"Fire!" something horrible, terrific, happened. The English ship, 
which I meanwhile supposed to be an old English battle cruis.er, 
broke asunder, and an enormous explosion, black smoke, and 
pieces of the ship whirled upward, and flame swept through the 
entire ship, which then disappeared before our eyes beaneath the 
water. Nothing was left to indicate the spot where a moment 
before a proud ship had been fighting, except an enormous clould 
of smoke. According to my opinion, the vessel was destroyed by 
the fire of the ship just ahead of us, the Luetzow, the flagship of 
Admiral Hipper. 

All this took place much more rapidly than the time taken in 
the telling. The whole thing lasted only a few seconds, and thcp. 
we had already engaged a new target. The destroyed ship was 
the Defense, one of the older armored cruisers of the same tvpc 
as the Black Prince, which was sunk by gunfire during the fol- 
lowing night by the Thueringen and other battleships. The ship 
displaced 14,800 tons, was armed with six 23,4-centimeter and 
ten 15.2-centimeter guns, and had a crew of 700 men. Of the crew 
not a single soul was rescued. The ship was blown into atoms 
and every living being was destroyed by the explosion. As we 
saw the ship in a good light at a comparatively short distance 
from us and magnified 15 times by our periscope, we could ob- 
serve the occurrence very accurately. I shell never forget tlii:; 
sight in all its gruesomeness. 

I continued to fire at the large ships. I no longer had any 
idea what ships they were. A 8.22 p. m. we turned into a south- 
west course, but in the poor conditions of visibility and the con- 
fusion of battle now prevailing, I had no longer any correct grasp 
of the tactical conditions. At one time it flashed through my mind, 
"May it not be German ships that we are firing at?" Then the 
visibility, which varied from minute to minute but which on the 
whole was gradually growing worse, became somewhat better, 
and one could clearly recognize the typical English contours and 
the dark gray color of theif paint. I am of the opinion that our 
light gray paint is better than the dark color of the English. Qur 
ships disapoeared much more quickly in the thin mists which 
were now drifting from east to west. 

At 8.25 p. m., Lieut v. d. Decken reported from the after con- 
ning tower: "Heavy hit in the fore part of the Liietzow; ship 
burning; much smoke." At 8.30 p. m. he reported: "Three heavy 
hits on the Derffiinger." One of these hits had struck the second 
15-centimeter casemate gun on the port side, passed through the 
gun near the center, the fragments of the explosion killing or 
wounding the greater part of the casemate personnel. Frag- 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 29 

ments of the explosion had also thrown the first 15-centimeter gun 
off its carriage and killed or wounded several men in the llrst 
casemate. The other heavy hits fell in the after part of the ship. 

I now sought my target as far forward as possible at the 
head of the enemy line. I noticed that the Luetzow was now lir- 
ing weakly. The fires raging in the fore part of the Luetzow 
made it almost impossible to direct the gunfire. 

From 8.24 p. m. on I fired at the enemy battleships in a north- 
easterly direction. The ranges were short, 60 to 70 hectometers, 
but in spite of this the ships often disappeared from view in the 
thick mist resulting from weather conditions and the smoke from 
stacks and guns. 

It was almost impossible to observe the points of fall. All 
the projectiles which fell beyond the target were practically in- 
visible to us, and we gained a fairly correct idea only of the points 
of fall which were somewhat short. This helped one, however, 
mighty little. If the gun were again fired at the target according 
to such points of fall, the white columns of water were no longer 
visible and one knew absolutely nothing as to where one had 
really struck. I fired according to the measurements of the range 
taker in the gunnery station. Seaman Hanel, my trusted man for 
the past five years. Owing to the thick weather, the measure- 
ments were very irregular and incorrect. But as I was without 
observations, I was forced to fire slowly by these measurements. 
Meanwhile, we were receiving heavy and well-placed rapid fire 
from several ships simultaneouly. It was obvious that the en- 
emy could now see us much better than we could see him. To 
those who have ever been at sea this statement will seem ambig- 
uous. As a matter of fact, however, the differences in visibilit> 
at sea in weather of this kind vary greatly. Persons on board 
a vessel enveloped in mist can make out a vessel silhouetted 
against a clear horizon much more distinctly than the latter can 
make out the vessel enveloped in mist. The position of the sun 
plays an important part in visibilitv conditions. In misty weath- 
er the ships which have their shaded side toward the eneni^' arc 
much more plainlv visible than those on which the light shines. 

Thus it was that the battle became an unequal, bitter strug- 
gle. Several heavv hits fell with terrific force on our shios and 
exploded with a terrible report. The entire ship trembled i'l 
everv joint at the impact of the shell. The commanding officer 
fretruentlv swerved out of line to avoid the hail of shell. It was 
no easy firing. 

This lasted up to 8.29 p. m. 

At this moment the veil of mist lifted as if it had been the 
curtain of a theater. In front of us, in the middle of the clear 
portion of the horizon, in full view, and distinctly outlined, stood 
an enormous battleship with two funnels between the masts and 
a third funnel close up against the forward tripod mast. She was 
steaming at full speed on a course about parellel to our own. 
Her guns were aimed at us, and again a salvo burst forth which 
fully covered us. "Measurement 90 hundred," shouted Seaman 
Hanel. "90 hundred! Salvo — firel" I commanded, and with 
feverish anxiety I awaited the result. "Over! Two hits!" cried 
Lieut. Stosch. I commanded: "One back! Good; rapidity!" and 
in 30 seconds after the first salvo the second left the guns. I 
observed two shorts and two hits. Lieut. Stosch shouted, "Hit!" 
Every 20 seconds now a salvo thundered forth. At 8.31 p. m. 



30 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

the Derfflinger fired her last salvo at this ship, and then there 
took place before our eyes, for the third time, the horribxe sight 
which we had witnessed in the case of the Queen Mary and the 
Defense. As with the other two ships, several enormous explosio x 
followed each other rapidly, masts tell over, fragments of the 
ship whirled through the air, a huge black cloud of smoke rose 
toward the heavens, and out of the disintegrating ship coal dust 
was scattered in all directions. Flames swept over her, new ex- 
plosions took place, and then our opponent disappeared from view 
In a black cloud. I called through the telephone, "The enemy has 
Jjlown up I" and in the midst of the uproar of battle a thundering 
hurrah passed through the ship, which was repeated by all the 
telephones of the gun station and transmitted from battle station 
to battle station. I breathed a short, intense prayer of thanks to 
heaven^ and called out to my man, "Bravo, Hanel: splendidly 
measured I" and then gave my command: "Change target to the 
left, on the second battle cruiser from the right!" and the battle 
went on. 

Who had our enemy been? I did not spend much time won- 
dering about this, but I had supposed the ship to be an English 
battle cruiser. I had designated her as such in determining my 
range as it appeared from the record made by the recorder in 
central. There was no time for discussing the type, so long as 
we were firing at the ship. There were only a few minutes dur- 
ing which we might have identified her. Only the officers and 
gun captains, together with the torpedo officers, had observed 
the ship when she flew into the air. The attention of the com- 
manding officer and his helpers, the navigating and signal ofti- 
cers, was entirely taken up with the management of the ship 
in cruising formation. It was difficult to keep place behind thf^ 
Luetzow, which was scarcely able to keep her positio,; 
line. 

In writing up the report of the battle afterwards, the ma- 
jority of the officers believed that the vessel was a ship of the 
Queen Elizabeth class. I felt sure that she was a ship of the 
Invincible class, but I yielded the point, as I was not sufficiently 
certain. When we examined a fleet pocket manual and com- 
pared the silhouettes of the Invincible and those of the Queen 
Elizabeth class, the similarity was at once striknigly apparent. 
We therefore stated in our report of the battle that at 8.30 p. m. 
we had destroyed with our gun fire a battleship of the Queen 
Elizabeth class. Our service record in the report of the battle ran: 
"The vessel was blown up in the same manner as the Queen 
Mary, at 6.26 p. m." Reliable observation by the first and third 
sunnery officer and the first torpedo officer in the forward sta- 
tion bv the second and fourth gunnery officer and bv the sec- 
ond 'torpedo officer in the after station, arid by the spotter in the 
foretop "Ship of the Queen Elizabeth class." 

The English prisoners stated at Wilhelmhaven, after the 
battle: "One of the Queen Elizabeth ships, the Warspite, listing 
heavily, had left the line and had withdrawn to the northwest. 
At 8 p. m. the English destroyer, Turbulent, picked up the wire- 
less report that the Warspite had sunk. 

On the basis of our report of the battle, and of this statement 
by the English prisoner, we then believed that the vessel destroyed 
hv the Derfflinger had been the Warspite, and therefore reported 
the Warspite as the lost enemy ship instead of the Invincible. 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 31 

We first learned of the destruction of the Invincible from the 
reports of the English Admiralty, and naturally she was added 
later to the list of losses reported. As a matter of fact, we had 
been fighting with the Invincible; it was the Invincible which 
blew up under our lire, and not the Warspite. English reports 
soon proved this clearly enough. 

As early as 3 June, the following appeared in the Manchester 
Guardian: "The German Admiralty report of 1 June contains a 
detailed and very correct account of the English losses — with 
the exception that it mentions the name of the battleship War- 
spite instead of the battle cruiser Invincible." The Times report 
of 16 June, 1916, gives statements of the participants in the 
battle: "The Invincible, the flagship of Admiral Hood, the second 
admiral after Sir David Beatty, engaged the Hindenburg, and after 
a hot fight, in which, according to the accounts of some ol our 
people, the Hindenburg received her deathblow, the Invincible 
sank beneath the waves." 

The Hindenburg was at that time under construction; the 
Derfflinger was her sister ship, and everything thus agrees wiih 
the English account except the name of the ship. It was the 
Derfflinger and not her still unfinished sister ship, the Hinden- 
burg, that had fought with the Invincible. 

One of the two rescued English officers of the Invincible gave 
a very correct account, especially as regards the time of day of 
the gunnery duel between the Derfflinger and the Invincible. 
The Times of 12 June, 1916, contains the following statement re- 
garding this engagement: "The father of one of the lieutenants 
who went down with the Invincible received a letter from the 
two surviving officers of the ship in which the following state- 
ment occurs: 'Your son was serving with the admiral and we 
were in the action with the battle cruiser Derfflinger. At 8,34 
p, m. a frightful explosion took place, the ship broke in half and 
sunk in 10 or 15 seconds.' " 

On 13 June, 1916, the Times reported: "A letter from the 
brother of Lieut. Charles Fisher stated: 'We learned from Lieut, 
Commander Dannreuther, the sole survivor of H. M. S. Invincible, 
that a shell struck in the powder room and produced a terrific 
explosion there. When Dannreuther returned to consciousness 
he was floating in the water; ship and crew had disappeared.' " 

That the vessels which I fired upon from 8.24 p. m. on ranges 
of from 6,000 to 7.000 meters, were battle cruisers of Hood's squad- 
ron is shown by the official report of Admiral Beattv. He reports 
concerning the attack of the third battle cruiser squadron, con- 
sisting of the Invincible, Indomitable, and Inflexible, as follows: 

"At 8.21 p, m. I ordered the third battle cruiser squndron to 
take its position at the head. This maneuver was splendidly ex- 
ecuted by Rear Admiral Hood, who brought his souadron to the 
head during battle in the most tvpical manner, worthy of his long 
experience at sea. At 8.25 p. m. I chani?ed course to east-southeast 
in order to support the third battle cruiser squadron which at this 
moment was onlv 73 hectometers from the leading enemy ship. 
Thev were pouring a violent fire into the souadron and forced 
it out of its southerly course farther toward the west." 

On 5 .Tune, 1916, a Renter disnatch from Edinborough (press 
te^ppram. 5 Ju"p) sfpfesr "When the hnttle hnd b°en poins on for 
a few hours, the Indomitable, Invincible, and Inflexible appeared. 



32 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

This portion of the battle was principally a duel between the 
heaviest guns. The Invincible, after fighting bravely and in- 
tiicting considerable damage on the enemy, met her fate and 
sunk." 

I mention these English reports of the battle with the Invin- 
cible with so much fmlness here in conjunction with my own 
account of the battle, because in the German reports iiithefio 
published the question of whether the Invincible was destroyed 
by gun fire or by a torpedo was left open. For historicai rea- 
sons, if for no other, I consider it necessary to establish the iaci 
that the Invincible, as well as all the other ships which the 
English lost in the battle, were destroyed by gunfire. 

Admiral Hood, commander of the third battle cruiser squad- 
ron who went down with the Invincible, was a descendant of 
the famous English Admiral Hood who won great renown as a 
strategist and tactician in the North American revolution under 
Graves and Rodney, and later as commander in chief in the 
battie of St. Christopher (1782). During the English-French war, 
lasting from 1792 to 1802, he commanded the Mediterranean fleet 
during 1793-94, and occupied Toulon in 1793. 

Our heavy guns fired up to 8.33 p. m., according to the rec- 
ords kept by my recorder. At 8.38 p. m. we had turned sharply 
to the west. After the loss of their leader, the remaining ships 
of the third battle squadron did not again venture in our imme- 
diate vicinity. At 8.50 p. m. the entire ship was ordered to cease 
firing. A feverish activity began in an effort to extinguish the 
numerous fires in the ship. We observed a torpedo boat steer 
up alongside the Luetzow. The Luetzow was listing and vvas 
down deeply by the bow. Numerous clouds of smoke were 
pouring from the fore part of the ship. Admiral Hipper left the 
vessel. The torpedo boat cast off and steered for the Seydlitz. 
In passing the Derfflinger the admiral signaled: "Commander of 
the Derfflinger will take command until I am again on board 
ship." Thus it happened that our commanding officer was now 
leader of the battle cruisers, and he continued in this capacity 
until 11 p. m., when the admiral finally succeeded in getting on 
board another ship. Tlfis he had not been able to accomplish 
sooner as the battle cruisers had been almost continuously under 
enemy fire, steaming at high speed. 

The Derfflinger herself now presented a pretty bad appear- 
ance. The masts and all the rigging were badly damaged by 
fragments of explosion, the antennae hung down in wild con- 
fusion so that we were able to use our wireless only for receiving. 
It was therefore impossible to send any regular messages. A 
heavy shot had torn away the armor plates of the bow, leaving 
an enormous hole at least 6 by 5 meters in size just above the 
water line. Water continuously flowed in through this bole whtn 
the ship pitched. 

While we were steering to the west, the first officer came 
upon the bridge and reported the commander: "The ship must 
be stopped at once. The torpedo net has been shot awtsy aft 
and hangs directly over port screws; it must be cleared awav.' 
The commander order: "All engines stopped." I scanned the 
horizon, far and wide, with my periscope. At this moment the 
enemy was nowhere to be seen. We were as yet only loosely 
in touch with the Seydlitz, the Moltke, and the Von Der Tann; 
now they hastened up and again took their prescribed positions. 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 33 

It was a most dangerous thing to be compelled to stop here in 
the immediate vicinity of the enemy. But if our torpedo net 
should get foul of the screw we would be lost. How we had 
railed on board because we had not discarded these heavy steti 
torpedo nets, weighing several hundred ions. As we almost 
never anchored in the open sea, they were useless. Moreover 
they protected only certain portions of the ship against torpedo 
attack and at sea represented a very great danger, since in the 
suspended condition they greatly diminished the speed of the 
ship and were almost certain to become entangled in her pro- 
pellers, which was equivalent to the destruction of the vessel. 
For these reasons the English had abandoned their torpedo nets 
shortly before the war. We did not do so until immediatelv after 
the battle of Skagerrak. 

The boatswain and turret crew of the turrets Dora and Cae- 
sar, under the leadership of Lieut, (junior grade) von Bolteu- 
stern, worked like mad to raise the net, secure it with chains, 
and make fast all loose cables and chains. A few minutes later 
came the announcement: "Engines can run again." And we 
were once more immediately under way. The Luetzow had now 
left the line and was steering a course to the south at slow speed. 
The commander tried to signal to the other ships: "Follow the 
leader." But all means of signaling had been rendered useless. 
The signal yards were all damaged, the flags at the battle stations 
were burned, and the signal searchlights had been shot away. 
Our brave comrades in arms, however, followed without signal 
when the commander .now led the batUe cruisers on the north- 
erly course before the head of our main body. 

The pause in the battle lasted until 9.05 p. m.; then shots 
were again suddenly heard, and once more there rang through 
the ship the order "Clear ship for action 1" 

The Fourth Phase of the Battle of the Skagerrak (9.05 p. m. to 
9.37 p. m.) — The Battle Cruisers' Death Journey — Admiral Scheer 
Withdraws the Fleet from the Encircling Maneuver — ^Torpedo 
Boat Attacks — Getting Free of the Enemy. 

In the phase of the battle that had gone before we had gone 
from triumph to triumph. We had learned the meaning of a naval 
battle in all its wild beauty. Now we were to discover its horrors. 
During the pause in the battle I had remained in the conning 
tower without removing my head telephone piece. "Where is 
the enemy?" I called, as I again looked through my periscope. 
"Several small cruisers off the port beam," was the answer. In 
order to spare the heavy guns for larger targets, I ordered Lieut 
Hausser to fire at small cruisers with the 15-centimeter guns. He 
opened the fire at 7,000 meters. I meanwhile, searched the hori- 
zon, but as no other ships were visible, I again opened fire wjth 
the heavy guns on one of the small cruisers that had been reported 
to me. The enemy ships were once more just visible. I con- 
ducted a lively fire at them, and then observed that the ship on 
which I had aimed my guns was firing full salvos from her four 
double turrets. The outline of our enemy became clearer for 
a moment and I plainly recognized that a large ship was facing 
us, a dreadnaught of the largest type, with 38 centimeter guns. As 
I was looking they blazed forth. 

The commander in chief had meanwhile realized the danger 
which threatened our fleet. The head of our fleet was surrounded 



34 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

by a semicircle of enemy ships. Now, we certainly were done 
for. There was only one way of escaping from tnis tactically 
unfavorable position, that was to invert our line by countermarch- 
ing. This maneuver, however, would have to be carried out un- 
noticed and undisturbed. The battle cruisers and torpedo boats 
must cover the movement of the fleet. The commander in chief, 
at about 9.12 p. m., gave the signal to the fleet to countermarch, 
and almost simultaneously he gave to the battle cruisers and tor- 
pedo boats the historical signal to attack the enemy. At 9.13 p. m. 
the signal men in our conning station read the signal aloud, and 
added thereto the explanation which stands after the signal in 
the signal book: "Ram the enemy! The ships commanded must 
attack without restraint!" Without moving an eyelid, the com- 
mander ordered: "Full speed ahead! Course southeast!" Fol- 
lowed by the Seydlitz, Moltke, and Von Der Tann, we first steered 
a course to the southeast, then, from 9.15 on, to the southwest, di- 
rectly toward the head of the enemy line. An infernal fire now 
descended, especially upon the DerflSinger, as leading ship. Sev- 
eral vessels were firing at us simultaneously. I selected a target 
and likewise fired as rapidly as possible. At first the range which 
my trusty recorder in the central recorded were 120 hundred; 
then it decreased to 80 hundred. And still we continued to ad- 
vance at full speed into this maelstrom of fire, at the same time 
presenting a magnificent target to the enemy, while he vvas 
scarcely visible to us. Lieut. Commander Scheibe, in his account 
of the battle described this attack as follows: "The battle cruisers 
which, during the transfer of Admiral Hipper, were temporarily 
commanded by the commanding officer of the Derfflinger, now 
devoted themselves with reckless zeal to bftng the torpedo boats 
to the enemy line. A thick hail of projectiles fell upon us 
throughout our course." Salvo after salvo fell in our immediate 
neighborhood, and shell after shell struck our ship. Those were 
exciting moments. I no longer had any means of communication 
with Lieut, von Stosch, the telephone and speaking tube connec- 
tions with the foremast having been shot away. This compelled 
me to depend solely upon my own observations of the fall of %ae 
shot in firing. 

Up to this time I had continued to fire with all four heavy 
turrets, but at 9.13 p. m. a serious catastrophe occurred; a 38-cen- 
timeter shell penetrated the turret armor of Caesar turret and 
exploded inside. The brave commander of the turret, Lieut, von 
Bolterstein, lost both legs, and almost all the gun crew were 
killed. A charge was ignited in the turret by fragments of the 
explosion. The fire from the burning charge advanced to the 
ammunition hoist, where two more charges were ignited, and 
from there passed on into the handling room, where likewise 
two more charges were ignited. The cartridges burned with 
sheets of suffocating flames, which arose into the heavens far 
above the turret, but they merely burned and did not explode, 
as the charges of our enemy had done. That was the salvation 
of our ship. But in spite of that, the burning of the charges was 
disastrous in its effect. The awful suffocating flames destroyed 
everything that came within their reach. Of the 78 men mak- 
ing iro the turret crew only 5 succeeded m saving themselves by 
climbing through the hole provided for the eiectmg of empty 
cartridge cases, some of them being severely wounded. The re- 
maining 73 men died together in this catastronhe, meeting a 
hero's death in the full performance of duty while carrying out 
the orders of the turret commander. 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 35 

A few moments after this catastrophe, a second occurred. 
A 38-centimeter shell landed on the roof of the tmret Dora, pene- 
trating it, and in this case also exploding inside the turret, creat- 
ing a new scene of horrors. With the exception of a single man 
who was hurled out of the turret through the manhole by the 
pressure of air resulting from the explosion, the entire turret 
crew, including the personnel of the amunition room, in all -80 
men, went together to their death. Under the leadership of Gun 
Capt. Arndt, in command the turret Dora, the crew had stuck to 
their guns with heroic courage to the last second. Here again 
the burning gas ignited the charges not incased in their protec- 
tive packings, the flames extending even to the magazine located 
deep down in the ship. Large tongues of flames mixed with yel- 
low masses of smoke shot up toward the heavens from both after 
turrets like two gruesome funeral torches. 

At 9.15 p. m. I received the report from the main central sta- 
tion: "Danger from gas in main central. Central must be va- 
cated I" This was somewhat startling. The ship must be in a 
pretty bad condition when the poisonous gases had made their 
way into the main central which was so carefully isolated. I 
gave the order: "Switch to the forward station!" and immediately 
ascertained that the gun-control apparatus had actually been con- 
nected up with the forward station before the central was va- 
cated. Now I could conduct the gunfire only by calling out my 
orders through a speaking tube to an order transmitter situated 
below the grating on which I stood. He repeated the orders 
through his telephone and telegraph apparatus, directly to the 
gun turrets. This greatly increased the noise of voices in the 
gunnery station, but it, was at any rate still possible to direct the 
fire. Hit after hit fell upon the ship. The enemy's gunfire was 
excellent. My heart contracted when I though of what must be 
taking place inside the ship. We in the armored gun station were 
pretty well off. My train of though was suddenly interrupted. 
All at once it seemed as if the whole world were in the throes of 
destruction. A fearful rushing, a violent detonation, and then 
everything about us was black; we felt a terrific shock; the 
whole turret rose upward as if struck by a giant hand, and then 
fell back trembling to its old position. A heavy shot had struck 
the gun station about 50 centimeters from where I stood. The 
shell detonated but did not succeed in pentrating the thick ar- 
mor, because it had struck at an unfavorable angle. Nevertheless 
it had torn away huge pieces of the armor. Poisonous, green- 
ish-vellow gases floated in through the outlook slits into our 
station. I shouted: "Gas masks down!" and immediately each 
man pulled his gas mask down over his face. I now conducted the 
fire in a gas mask, which made it difficult for me to make 
myself understood. However, the gas soon passed away, and we 
cautiously raised our masks. We made sure that the gunnery ap- 
paratus was all in order. Nothing was destroyed. Even the deli- 
cate direction indicators had marvelously escaped, thanks to the 
manner in which thev were installed on springs. A few frag- 
ments of explosion had entered through the outlook slits into the 
forward control station and had wounded some of the men there, 
nmong them the navigating officer. The heavy armored door of 
the command station had been sprung from its place bv the great 
shock and now stood wide open. Two men endeavored in vain to 
force it back, but this was impossible as it was jammed too tight. 
Then unexpected assistance arrived. Once more we heard a 
terrif>nng rushing and crashing, and like a thunderbolt a 38-cen- 



36 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

timeter shell exploded under the bridge. Whole deck plates 
were thrown into the air. A furious blast swept everything that 
was not nailed and riveted fast overboard. In it vanished, for 
example the chart house with all the charts and apparatus, and 
last but not least, my beautiful cloak, which I had left hanging 
in the chart house. And a very remarkable thing had also hap- 
nened- the armored door of the gun station had been thrown 
back into position by the terrific shock of the bursting 38-centi- 
meter shell. Truly a polite fellow, the Englishman. As he had 
ooened the door for us, he also closed it again. Had it all been 
intentional? At any rate, we were very well pleased to have 
our door closed for us. 

Once more I looked for the enemy through my periscope. 
The salvos continued to fall upon us, but we could see almost 
nothing of the enemy, who still surrounded us in a huge semi- 
circle All that we could see distinctly was a mass of monstrous, 
red-gold flames bursting from the muzzles of the guns. It was 
but seldom that one caught a glimpse of the ships hull. 1 
measured the range by the flashes of the guns. That was the only 
way in which to determine our distance from the enemy. And 
without great hope of doing the enemy much damage, I had Iired 
salvo after salvo from the two forward turrets. I could feel how 
our firing steadied the nerves of the men. If we had ceased our 
firing at this time, the whole crew of the ship would have been 
overDOwer by despair, for everyone realized that a few minutes 
more and all would be lost. So long as we kept firing, however, 
things did not seem quite so desperate. The secondary battery 
also continued firing; but of the six guns on the side, only two re- 
mained in commission. The barrel of the fourth gun was burst 
wide open through an explosion in the tube, and the third gun 
was shot to pieces. The two 15-centimeter guns remaining in 
commission kept up a lively fire together with us. 

Unfortunately, the aim indicators in the Bertha turret now 
broke down. This left me with but a single turret which I could 
train on the enemy by means of my periscope. The tram of my 
periscope, as indicated by the control apparatus m tnc ffuniiery 
central, was continuously called to the Bertha turret;^ this w'as 
a certain guide for the turret commander, but natu^al]^ ti)d not 
suffice for ships constantly in motion. 

Furthermore, the turret commander could not continuously 
discern the enemy with the turret telescope. All that could really 
be seen were the fierv flashing eyes which the monster opposite 
opened from time to time, namely, when a salvo was discharged. 
I confined my fire to a ship which alternately discharged double 
shots out of two turrets. The mouths of the guns then looked 
like two blazing, wide-open eyes. Suddenly, it occurred to me 
that I had seen something like this before — Sascha Schneiders 
picture. The Feeling of Despondency, had awakned m me a sen- 
sation similar to the one I was now experiencing. It represented 
a black monster of vague outline sleepilv opening and shutting ms 
fierv eyes fixed on a fettered man, ready for the deadly embrace. 
Our present condition seemed very little different from this to 
me. Also our struggle with the monster must be fought to the 
end The Anna turret, under the leadership of brave Gun Lapt. 
Weber — I had sent the turret commander to the after gun sta- 
tion to renlace the fourth mimerv officer who h^d been detached 
— continued to fire unflinchingly; and likewise the valiant 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 37 

"Schulzburg," the leader, however, frequently firing at a ditferent 
target from the one ordered. Without any aim indicator it was 
impossible to have both turrets fired always at the same fire- 
spitting muzzle of the enemy. 

At 9.18 p. m. we received orders by wireless from the Com- 
mander in chief: "Maneuver for the head of the enemy line. " 
This meant that we shouid no longer charge the enemy directly, 
but that we should keep up a running fight with his leading ships! 
We immediately turned to a course west by south. Unfortunately 
the enemy now stood so far astern that I could no longer see him 
in the forward station, and the fire control must therefore be 
transfered to the after station. The necessary switching could, 
however, be done only in the central station. This station could 
now no longer be used. It thus became impossible for the mom- 
ent to control even the two forward turrets. I gave the order: 
"Turrets independently." For sometime the two turrets fired in- 
dependently under the direction of their commanders. I ob- 
served that the Bertha turret qxiickly got the range of the target 
dead astern and kept it under a lively fire. The turret Anna also 
soon began firing. For some time the enemy stood directly astern 
of us so that the forward turrets could not reach him, as their 
angle of train extended only up to 220°. Under these circum- 
stances we could no longer defend ourselves. By turning out, 
the torpedo officer fired a torpedo at 80 hectometers. Our tor- 
pedo boats, which had thus far remained behind us, also joined 
in the attack. Several flotillas advanced simultaneously. A thick 
cloud of smoke arose between us and the hostile monsters. A 
wild tumult of battle again arose before our eyes. It was diffi- 
cult to distinguish friend from foe. One torpedo boat after an- 
other plunged into the smoke, disappearing from view, and then 
reappearing again for a moment. Others emerged, on their way 
back, having fired their torpedoes. The flotillas reassembled 
under our protection and then went forth a second time for the 
attack. The enemy now disappeared from view, and his shell 
ceased to fall upon us. We drew a breath of relief. The hostile 
fire thundered and roared as before but we were no longer a tar- 
get for the guns. As my recorder had to leave central at 9.15 p. m. 
with the rest, no records of this part of the battle could be kept. 

At 9.23 p. m. the announcement came from central: "Main 
central again manned." I learned later that the trouble had been 
caused bv thick masses of yellowish gas making their wav into 
central through the speaking tubes from the Caesar turret. In 
the excitement of the battle no one had noticed it at the time. 
Suddenly the entire central was filled with it. Everyone put 
down his gas mask. The order transmission officer, Lieut. Ho'ch, 
ordered: "Switch gun control apparatus to forward station," and 
then had the central vacated. Immediately thereafter, the me- 
chanic, Schoening, courageously, and with his gas mask securely 
adiusted, returned to the central. He felt his way through the 
poison-laden gases which entirely filled the room to the speak- 
ing tubes, and closed them with wooden plugs. Meanwhile the 
electric ventilation was started and in a few moments it had be- 
come clearer in the central, the gases were removed by suction, 
and the order transmitters returned to their stations. It had been 
absolutely necessary to cease operations for a time. 

At 9.37 p. m., as there was no lonser any hostile vessel in 
sight, the order was given to suspend action. All gun crews 
were summoned on deck to extinguish fires. The forward con- 



38 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ning station was burning and enveloped in smoke, and the 15- 
centimeter gun crews were ordered to extinguish the lire. The 
min duel came to a halt, but a stubborn tight against water and 
fire was going on inside the ship. Notwithstanding the fact that 
evervthing possible of an inflammable nature had been removed 
from the ship, the fire still found something to feed upon, especial- 
Iv in the Unoleum, wooden decks, clothing and oil pamt. low^rd 
1 D m we had practically mastered the hostile elements, the 
fire still* smoldering only in places. The Caesar and Dpra tur- 
rets were still smoking somewhat; thick yellow gas continued to 
flow out of them at intervals, but this gradually ceased after the 
ammunition rooms were flooded. None of "should have believed 
tlXa ship could withstand so many heavy hits. After the battle 
was over we verified about 20 hits with 38-centimeter shell, and 
rneSual* number of heavy hits of small caliber. The resisting 
Sower of our ship together with the enormous destructive effect 
Sf Ter armament was a brilliant tribute to the builders of our 
Savy! espeSv to the genial Grand Admiral von Tirpitz. 

The Luetzow was no longer to be seen. At 9.20 p. m. this 
had been recorded in the after gun station: "Target covered by 
fh^ok smoke of Luetzow." After that the burning ship disap- 
Safed hi the constantiy increasing gloom. Our battie comrades 
Ae Sevdlitz, Moltke, and Von Der Tann, were, however, still with 
m Thev too, had been severely punished. The Seydhtz in par- 
Hrnlar had suffered. Huge flames were leaping upward from one 
^f W turrets Fires were raging in all the ships. The bow of 
?L Sevdiuf lav deep in the water. Admiral Hipper, when he 
^L alongside the Seydlitz in his torpedo boat, had learned tha 
sh? no Se? possessed her wireless outfit and that several 
fhousandtSns of water had already entered the slup Then he 
2?o??^H to he taken on board the Moltke, commanded by Capt. 
Tn K^rpf the fo?me? commander of the Hohenzcllern. But .as 
von ^arpi, me luii board, the ship received such an m- 

?eU^of sheUs tiiatSie ?Smmanding officii- could not. reduce his 
Sh The Derfmnger also was asked by Admiral Hipper what 
speed. Ihe "^"™^[ ^^ " ^^en we replied that we were now 
aroni? twf sTSime^r and two'' 15-centimeter guns on 

*^"?i^ i: ♦♦iL ThP namp of Capt. Hartog is inseperably connected 

ver the fleet TullV intact from the threatening . encircling -^e 
ver tnt "*^'^'^, . /%, „ fl--t rptirpd can be seen m sketcn i. we 
route over which the ^^^L^Xlt %tl?red a northwesterly course 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 39 

the fleet had already turned into a westerly course, in order not 
to leave the burning Wiesbaden, which was continuously under 
the heaviest lire, in the lurch; alter this turned back into an 
easterly course, and then, at 9.17 p. m., completed the counter- 
march on the westerly course, which had been ordered at 9.12 p. 
ra., and withdrew under the protection of the battie cruisers and 
the torpedo-boat flotillas, from the surrounding semicircle. The 
ships farthest forward, the vessels of the third squadron, came 
into the battle when they engaged the vessels of the Queen Eliza- 
beth class at 7.48 p. m.; and then again when they came within 
reach of the guns of the encircling English ships upon complet- 
ing their advance on the eastern course at 8.35 p. m. and at 9.17 
p. m. The first squadron occupying a position at the middle 
of the line did not use its guns at all during the daytime battle, 
but had to bear the burden of the night engagement. The second 
squadron, in consequence of its slow speed, had remained several 
nautical miles in the rear. By chance, however, it came into the 
engagement during the last phase of the battle, of which I shall 
have more to say later on. In consequence of the tactical char- 
acter, arrangement, and conduct of our fleet, the English ships 
engaged only our most modern and efficient vessels in the prin- 
cipal actions of the battle. Only in this way could it have hap- 
pened that we absolutely lost no ship during the battle itself — 
the severelv damaged Luetxow was abandoned by her crew on the 
day after the battle and then torpedoed by us ourselves — while 
the English lost three of their best ships. This fact is a bril- 
liant v^atness to the consummate tactical skill of Adniira' vScheer 
and his gifted chief of staff, Rear Admiral von Trother. 

The Fifth Phase of the Battle of the Skagerrak (from 9.37 p. m. to 
10.35 p. m.) — And the Night of June 1 — The Last Gunnery 
Duel — The Night Battle — Sinking of the "Pommern." 

A pause in the battle followed the strenuous efforts of a 
charge upon the enemy which lasted until 10.22 p. ra. On board 
the Derfflinger we began preparations for the night at this time. 
Almost all of the searchlights had been destroyed. On the star- 
board side we had only one left; on the port side, two. "Hein- 
zelmaenchen" and his helpers had all they could do to execute 
in a measure all the demands made upon them. I remained on 
the bridge in constant expectation of coming upon the enemy 
again. There was a man at every periscope who searched the 
horizon, and all the telescopes were in use. 

At about 10 p. m. we sighted our first squadron steering a 
southerly course. Our comamnder, who still had charge of the 
conduct of the battle cruisers, led our formation toward the head 
of our main bodv in order to take up a position further forward. 
The other battle cruisers followed the Derfflinger without any 
signal. As we were executing this maneuver we and the first 
cruiser suddenlv came under heavy fire from the southeast. It 
was alreadv crowing dark. The gloom had increased, rather than 
diminished! "Clear ship for action!" again sounded throuishout the 
ship, and in a few seconds I had the Anna turret trained on the 
target and a shot was fired. The prevailing darkness madp it 
imT>ossible to bring the Bertha turret to bear on the target. I fired 
with the Anna turret as ranidlv as possible, but even so there 
was a pause. A henvv hit struck the Ann^ turret and bent one 
of the parking disks of the traver^^e circle ^n that the turret 
jammed. Our last weapon seemed about to fall from our hands. 



40 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Again Capt Weber, with his customary quick decision, ran 
out of the turret and with the aid of some petty officers and men 
of the gun crew cut away the packing disk with axes and hatch- 
ets and got the turret clear again. In tliis way we could at least 
fire a shot now and then. I fired almost exclusively with an es- 
timated range. Only rarely did the range taker succeed in meas- 
Sng the SItance from a flashing. I fired at range of 80 hundred, 
60 hundred, and 100 hundred and thereabouts. It was impossi- 
ble to observe the flash. Once more the station had become ex- 
tremely uncomfortable. Then help arrived from a source where 
we would have least expected it. Our second squadron, the old 
TuvTotthe Deutschland class, had stood at the head of the fleet 
Ifter the countermarch on the southerly course. Admiral Scheer 
now considered the moment opportune to arrange the fleet in 
sS a way as to be tactically correct for advance toward the 
south. The second squadron, in consequence of his command, 
?ook up ite position at the rear of the two modern squadrons^ 
•^e chief of the second squadron had just executed this order by 
leading his squadron westward past the remainder of the fleet 
and Sso past m This brought him between us and the enemy, 
who was nressink hard, and who suddenly saw seven large ships 
Idvandng aSt him kt high speed. At the same time our inde- 
fatlSetorfedo boats once more joined in the attack. That was 
too much for our foe. He turned away and disappeared m the 
l?onm Mav we never see him again. A great joy filled pur 
hearts as we luddenly saw ourselves free. I saw all the good 
?rilnds of ^yfonner squadron approaching; the brave Hessen 

rV.L^ T hpH^nent five years; the Pommern, the Schleswig, the 
WnUtpJn and othlS AU kept up and received a lively fire which 
Sid for a s£t time The eSemy, however, had^ had enough 
Tfh^had dreamed what kind of ships they were. I do not believe 
he Wd have turned away. They were, however, the celebrated 
ne ^"^"«fl,,2 TTiinntp" shins for whose destruction the bngiisn 
dSd a™ mTnStes wtfd- suffice. Now, however, he bravely 
avoided them. x. . a a 

At lO'il n m my trusty recorder recorded the last shot hred 

Sn »t end onine/' We therefore had the honorable task of pro- 
*^?SorvSi:e°tLe%«.StL°r„.l''fio!?.1\eri„S^^^^ 

^%f^HS€»oXVn?v^ ^;\^-^^s^^'^s p 

Ft7o%r^]he^"Myhip £a|r,^f v|»|- £S''St'.' 
SfnVr ™n ^'Jenl?et%''^Mhe sWplnTo Wilhelmshaven two 
days after the battle. 

r, 1 ♦!,« norfflinPAr and the von der Tann took their posi- 
tions°«en"dtff ^r^nSh.. ni^^^^^^ 

ered o'"^''™^' ™'T,,*l?"tS!centtniSe? gins on that side were 
^?n iSfjAt l^inRle searcufghrwas^^^^ sufficient On 

ISh^o^^^o'Latf o^me^sUoard side so far as pos,*.e. 
There we could take good care of them. 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 41 

As the heavens were overcast, the night at last became dark. 
We officers had now left the conning tower and took our sta- 
tions on the bridge. The commander joined us. He shook my 
hand heartily and said: "That was well done." These words 
meant a great deal to me, as has every mark of recognition which 
I have later received. As it was beginning to grow cool, he 
ordered a bottle of port. The glasses were filled, and we officers 
drank to the day. I sent my man below decks to my room to see 
how things were down there and to bring me another cloak. 
Haenel came back with the cloak and reported with a beaming 
face: "The Herr Captain's room is the only whole one left. All the 
others are completely destroyed." In looking at his smiling 
countenance I could but think of the old lines: 

Oh, St. Florian! 

Protect my house and let the others buml 

As we were the next to the last ship in the long line, it was 
to be expected that we would escape attack by the torpedo boats, 
which must always direct their attacks at the vessels heading 
the line. As a matter of fact only one English destroyer foiind 
the way to us during the entire night. All the other destroyers 
were driven off by the vessels ahead of us. I can not tell very 
much about these night engagements, as we were too far away. 
Firing was kept up, however, during the entire night. One must 
admit that the English torpedo boats attacked us over and over 
again with marvelous spirit. But they accomplished practic^ly 
nothing. The only German ship that was sunk during the night 
was the small cruiser Frauenlob, and she was not sunk by tor- 
pedo boats but by an English cruiser which had overcome her in 
a gunnery duel and then sent a torpedo into her side. Not until 
dawn did the English torpedoes meet with any success. An Eng- 
lish destroyer succeeded in hitting and destroying the Pommern 
with torpedo fire at long range. 

From our position we were able to quietly watch the battle 
as it was fought out, at times at a great distance from us. Search- 
lights flashed, illuminating torpedo boats as they advanced at 
maximum speed. Both ships and torpedo boats used their guns; 
the huge splashes were lighted up and the thick clouds of smoke 
rolled past the ships and boats. All details escaped us. Never- 
theless, the outcome of the battle was plain to us, when one burn- 
ing, glowing vessel after another drove past us. I could but think 
of the living torches which the Romans in their gruesome orgies 
had running about while burning, for their entertainment. All 
iron parts were red hot. The boats looked like particularly fine 
golden red filigree work. The reason why the fire spread so 
rapidly over the English boats was that they were fitted for oil 
firing only. The oil ignited by the gunfire spread quickly oyer 
all parts of the deeply rolling vessels. It seemed as if at least 
10 boats and ships drove past us in this condition. We looked at 
them with mingled feelings, for we were not absolutely certain 
that some of them might not be German boats. As a matter of 
fact, however, no German boat was destroved that night. Our 
boats were cruising in search of the enemy fleet. It is a strange 
and almost incredible thing that our boats spent the nieht search- 
ing for the English main bodv and did not find it, although its 
point of departure was correctly known. 

When the firing forward became somewhat quieter I heard, as 
I stood beside the commander, the noise of a turbine torpedo 
boat approaching at high speed. It was on the starboard sidf. 



42 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

and suddenly a black object emerged at about 4 points to star- 
board. Sball we ligbt our single searchlight and thereby betray 
cm" presence, or shail we wait until the destroyer covers us with 
his searchlight in order to determine our position before firing 
his shot? I hastily advised the commander not to use our search- 
light. He agreed with me, and the destroyer rushed past us. He 
was quite near, only 300 or 400 meters away, but he did not use 
his lights and fired neither gun nor torpedo. The ship following 
us, the Von der Tann, did exactly as we did. As the gunnery of- 
ficer told me later, they also feared that the flash of their search- 
lights would bring the whole swarm of toiTjedo boats down upon 
them. Had they not seen us on board the English destroyer? 
Had he fired all his torpedoes? Had he already been under such 
telling fire that now he thought of nothing but to get away? 1 
do not know. "Ships that pass in the night." 

Thus the night wore away and morning dawned. At 2.^5 : 
m. a burning ship drifted past us; orobabiy the English armored 
cruiser Black Prince. The entire ship was aglow. It must have 
been sometime since anyone remained alive on board. At 3.10, a. 
m. we heard two great detonations to port, but we could not 
discover what had taken place. We had to stop many times be- 
cause the entire line ahead of us got into disorder, owing to the 
numerous torpedo boat attacks. Vessels in turning out to avoid 
the attacks and in advancing against the enemy boats, left their 
line, described circles, and then had to push into line again 
wherever they could. Thus it was that the Nassau, which origin- 
ally had been the second ship of the entire line, gradually be- 
came the last ship in the line, and therefore immediately ahead 
of us. It was no easy task for our navigating officer and the 
watch officer to keep the ship always at the right distance from 
the line so that we should not lose our place in the darkness. 

At the first appearance of dawn we believed with certainty 
that we were about to enter battle once more with the entire 
English fleet. All preparations were made for the day's en- 
counter. The direction indicators of the Bertha turret were again 
put in order by Heinzelmaenchen and his faithful helpers. 

We then assembled on the bridge and gazed into the night 
and into the creeping dawn. The torpedo attacks seemed to have 
ceased. Suddenly — it was about 3.50 a. m. — we heard a loud 
detonation, and an enormous shaft of fire arose before our eyes 
toward heaven. From the distance it looked like a giant sheaf 
of fire from a brilliant pyrotechnic display. We noticed that the 
two ships ahead of us were turning out with their rudders hard 
to port. What had happened ahead? What catastrophe had taken 
place? Our ship continued to cut the waves. We held our 
course, and so passed the place where the explosion had taken 
place. We looked all about us to see whether any men or pieces 
of wreckage were floating in the water. There was nothing to 
be seen. As we passed over the snot where the catastrophe oc- 
curred we could not form the slightest idea of what had hap- 
pened, and vet only a few minutes before the Pommern, a bat- 
tleship of 13,000 tons, had passed. An English torpedo boat had 
sneaked up to the very limit of visibility and torpedoed the 
Pommern. The ship must have been blown to atoms, as a few 
minutes Ipter not the least tmce of her w^s to he seen. My iol^y 
friend and comrade, Lieut. Commander Elle, met a hero's death 
on board the Pommern. As gunnery officer he had always taken 
such pains to stow the ammunition so as to be safe from torpedo 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 43 

attack, and now it had all counted for nothing, for a torpedo 
must certainly have struck an ammunition room. vVe Qiq not 
know until several days later that it was the Pommern which 
had been blown up. 

At 4.10 a. m. the second squadron, which was preceding us, 
began to tire. We sounded the alarm "Clear ship for action," tor 
we felt certain that a great decisive battie was at hand. But, a^ 
it turned out, it was only an English destroyer which had ven- 
tured to near and been lired upon. Perhaps it was the same one 
that had a short time previously torpedoed the Pommern. At any 
rate she got rough handling now. The destroyer, which was only 
a short distance from us, was set on lire belore our eyes and be- 
came lost in the gruesome procession of living torches. 

Meanwhile the sun had risen. On our ships hundreds of bin- 
oculars and telescopes searched the horizon, but nowhere \Ya.s 
there any trace of the enemy. The fleet continued to the south. 
and in the afternoon of June 1 we entered Wilhelmshaven. Our 
ship was very badly damaged, and at many piaces everything had 
been converted into a mass of debris. The vital parts, however, 
had not been struck. The engines, boilers, steering arrangements, 
propeller shafts, and most of auxiliary machinery were practi- 
cally intact, thanks to the heavy armor. The engine rooms had 
been filled for a long time with poisonous gases, but by using 
their gas masks the engine personnel — even though some of them 
were lost — had been able to carry on. The entire ship was 
strewn with thousands of fragments, large and small, resulting 
from the explosions. Among these fragments we found two 38- 
centimeter caps of projectiles which were almost undamaged; 
huge pieces in the form of large buckets, which later were used 
in the commander's cabin and in the officers' mess as champagne 
coolers, even though we could scarcely believe that they had 
been thrown on board by our English opponents for this pur- 
pose. The armor plate had been perforated in several places, but 
the leaks had always been stopped up or we had been able to con- 
fine the inflowing water to small compartments. At Wilhelms- 
haven we buried our dead, almost 200 from the Derfflinger, who 
now rest in honor in the cemetery there. 

On 4 June the Emperor inspected our ship and she was then 
docked at Kiel for a six months' overhauling. She was again 
ready for battle in December, 1916, after many repairs of various 
kinds, including her guns. The battle of the Skagerrak, how- 
ever, proved to be the last meeting between our ship and the ene- 
my, at least so long as the flag to which we had sworn our al- 
legiance floated at her stern. This proud ship now rests in the 
Bay of Scapa Flow at the bottom of the sea. 

Observations on the Battle of the Skagerrak. 

At sunrise on the morning of 1 June, the German fleet was 
standing off Horn Reef, at the same latitude, therefore, as the 
Danish city Esbierg. When we discovered far and wide nothing 
of the enemy, I admit frankly that a load fell from mv heart; 
for with our disabled ship, and especiallv with our crippled bat- 
tery, we couM have made but a ooor showing against a dread- 
naught with her guns intact. I had alreadv fired almost all the 
ammunition for the Anna and Bertha turrets, and the rest of the 
ammunition in the Caesar and Dora turrets could not be utilized, 
«s these turrets were still filled with poisonous gases, and the 



44 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ammunition rooms were flooded. I regretted from the bottom of 
my heart, for the sake of our fleet and the Fatherland, that the 
decisive battle was not fought then. This was undoubtedly a 
great grief and a disappointment for Admiral Scheer, our com- 
mander in chief. It would have been a very easy matter for the 
English to have offered us battle in the early morning. They had 
kept in touch with us during the whole night by means of their 
cruisers and torpedo boats. The English commander in chiel 
was therefore kept constantly informed by radio concerning our 
every movement. It would have been a most fortunate thing io 
the Fatherland if an engagement had occurred at that time off 
Horn Reef, which was a comparatively short distance from Heli- 
goland. To judge by what we saw on 31 May, many of the Ehg- 
glish ships must have been absolutely destroyed, and it must 
have required an enormous e?ipenditure of ammunition to put the 
German dreadnaughts entirely out of action. If Jellicoe had 
sought a decision off Horn Reef on 1 June, the English Navy 
would doubtless have been forced to yield her place as the strong- 
est navy of the world to America. I willingly admit that the com- 
plete destruction of Jellicoe's fleet on 1 June was not to be thought 
of; but, as one fully informed concerning our ships and of nayal 
armaments and also well informed' concerning the English ships 
and their armaments, and on the basis of my experience in the 
battle of the Skagerrak, I think I can say with ccitainly that a 
naval engagCAncait between the English and Gv^rman dreadnaughts 
fought to an absolute decision, would have cost the enemy a very 
large number of his capital ships. 

On 31 May it was not possible for Admiral Scheer, after his 
maneuver of withdrawal from the "lion's claws" to again deploy 
his fleet for battle in a manner that would be tactically favorable. 
A night engagement between two fleets of such power was an 
impossibility. In spite of all means of recognition provided for bat- 
tle in the darkness, the action would have unavoidably been a cruel 
melee, a rending of ship by ship without a knowledge of whether 
it were friend or foe. But even if we, like "fearless gamblers" had 
endeavored to bring about a night battle, the English fleet must 
have avoided it. She would have lost in a night engagement all 
the advantages of her numerical superiority, her greater speed, 
and her long-range guns; everything would have been left to 
blind chance. Jellicoe did perfectly right in withdrawing at 
nightfall and in bestowing his squadron during the night in such 
a manner as not to be discovered by our torpedo boat flotillas 
systematically searching the locality where the battle had been 
fought. Jellicoe, furthermore, did perfectly right from the stra- 
tegical point of view in not presenting himself for battle on 
1 June. With the employment of the English fleet as a "fleet in 
being" — ^that is to say, by the mere fact of its existence — it had 
fully performed the duty thus far assigned to it. The battle of 
the Skagerrak did not for a moment interrupt the pressure ex- 
erted by it as a "fleet in being." If Jellicoe had not engaged in 
the battle of the Skagerrak on 31 May, and in order to keep his 
fleet undamaged had instead withdrawn to his port of sortie 
at Scapa Flow, we would have been able to carry out the task 
assigned to us bv a commerce destroying warfare in the Skag- 
errak and the Kattegatt, and would thus have had control of the 
North Sea for a long time. The execution of our task, however, 
was frustrated by the battle of the Skagerrak. But as Jellicoe 
did not attack our fleet as it was steaming toward the German 
mine fields and home ports, he did not for a moment surrender 



THE TWO WHITE NATIONS 45 

the mastery of the sea. To what end then in this strategical game 
of chance should an additional move be made when his position 
was already such that the checkmate of the opponent could but 
be the result? Jellicoe withdrew to Scapa Flow. Later, when 
he made Beatty the chief of the fleet in his place and was made a 
lord by his King, he took the name of "Viscount of Scapa." Many 
a person in Germany and in England laughed at the idea that an 
admiral should take his name from a desolate spot where his 
fleet had lain continuously at anchor for almost four years. Never- 
theless this four years of idleness on the part of the English fleet 
contributed decisively to the fact that our entire navy was forci- 
bly conducted to this same Scapa Flow and that it now lies at 
the bottom of the bay there. What a triumph for the "Viscount 
of Scapa." As the confidence of the English in victory was se- 
verely shaken after the battle of the Skagerrak, Churchill pub- 
lished a series of articles in the October number of the London 
Magazine on the war by land and sea. What he says in these 
articles concerning the war at sea and the battle of the Skagerrak 
is in my opinion not correct. More's the pity. We could but 
draw the following conclusions at that time: the English fleet 
presented itself for battle outside our mine fields and at a respect 
ful distance from our submarine bases and coast defense. We, 
however, were forced to seek battle if only to make an attempt 
to free ourselves from the iron clutch with which England was 
strangling us. Hence we were compelled to seek the English fleet 
out on its own coast and engage it there. 

In opposition to this, it has been said that the submarine 
warfare could only be carried out with an intact, high-sea fleet; 
ihat our naval harbors would have been hopelessly blocked if 
we had lost our fleet. The answer to this is that, in the first 
place, a battle with the enemy fleet was not equivalent beforehand 
to the loss of our entire fleet. The Skagerrak could be cited as 
proof of this. In the second place, the cruisers, old battleships, 
and torpedo boats, together with our submarines, mine layers, 
mine sweepers, airships, flying machines, and coast defenses, 
that would have been left to us in any case, would have sufficed 
for the prosecution of the submarine warfare. Furthermore, we 
still had the Kattegatt as a port of sortie for our U-boats. The 
submarine warfare had been conducted in Flanders without the 
fleet, under much more difficult conditions than those in the 
North Sea. A decisive battle on the high seas would indeed have 
made the submarine warfare unnecessary, and would have 
brought the war to a speedy end. 

I do not want to detract from our joy at our partial victory 
over the English fleet at the Skagerrak by these reflections, but 
it turned out that this victory — like all our others on land and 
sea — did not constitute a final victory for the German people. 
That it was like a chalybeate bath for the fleet and gave the 
German people new strength and confidence, contributing preat- 
ly to their prestige, there can be no question. It was a bad day 
for England as we sent 10.000 English seamen, together with the 
proudest of the English ships, to the bottom of the sea, while 
scarcely more than 2,000 German sailors had to yield up their 
lives for their victorious flag. 

The extracts from Churchill's articles in the London Maza- 
rine (autumn, 1916) were published in a special edition of the 
Fremden Presse, of the News Bureau of the Imperial Navy Office. 



46 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

I bring my narrative of the greatest day at sea which we 
Germans have ever experienced to a close with the wish that my 
little book and Chm-chiU's article may be the means of enlighten- 
ing many Germans as to the enormous influence the control of the 
sea has exerted on the history of the world, and will continue to 
exert for all time to come. And I express the hope that in 
coming years many Germans, proud of being Germans and sailors, 
will let the sea wind whistle in their nostrils. 

It is true that we have been a poor nation. It is true 
that we have been greatly humiliated in our national honor. But 
because of that we will permit no one to take from lis the cojir- 
age for new deeds. Let us bear in mind the maxim: 

Money lost — nothing lost I 
Honor lost — ^much lost I 
Courage lost — all lost! 



n 

NOTES FROM O. N. L PUBLICATIONS 



OPERATIONS 



Analysis of Torpedo Firing in the Battle of Jutland. 



Torpedoes Fired at the Enemy in the Battle of Jutland. 

An analysis and summary of all the torpedoes fired by British 
ihips and vessels follows: 

"Probability" figures based on peace practices are given as a 
comparison, principally as an indication of the relative ease or 
difficulty of the different shots. These chances, of course, take 
no account of bad runs or successful avoidance of torpedoes. 
The higher figure given in some cases is that for a line of big 
ships, 2^/4 cables apart; the lower figure that for a single ship shot. 
It is interesting to note that the number of hits claimed corres- 
ponds very closely with the "probability" for single ship shots. 

The estimate of actual hits is based on information available, 
necessarily by no means reliable. A comparison of the reports 
from British individual ships would give about 18 hits instead 
of the 13 given in the list below. In the latter number no ac- 
count is taken of the possibility that more than one hit may have 
been made on the same ship; there is, however, no confirmation 
that more than one hit was obtained on any ship. Tbv» estimated 
number of actual hits is therefore considered to be, if anything, 
on the low side. 

SUMMARY OF RESULTS 





s 

h 

E-fa 


•2 


1 


Actual hits 


Percentage 
of Certain 
and Prob- 
able 




6%^ 


w 

« 



Day 

Night 


46 
39 


9 
18 to 20 


9 to 17 
20 


4 

7 


2 

(?) 


8.7 
18.0 






Total 


85 


27 to 2? 


29 to 37 


11 


2 


13,0 



Some of the other claims may ultimately be upheld, but there 
is at present no evidence that further hits were obtained except 
from British reports; in some cases two or more hits may haye 
been obtained on one ship, which in this summary are counted as 
one only. 

Approximate Allocation of Hits. 

Owing to conflicting reports as to the times at which enemy 
diips, known to have been torpedoed, were actually hit, and to 

47 



48 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

difficulties in obtaining reliable information as to ships torpedoed 
which subsequently reached harbor, it has been found impossible 
to allocate the hits claimed with any degree of certainty. In the 
cases of ships severly damaged, it is rarely possible to obtain 
reliable evidence as to the respective share of guns, mines, and 
torpedoes in the infliction of the damage. 

The following four ships are definitely known to have been 
hit by torpedoes and to have subsequently sunk: 

Battleship - PommeTn. 

Light cruisers -- - Frauenlob, Wiesbaden, Rostock. 

The other German vessels sunk were: 

Battle cruiser - r - - ^"f'^*"" 

Light cruiser *'"U?S* 

Destroyers rive 

The Luetzow is reported, on rather doubtful authority, to hgve 
been disabled by a torpedo about 6 p. m. and sunk by the enenjy 
in the early morning. 

The Elbing was severly damaged in collision with a German 
battleship while avoiding a torpedo, and subsequently sank. 

As to the five torpedo-boat destroyers, there is no definite 
evidence except from British reports. Petard claims to have tor- 
pedoed one. 

It has been reported that the following seven ships, which are 
known to have reached harbor, were struck by torpedoes: 

Battleships --- ..Markgraf. Rheinland, Nassau, Westfalen 

Battle cruiser — - Von der Tann. 

Li^t cruisers - Muenchen, Stettin. 

It is thought in several instances the names of these ships 
may have been wrongly given, as other evidence indicates that the 
period during which certain of the ships named were under repair 
were considerably shorter than one would expect in the case oj a 
ship seriously damaged below the water line. 

It is, however, considered likely that, although the names of 
the ships may have been given erroneously, the number of ships 
in each class damaged by torpedoes is approximately correct 

In addition, the battleship Ostfriesland is known to have re- 
ceived extensive underwater damage, but this is believed to have 
been due to a mine. 
Ships Sunk by Torpedoes. 

Pommem.— This ship was torpedoed during the night and sank 
instantly. It is reported to have been struck in the magazine. 
There were no survivors. Evidence points to this ship having been 
sunk by the Fourth Flotilla about 11.30 p. m. The enemy attacked 
by the Fourth Flotilla between 11.10 p. m. and 12.25 a. m. appears 
to have been consisted of a battle squadron of Deutschland-type 
battleships, preceded by light cruisers, and it is uncertain from 
many other reports whether the ship fired at was a light cruiser or 
a battleship. Eleven torpedoes were apparently fired at the cruis- 
ers between 11.10 and 11.43 p. m. Four hits are claimed, another 
doubtful. Muenchen and Stettin were probably torpedoed m this 
attack. 

Five torpedoes apparently were fired at the battleships be- 
tween 11.30 p. m. and 12.30 a. m. Three hits and one probable hit 
are claimed. Faulkner reported three torpedo explosions about 
11.30 p. m. Pommern was in all probability sunk in this attack. 



NOTES FROM O. N. I. PUBUCATIONS 4t 

Wiesbaden. — After being disabled by gunfire, this ship was 
torpedoed either by Onslow at 6.15 or Falmouth at 6.21. Both 
fired at a disabled light cruiser with three funnels. Onslow re- 
ported a hit under the fore conning tower. The range in each case 
was about 4,000 yards. Wiesbaden did not sink until the next 
morning. The sole survivor, who remained on board until she 
sank, reiaorts only one hit by a torpedo. 

Rostock. — This ship was torpedoed by a torpedo boat des- 
troyer at about 6.30 p. m. She was, therefore, the vessel claimed 
by Shark, who hit a light cruiser with four funnels at 6 p. ra. with 
a torpedo. The cruiser appeared to catch fire. Rostock remained 
afloat until the following morning, when she was apparently blown 
up by her own crew, who were taken off by German destroyers. 

Frauenlob. — The evidence available points to this ship having 
been torpedoed by Southampton, who fired one torpedo at a group 
of searchlights at 10.21 p. m. Frauenlob was hit, and sank rapidly 
after being torpedoed. There were only about eight survivors, 
who were picked up by Dutch fishing craft. 

Laetzow. — ^This ship is reported by a deserter to have been hit 
by a torpedo at 6 p. m. just abaft the foremast. She became totally 
disabled and was sunk by the enemy next morning. Other state- 
ments made by the deserter were so imaginative that this hit can 
only be as a "possible." The position of the hit given in his state- 
ment is, however, corrobated by Falmouth, who claims to have 
hit the leading battle cruiser, Luetzow, at 6.55 just abaft foremast. 
On the other hand Yarmouth fired a torpedo at the leaking ship 
of the German battle cruisers at 6.30 and Admiral Beatty from 
the Lion reports this ship leaving the line of battle at 6.36. Luetzow 
may have been sunk by gunfire. 

Ships Reported Hit by Torpedoes. 

Markgraf. — ^There is no evidence at all as to when this vessel 
was torpedoed. 

Rheinland, Nassau, Westfalen. — It appears possible that these 
ships were torpedoed by the Twelfth Flotilla, which attacked a 
squadron of four dreadnaught battleships about 2 a. m. The enemy 
appears to have consisted of four two-funnelled ships, class un- 
certain. Seven torpedoes were fired at a range of about 3,000 yards 
and eight hits are claimed, on the second, third, and fourth ships 
of the line. The second ship appeared to blow up, but this has 
not been confirmed. 

Actual hits appear to have been as follows: 

Second ship.— At least one hit, perhaps more; two xmder 
bridge, one abreast mainmast. Appeared to blow up. 

Third ship. — One between funnels. 

Fourth ship. — One amidships. 

These vessels were probably Rheinland, Nassau, and West- 
falen. All returned to harbor. 

Von Der Tann. — The reported damage to this ship could have 
been caused during the torpedo attack on the German battle 
cruisers at 4.15 p. m., but there is considerable doubt as to whether 
this ship was actually torpedoed. This hit is, therefore, only 
counted as "possible." 



50 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Muenchen and Settin. — It appears possible that these ships were 
struck at the same time as Pommern, as this type of light cruiser 
would be likely to accompany vessels of the Pommern class. At 
11.55 Broke fired a torpedo at a cruiser with three funnels and re- 
ported a hit amidships. At 11.30 Garland likewise claimed a hit 
abreast mainmast on a light cruiser with three funnels. As the 
range in each case was only 8,000 yards, it is probable that the 
light cruisers were Muenchen and Stettin. 

Ostfriesland. — There is no evidence as to when this ship was 
damaged, except that it was in the early morning. The damage 
was almost certainly from a mine, and this has not been counted as 
a hit. 

SUMMARY OF HITS OBTAINED 
<1) Caused ship to sink: 

Certain or 
, probable Possible 

Pommern 1 

Fratienlob 1 

One destroyer 1 

(2) Instrumental in sinluiig: 

Luetzow 1 

Wiesbaden 1 

Rostock 1 

(3) Caused damage but did not sink: 

Markgraf 1 

Rheinland 1 

]>lassau 1 

Westfalen 1 

Von Der Tann 1 

Muenchen 1 

Stettin 1 

Total 11 2 

It is also possible that some of the above ships may have been 
hit by more than one torpedo, especially during the frequent at- 
tacks made during the night by the torpedo boat destroyer flotillas. 

The Elbing was sunk in collision while avoiding a torpedo. 

Four destroyers were also sunk, presumably gy gunfire only. 

In justice to the ships claiming hits during the various actions, 
it must be clearly emphasized that the above remarks are only a 
provisional attempt to allocate the hits, based on the scanty evi- 
dence at present available. 

General Torpedo Remarks. 
In most cases in the Battle of Jutland torpedoes were fired 
under conditions now generally recognized as the best, viz: 

Range. Inclination of 
eneraiy. 

Yards. Degrees. 

Day 7,000-10,000 100 to 1.35 

Nlglit 800-3,000 90tol30 

During the battle cruiser action prior to 4.40 p. m., the enemy's 
first scouting group were slightly abaft the beam of the British 
battle cruisers and well outside torpedo range. An opportunity 
occurred for day attack with destroyers and was effectively car- 
ried out by the Thirteenth Flotilla between 4 and 4.30 p. m. Two 
destroyers were put out of action after closing to 5,000 yards or 
less. This proved to be rather too close. After 4.40 p. m. the bat- 
tle cruisers were still outside tornedo range. No ooportunity oc- 
curred throughout the action for firing 18-inch torpedoes from bat- 
tle cruisers. 



NOTES FROM 0. N. I. PUBLICATIONS 51 

The opening stages of the battle fleet action about 6.30 p. m- 
were distinctly tavorabie for E. R. torpedo attack as regards posi- 
tion and range, but the iow visibility prevented a clear apprecia- 
tion ot the general torpedo situation being iormed; the lirst cruiser 
squadron was also between the battle fleet and the enemy, while 
the battle cruisers were barely clear of the second battle squad- 
ron at the van. When the British ships had cleared the range, 
the enemy were distinctly seen and commenced to retire under 
the pressure of the gunfire, and no subsequent opportunity for 
daylight torpedo attack occurred. 

The destroyer day attacks carried out by both British and 
German squadrons showed that, against an enemy who is de- 
veloping a rapid and eft'ective gunfire, destroyers should not ap- 
proach within 7,000 yards gun range of the enemy heavy ships. 
If, however, enemy gunfire has been crushed or reduced in vol- 
ume, the attack should be pressed home until a position of 5,000 
yards from the enemy line is attained in order to insure torpe- 
does crossing the track should the enemy turn away. Except 
when firing torpedoes at single disabled ships little advantage is 
Rained in closing to within 5,000 yards. 

A noticeable feature of the torpedo records of the action is 
the considerable difTerence in the numbers of torpedoes fired by 
ships in the same squadron and for whom the torpedo situation at 
a particular moment was presumably very similar. In one squad- 
ron seven torpedoes were fired by one ship, one by another, and 
none by a third. It is of very great importance, when the con- 
ditions admit, that torpedo fire should be opened by a maximum 
number of ships possible at the earliest moment, always allowing 
a reasonable margin for range and for torpedo and sighting er- 
rors. Further, a steady rate of fire should be kept up. Success in 
a "browning" attack must depend upon the number of torpedoes 
which can be thrown across "the enemy's line. 

The action emphasized the importance which attaches to ef- 
ficient lookouts being stationed to give warning of the approach 
of torpedoes, enabling immediate steps either by a turn toward 
or awav to be taken to avoid them. The selected lookouts must 
be highly trained and able to pick up the tracks of torpedoes un- 
der unfavorable conditions. 

The torpedo actions during the battle emphasized the impor- 
tance of a torpedo-control officer being stationed in light cruisers 
and destroyers to assist the captain during the attack. In de- 
stroyers it mav be necessary that such officer should be also a 
gun-control officer. He should be available for controlling either 
the gun or torpedo armament, according to whether the gun or 
torpedo situation is at the particular moment considered of para- 
mount importance. 

TORPEDOES FIRED AT THE ENEMY DURING THE BATTLE 
OF JUTLAND BANK, n MAY 1916- 
DAY ACTION 

L — Torpedo Attacks on German Battle Cruisers, 4.15 to 5.15 p. iii. 

This attack was commenced at 4.15 p. m. bv 12 torpedo-boat 
destrovers against five battle cruisers, then steering southeast. 
The attack was broken up by an action with a German flotiUa 
of 1 light cruiser and 15 torpedo-boat destroyers. Although the 



»2 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Germans were driven back, only 5 torpedoes out of the 48 carried 
by the attacking torpedo-boat destroyers could be fired across 
the line of the battle cruisers before they turned at 4.52 p. m. to 
northwest. 

Five more torpedoes were fired after the turn to northwest, 
two by Nerissa, one of the attacking flotilla, and three from the 
British battle cruiser line, two from Lion, one from Moresby, sta- 
tioned on her engaged bow. 

Morseby and Nerissa both claimed hits on the rear ship of 
the line, at approximately the same time. As Fearless reported a 
battle cruiser leaving the line at 5.10 p. m., it appears probable 
that one hit at least was obtained. This may have been the Von 
Der Tann, but there is considerable doubt as to whether this 
ship was actually torpedoed. Three torpedoes are known to have 
passed close to Moltk'e. 

Torpedoes Fired Hits Claimed "Probability" Estimated Actual Hit* 
13 2 2 to 5 Possibly 1 

n. — ^Attacks on German Battle Fleet, 4.40 to 5.30 p. m. 

On the German Battle Fleet being sighted in the rear of their 
battle cruisers, they were attacked by Nottingham with an E. R, 
torpedo, at very short range by Nestor and Nicator, who had iust 
been attacking the battle cruisers, and subsequently by Moorsom 
at a longer range. 

Torpedoes Fired Hits Claimed "Probability" Actual Hits 

7 to 8 2 to 3 No evidence 

It is possible that the Markgraf was hit during this attack in- 
stead of as indicated in V. 

ni. — Attacks on German Battle Cruisers During the Fleet Action, 
6 to 7 p. m. 

Five torpedoes were fired at the battle cruisers by various 
torpedo-boat destroyers and light cruisers during the deployment 
of the Grand Fleet and the turn of the Germans to the south. 

Hits are claimed by Acasta and Falmouth on the leading battle 
cruiser, and by Ophelia on a battle cruiser whose position in the 
line is not stated. One battle cruiser is reported to have left the 
line at about 6.30 p. m. This was the Luetzow, and it is counted 
as a "possible" hit. 

Torpedoes Fired Hits Claimed "Probability" Estimated Actual Hits 

5 3 1 to 2 Possibly 1 

TV. — ^Torpedoes Fired at the German Battle Fleet Between 6 and 
7.30 p. m. 

Vailant and Malaya fired one torpedo each at the head of the 
line, Onslow and Marlborough at the Kaiser group; Lion and Re- 
venge, point of aim not stated. Lion and Marlborough fired E. R. 
torpedoes. 

No hits were seen. 

Torpedoes Fired Hits Claimed "Probability" Actual Hits 

8 1 to 3 No evidence 

It is possible that Markgraf was hit in this attack and not as 
indicated in Y. 



NOTES FROM O. N. I. PUBLICATIONS 



53 



T. — ^Torpedoes Fired at the German Battle Fleet Just Before Dark. 

Five torpedoes were fired at a group of ships apparently con- 
•isting of three Deutschland type, some Kaiser type, and three 
Nassau type. No hits were claimed by the firing ships, but an 
explosion was seen to take place on a large ship apparently of the 
Kaiser class at 8.40 p. m. If the times are correct, this explosion 
may have been caused by Calliope's torpedo. This ship may have 
been the Markgraf, but it is not known at what time she was tor- 
pedoed. (See above). 

Torpedoes Fired Hits Claimed "Probability" EsUmated Actual Hits 

5 1 to 2 Possibly 1* 

TL — ^Attacks on Detached or Disabled Ships During the Day Action. 

In the destroyer action at 4.15 p. m. Petard fired a torpedo at a 
group of three or four German torpedo-boat destroyers and claims 
to have sunk the leader. 

Lion, Onslow, and Falmouth fired among them four torpedoes 
at a disabled light cruiser with three funnels, probably the same 
one in each case. This was the Wiesbaden. Lion and Onslow 
claimed hits. 

Marlborough and Shark fired two torpedoes at a foiu--funelled 
cruiser — the Rostock. Shark obtained a hit. 



Torpedoes Fired 
7 



Hits Claimed 
4 



'Probability' 

2 



Estimated Actual EUt* 

Probably 3 



SUMMARY OF TORPEDOES FIRED DURING DAY ACTION 



Torpedoes fired. 



I. 13 (1 misfire) 

n. 7 or 8 

ra. 5 - 

IV. 8 

V. 5 

▼I. 7 - 

Total: 

Without VI, 38 or 39. 
With VI, 45 or 46- .. 



«a 



x>ff 

01,4 
Z at 



2 to 5. 
2 to 3. 
1 to2. 
1 to3. 
1 to 2. 
2 



7 to 15. 
9 to 17. 



Estimated 
actual hits. 



1 
No evd. 

1 
No evd. 






No evd. 

No evd. 
1 
3 

1 

4 



Number fired by different types of ships (VI excluded) : 

Battle cruisers — * 

Light cruisers - ^ 

Battleships - -- - - * 

Torpedo-boat destroyers -- *•* 

NIGHT ATTACKS. 
I — Attack on German Cruisers by Castor, Magic, and Marne, 9.50 
to 10.50 p. m. 

Several cruisers were seen. Four torpedoes were fired; other 
torpedo-boat destroyers did not fire apparently because they were 



*Thls hit is counted as a "probable"; it may not have been on this occasion 
that Markgraf was hit. 



54 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

blinded by Ihe glare of Castor's guns or because they thought the 
enemy might be British ships. 

Marne and Magic claimed hits, apparently on different ships, 
forpedoes Fired Hits Claimed "Probability" Estimated Actual Hits 

4 2 2 Possibly 1. 

Ship not identifiable. 

IL — Light Cruiser Attack, 10.21 p. m. 

One torpedo fired by Southampton at a group of searchlights. 
Hits claimed on leading ship. "Probability" about 50 per cent. 
Frauenlob was hit, and sank rapidly. 

IIL — Attack by Fourth Flotilla on German Cruisers and Battle- 
ships, 11.10 to 12.25. 

The enemy appears to have consisted of a battle squadron of 
the Deutchland type preceded by light cruisers, and it is uncertain 
from many of the reports whether the ship fired at was a light 
cruiser or a battleship. 

Eleven torpedoes were apparently fired at the cruisers be- 
tween 11.10 and 11.43 p. m. Four hits are claimed; another doubt- 
ful. 

Muenchen and Stettin were probably torpedoed in this attack. 

Five torpedoes apparently were fired at the battleships be- 
tween 11.30 p. m. and 12.30 a. m. Three hits and one probable hit 
were claimed. 

Faulkner reported three torpedoes explosion at about 11.30 p. 
m. 



Torpedoes Fired 


Hits Claimed 


"Probability" 


Estimated Actual Hit* 


16 


•6 


10 to 11 


Probably 3. 


• Two doubtful. 









Pommern was probably sunk in this attack. 

IV. — Attacks by Twelfth Flotilla on a Squadron of Four Dread- 
naught Battleships or Battle Cruisers, 2 to 2.30 a. m. 

The enemy appears to have consisted of four two-funnelled 
ships; class uncertain. 

Seventeen torpedoes were fired, and eight hits were claimed, 
on the second, third, and fourth ships of the line. The second 
ship appeared to blow up, but this has not been confirmed. 

Actual hits appear to be as follows: 

Second ship. — At least one hit, perhaps more; two under 
bridge, one abreast mainmast. Appeared to blow up. 

Third ship. — One between funnels. 

Fourth ship. — One amidships. 

These ships were probably Rheinland, Nassau, and Westfalen. 
All returned to harbor. 

Torpedoes flred Hits claimed "Probability" Estimated actual hits 

17 8 7 Probably 3. 



NOTES FROM O. N. I. PUBLICATIONS 



55 



V. — Attack by Moresby on a Squadron of Four Deutschland Class, 

2.37 a. m. 

One torpedo was fired; Moresby claimed a hit on tlie third 
ship of the line. 
Torpedoes fired Hits claimed "Probability" Estimated actual hits 

1 1 50 per cent Possibly 1. 

Ship not identifiable. 
SUMMARY OF TORPEDOES FIRED IN NIGHT ATTACKS 





« 
o 
r) 

Si 

Hfa 




"Prob- 
ability" 


Estimated 
Actual hits 


Per cent 


I 


4 
1 

16 

17 

1 


2 
1 
7 to 9 
8 
1 


2 

50 percent 
10 to 11 
7 
50 percent 

20 to 21 


Possibly 1*. 




fl 




III 


Probably 3.. 
do 




IV 




V 


Possibly 1*.. 








Total 


39 


19 to 21 


7 


18 









* These must be classed "improbable. 



Ships hit not identified. 



TORPEDOES FIRED BY THE ENEMY— BATTLE OF JUTLAND 
BANK AND THE DAY FOLLOWING. 

An analysis and summary of all torpedoes reported to have 
been fired by the enemy at British ships and vessels during the 
Battle of Jutland Bank and on the day following follow: 

The various attacks have been classified as follows: 

I. Attack on battle cruisers by German submarines, 3.45 to 
4.15 p. m. 

II. Attack on Third Battle Cruiser Squadron by German light 
cruisers, 5.45 to 6.15 p. m. 

III. Concentrated attack on First Battle Squadron, 6.45 to 7.15 
p. m., apparently by two submarines. 

IV. Concentrated attack on First Battle Squadron, 7.33 to 
7^8 p. m., apparently by one destroyer flotilla. 

V. Torpedoes fired at cruisers at head of line about 6.40 p. m. 

VI. Torpedoes fired at cruisers at head of line about 7.30 p. m. 

VII. Single torpedoes fired at fleet. 

VIII. Individual attacks on Champion and torpedo-boat de- 
stroyers by German torpedo-boat destroyers. 

The probability figures are based on the results of torpedo 
long-range firing in peace time, when alterations of course were 
not allowed. 



SUMMARY OF RESULTS 



Torpedoes 
seen 

66-|-(?) 



Hits 
2 



Under 
4 



Short 

2 or 3 



Avoided 

32+(?) 



Missed 
25+(?) 



Hits 
(per cent) 
About 2.5 



56 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

The two attacks on the First Battle Squadron must be re- 
garded as successful opcralions in a sense, although unfruitful. 

On each occasion a large number of torpedoes were success- 
fully fired across the track of the battle squadron. Had it not been 
for the good lookout kept and the successful use of helm, six or 
seven hits should have been obtained. 

Some of the torpedoes appear Jo have been running badly and 
several appeared to be at the extreme end of their run. One at 
least must have passed under; four others are reported to have 
passed under on less definite evidence. 

Of the eight torpedoes fired during the night, three ran on the 
surface. This was probably intentional. 

SUMMARY OF GERMAN TORPEDOES WHICH MISSED THEIR 

AIM 

Missed 

Ship. Missed. Under. Hit. 
Battle-cruiser force: 

Nicator 1 

Tiqer 4 ; 

Princess Royal S 

Invincible - (?) 5 

Indomitable 5 

Inflexible 4 1 

Battle fleet: 

Iron Duke 2 

Marlborough 5 11 

Revenge 3 

Hercules 3 

Agincourt 4 

Collingwood 2 

Neptune 1 

St. Vincent 3 

Barham 4 

Malaya (?) 

Duke of Edinburgh 1 

Calliope 6 

Champion ..1 1 

Shark 1 1 

Unity 1 

Garland 3 

*59 5 JT" 

Total 66 

I — Attack on Battle Cruisers by German Submarine, 3.45 to 4.15 
p. m. 

The battle cruisers were steering southeastwardly, with Ly- 
diard and Landrail on the engaged (port) bow of Lion, and Thir- 
teenth Flotilla ahead. 

3.30 p. m. — Torpedo fired by a submarine at Nicator; surface 
run; Nicator turned away at full speed; torpedo missed ahead. 

3.45 p. m. — Torpedo fired by a submarine passed under Lan- 
drail and crossed the line of battle cruisers; Landrail reported be- 
tween Tiger and New Zealand, Lydiard 60 yards ahead of Queea 
Mary. 

4.11 p. m. — Torpedo pased under Princess Royal amidships. 

Torpedo Passed 

seen Avoided Missed under "Probability" 

3 1111 



NOTES FROM O. N. I. PUBLICATIONS 



57 



IL — Attack on Third Battle Craiser Squadron by German Lifht 

Cruisers, 5.45 to 6.15 p. m. 

5.45 p. m. — Invincible sighted several torpedoes fired by a 
light cruiser, afterwards destroyed; avoided by turning away. 

6.13 p. m. — Indomitable sighted five torpedoes, fired apparent- 
ly by light cruisers; avoided by turning away; one ran alongside 
for 20 yards but ship outran it: two passed astern. 

6.15 p. m. — Inflexible sighted three torpedoes; one passed 
slowly down port side 20 feet off; one passed astern; one passed 
under, and was seen on far side. 

Torpedoes seen Avoided Passed under "Probability" 

8-f uncertain 7+uncertain 1 3 to 4 

IIL — Concentrated Attack on First Battle Squadron, 6.45 to 7.15 p. 
m. 
Eight or nine torpedoes were seen. The first (doubtful report) 
stopped short on starboard bow of St Vincent, the second struck 
Marlborough on the starboard bow. Another stopped short 100 
yards on starboard quarter of St. Vincent, who had altered course 
away on sighting it. The remainder crossed the track (see list 
below) and were avoided by the use of helm. 



No. Time. Reported by- 



6.40 

6.54 

7 

7 

7.1 

7.1 



St. Vincent. 
Marlborough 

St. Vincent 

Marlborough.. 
Marlborough.. 

Marlborough.. 



7 7.9 Revenge... 

8 7.8 Agincourt. 

9 7.15 Neptune.. 



Turned. 



Away 

Toward. 
Away 



Away. 



Not stated 

Away, then toward. 



Result 



Stopped 200 yards short. 

Hit. 

Stopped 100 yards short 

Passed under stem. 

Passed ahead and close 

under bow. 
Passed ahead and close 

under bow. 
Passed astern. 
Just missed astern. 
Near port quarter. 



These torpedoes may have been fired by: 

(a) Disabled cruiser about 10,000 yards on starboard beam 
(reported by Mnrlborough and Hercules as Boon, by Revenge as a 
light cruiser, by Neptune as a three-funneled ship). It was prob- 
ably the Rostock. 

This is thought improbable, as the torpedo would have to 
possess a speed and range of 30 knots to 12,000 yards at least. It 
is not impossible, however, that the Rostock, being a modern light 
cruiser, may have had a torpedo of this speed and range. 

(b) Neptune believed two submarines were sighted about 2 
miles off. Revenge considered she hit the submarine which tor- 
pedoed Marlborough. 

Agincourt sighted a periscope at 7 p. m., and considered tor- 
pedo, which missed astern of her, was fired by a submarine. 
Barham reported firing on a submarine about this time. 

(c) Neptune and Collingwood reported torpedo-boat des- 
troyers. 

It appears most probable that these eight torpedoes were fired 



58 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

by two submarines (carrying at least two bow and two stern tubes 
each). They may have come from the torpedo-boat destroyers, but 
in view of a torpedo-boat destroyer attack having definitely been 
made a few minutes later, this is less likely, except in Neptune's 
case. No. 9, 7.15 p. m. 

No special remarks were made on the running of these torpe- 
does. Except for the two which stopped short of St. Vincent, they 
all appear to have been running efficiently. 

The apparent concentration on Marlborough is probably due 
to the center ship of the squadron having been taken as point of 
aim. 

Torpedoes Hit. Short. Avoided, "Probability." 

Seen. ^ 

8 or 9 11 or 2 6 2 

IV.— Concentrated Attack on First Battle Squadron, 7.33 to 7.38 p.m. 

Eleven (possibly 12) torpedoes were seen. One appeared to 
pass under Marlborough. The others were avoided by a general 
turn away, and by the use of helm. 

I and 2. Passed one on either side of Collmgwood, about 200 
yards anart, running neck and neck in a course of about 60° port. 
Colossus and Collingwood turned away. Colossus reports torpedo 
running slow and erratic, leaving a broad track. One passed 30 
yards ahead of Collingwood, the other 10 yards astern. 

3 and 4. Sighted on starboard bow of Marlborough, who 
turned to port, and subsequently back to starboard. One passed 
ahead, the other close under stern. 

5. Sighted on starboard beam of Marlborough, appeared to 
pass under ship abreast of "Y" turret. 

6. Broke .surface 25 to 30 yards on starboard beam of Revenge 
after alteration of course to port. 

7 Passed 30 yards astern of Revenge at approximately the 
same time as 6. Revenge reported these torpedoes running straight, 
and keeping good depth, but at end of run. 

8 and 9. Sighted 800 yards on starboard quarter of Hercules, 
after the turn to port. Course altered 5 points to port to avoid 8, 
which passed 40 vards ahead; 9 was seen bearmg starboard 100 , 
distant 700 yards," was lost sight of when course was altered for 8, 
was last seen bearing starboard 160°. and it is estimated to have 
oassed very close to stern. Ship's going to port was checked to 
avoid swinging over on to this torpedo, which was, however, not 
seen again on the port side. 

10 Two torpedoes sighted by Agincourt. Avoided by use of 
heim; passed 50 to 100 yards ahead. The latter was probably 9 
above. 

II Just missed stern of Agincourt; slower running. Avoided 
bv use of helm. Barham reported seeing four tracks ahead be- 
tween 7 and 8 p. m. Malaya reported seeing several tracks; not 
verified. 

These torpedoes appear to have been fired by a flotilla of 
torpedo-boat destroyers. Bearing and distance reported as fol- 
lows: 



NOTES FROM 0. N. I. PUBLICATIONS 



59 



Time Ship reporting 


Bearing 


Distance Number 


B. m. 


70° starboard 


Yards 

6,000 1 


7 30 Collingwood . . 

7 15 Neptune 

7 35 Revenge 


5 abaft starboard beam (795'' 

starboard) 
WNW 


1, 000 (?1 0.000) 3 or 4 
8,000-10,000 tf to 8 


70° starboard . 


1 


7 35 Agincourt 


Stnrboard b'^nf. . . .... . , . 









No. 1 appears to have been running badly, and probably cold. 

No. 5 appears to have passed under Marlborough. 

Nos. 6 and 7 are reported as running well, but at the end of 
their run. 

No. 11 seems to have been running slow. 

The range and bearing given by Colossus is consistent with a 
28-knot 7,000-yard torpedo, such as the Germans are known to 
have had in large numbers. 

The apparent concentration on Marlborough was probably due 
to the center ship of the squadron having been taken as a point 
of aim. 



Torpedoes seen 

11 or 12 



Under 
1 



Avoided 
10 or 11 



•Probability' 
4 



V. — Torpedoes Fired at Cruisers at Head of Line about 6.40 p. m. 

(a) Tiger reported, 6.37 to 6.39 p. m. — Three torpedoes passed 
close to stern. Course altered for one, but the others passed clear. 

(b) Princess Royal reported, 6.40 p. m. — ^Torpedo passed un- 
der amidships. 

(c) Duke of Edinburgh reported, 6.47 p. m. — ^Track of torpedo 
observed passing starboard to port. Helm put hard over to avoid, 
or it would otherwise have struck. The torpedo passed 50 yards 
astern. 



Torpedoes seen 

5 



Avoided 

2 



Passed under 
1 



Missed 
2 



•Probability' 
2 



VL — Torpedoes Fired at Cruisers at Head of Line abont 7.30 p. m. 
by German Torpedo-Boat Destroyers. 

(a) Inflexible reported, 7.25 p. m. — ^Track of torpedo passed 
astern at 150 yards (fired by torpedo boat), 

(b) Calliope, 7.25 p. m. — Attacked by eight torpedo-boat des- 
troyers, bearing starboard 75°, 7,000 yards on parallel course. 
Speed of Calliope, 27% knots; enemy estimated 33 knots. Four 
torpedoes seen — 

Seen Passed 

(a) 100 yards off. to 5 vards ahead. 

(b) 150 vards off 5 to 15 vards astern. 

fc) Well ahead 100 to 150 vard ahead. 

(d) Well ahead 400 to 500 yards ahead. 

Torpedoes were running straight and well, leaving tracks like 
cold torpedoes. 



60 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

(c) Caroline, 7.35 p. ra. — Enemy fired from behind smoke 
screen, Caroline steering toward enemy. First torpedo passed 
down port side, second down starboard side; surfaced when abeam 
at end of run and passed close to stern. 

Appeared to be an 18-inch, and was painted red. 
Torpedoes seen Missed "Probability" 

7 7 2 

VIL — Single Torpedoes Fired at Fleet. 

(a) Iron Duke-Oak reported, 7.35 p. m. — Track passed 200 
yards ahead of Iron Duke. The torpedo traveled slowly, and fin- 
ished its run 2,000 yards on port side of line and then sank. 

(b) Iron Duke-Benbow reported, 8.27 p. m. — Observed tor- 
pedo crossing Iron Duke's bow. 

(c) Barham, 6 to 7 p. ra. — Four torpedoes passed through the 
line close to Barham and were avoided by turning away. A sub- 
marine was fired on about this time. 

(d) Malaya.— Several tracks reported, but none verified. 

(e) St. Vincent. — ^Track seen between 8 and 8.10 p. m., which 
passed between Neptune and St Vincent. 

(f) Agincourt reported, 8.25 p. m. — Observed a track on star- 
board side and used helm. Torpedo came to surface apparently at 
end of run, 150 yards on starboard bow. 

(g) Inflexible reported that at 8.35 p. m. the track of a tor- 
pedo crossed her bows. 

Torpedoes seen Avoided Missed "Probability" 

9+tmcertain 5 4-1-uncertain 3 or 4 

yill. Individual Attacks on Champion and Torpedo-Boat Destroy- 
ers by German Torpedo-Boat Destroyers. 

(a) Shark was attacked at about 7 p. m. by two torpedo-boat 
destroyers with two torpedoes at a range of 1,500 to 1,800 yards; 
one hit and sank her. 

(b) Unity was attacked at 10 p. m. by a German torpedo-boat 
destroyer with one torpedo. Enemy's range, 1,000 yards, bearing 
160° • course two points outward. Torpedo was seen to leave tube. 
Speed was increased, helm put hard over toward the enemy; tor- 
pedo passed 30 feet astern. 

(c) Garland was attacked at 9 p. m. by two German torpedo- 
boat destroyers with two torpedoes. 

Enemy's range 600 yards, bearing 79° opposite course. Ap- 
proach of torpedoes both seen and heard; ran on surface. Both 
missed astern, by 10 feet and 20 yards. 

(d) Garland was attacked again at 2.30 a. m. by one German 
torpedo-boat destroyer with one torpedo. 

Enemy's range 4,000 yards, bearing 67% opposite course. Tor- 
pedo ran on surface and missed astern by 500 yards. 

(e) Champion was attacked at 3.30 a. m. by four torpedo-boat 
destroyers with two torpedoes. Avoided by use of helm, one 
passing under bows, one missing close astern. 

^^Fh-ed*^* Hit Missed ahead Missed astern Not stated "Probability" 

8 1 1 ♦ .J ^ ^ ^ 

Note. — Three out of the eij^t ran on the surface. 



Ill 

NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

..(Note. — This narrative has been compiled from the account of the battle of 
Jutland by Arthur Pollen In his book "The Navy in Battle;" from a United 
States War College article on the battle of Jutland compiled by Lieut. Com- 
mander H. H. Frost, U. S. N.; and from various English and German reports. 
The narrative does not pretend to be complete. Special emphasis has been 
placed upon the part of the torpedo in the battle. The narrative, so to speak, 
is merely a frame-work to make intelligible the important and probable rela- 
tion of torpedo attacks to the main action. This narrative can be most proQt- 
ably studied in connection with the preceding detailed accounts of torpedo 
attacks in the battle of Jutland.) 

On the early afternoon of 31 May 1916, the English Grand 
Fleet, according to Admiral Jellicoe's report, was running on its 
particular sweep through the North Sea. The Grand Fleet was 
divided into two main detachments — the main body under the com- 
mander in chief, Admiral Jellicoe, and the scouting or battle cruis- 
er force under Vice Admiral Beatty. The main body of the Grand 
Fleet consisted of 25 dreadnaught battleships, 3 battle cruisers, 9 
armored cruisers, 10 light cruisers, and about 63 destroyers. About 
50 miles to the southward of the main body was the battle cruiser 
force commanded by Vice Admiral Beatty, which was composed of 
Lion (flagship), Tiger, Queen Mary, Princess Royal, New Zealand, 
and Indefatigable. This battle-cruiser fleet was accompanied by 
the fifth battle squadron, composed of Barham (flagship), Valiant. 
Warspite, and Malaya. In addition, there were the First, Second, 
and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons and about 84 destroyers. 

According to Admiral Beatty's report, the battle cruisers were 
steering towards the northward to join the commander-in-chief. 
The light cruisers were formed in a screen to the rear of the capi- 
tal ships about 15 to 20 miles from the battle-cruiser fleet. 

At 2.20 p. m. Galatea, in the east sector of the light cruiser 
screen surrounding the British battle cruiser fleet, reported to 
Admiral Beatty the presence of enemy vessels — actually the second 
German light cruiser group to the east. 

Admiral Beatty, with the capital ships, at once changed course 
to south-southeast with the intention of warding off the battle 
forces from their base. At 2.25 Galatea reported the enemy force 
was considerable. At 2.35 Admiral Beatty observed a great deal of 
smoke to the eastward. At 2.45 he ordered Engadine to send up 
a seaplane. By 3.08 this order had been executed, but the informa- 
tion obtained was too late to be of great value. At 3.30 the forces 
of Admirals Beatty and Hiuper sighted each other. As soon as 
Admiral Beatty made out the German battle cruisers he formed 
line of battle — Lion, Tiger, Queen Mary, Princess Royal, New Zea- 
land and Indefatigable. He then changed course six points to the 
right, steadying on east-southeast. As soon as Admiral Hipper 
made out the English forces approaching he went column left 
about 14 points and steadied on course south-southeast. His light 
cruisers fell in astern with him. Admiral Beatty had so formed his 
ships for action in a line of bearing that in the northeasterly wind 
the smoke of one shin should not interfere with the fire of the next. 
His course, east-southeast, converged on that of the enemy. 

Just as Admiral Beattv had given the order to form in a line of 

«1 



•2 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

bearing, a torpedo was fired by a submarine at H. M. S. destroyer 
Micator. As the torpedo ran on the surface. Nicator was able to 
avoid it by turning away at full speed. The torpedo missed ahead 
by the time the line was formed; the range was about 23,000 yards. 
The destroyers Lydiard and Landrail were on the engaged (port) 
bow of Lion and Thirteenth Flotilla ahead. At 3.45 another tiar- 
pedo fired by a submarine passed under Landrail and crossed the 
line of battle cruisers. Landrail reported between Tiger and New 
Zealand; Lydiard 60 yards ahead of Queen Mary. At 3.48 the 
range had been closed to 18,500 yards, when both sides opened 
fire simultaneously. The Fifth Battle squadron was at that time 
out of range. When the range had closed to about 14,000 yards' or 
less, parallel courses were steered and kept until the end of this 
phase of the engagement. 

The Fifth Battle Squadron consisted of four ships of Queen 
Elizabeth class, under the command of Admiral Evan-Thomas. At 
about the time Admiral Beatty formed his battle line, they were 
about 10,000 yards off; not straight astern of the battle cruisers, 
but bearing about half a right angle to port. The course that 
would bring the enemy into the line of the battle cruiser fleet then 
was not parallel to that steered by Admiral Beatty, but a course 
converging on it. It was this that enabled them, with increased 
speed, to come into action at 4.08 though only then at the range of 
20,000 yards. 

At 4.03 the sixth ship in the English column, Indefatigable 
(Capt. Sowerby), was hit by a shell in a vulnerable spot. The 
destruction of the ship was instantaneous and almost the entire 
personnel, including the captain, were lost. An almost exactly 
similar misfortune later befell Queen Mary, which was sunk at 4.30. 
Neither ship had in any sense of the word been overwhelmed by 
the gunfire of the enemy. Indeed, when Queen Mary went down, 
the enemy's fire, which had been singularly accurate and intense 
in the first phase of the action, had, as the Vice Admiral says in his 
dispatch, slackened. The superior skill, due chiefly to the wider 
experience of the British fire-control organization, had already be- 
gun to tell, the enemy's fire control being evidently unable to sur- 
vive the damages and losses of the action. 

At 4.11 p. ra., just as the Fifth Battle Squadron came into ac- 
tion, a torpedo passed under Princess Royal amidships, presuma- 
bly fired by one of the German battle cruisers. 

At 4.15 p. m. eight units of the Fourteenth Flotilla, together 
with two of the Tenth and two of the Ninth, moved forward from 
their position well ahead of the British flagship. It was almost 
simultaneously countered by an identical movement by the enemy, 
with a considerable preponderance of forces — 15 destrovers sup- 
ported by a light cruiser, Regensburg, against the 12 British des- 
troyers. These two forces met before either had reached a posi- 
tion for eff"ecting its main purpose, viz, the torpedo attack on the 
capital ships. The Germans were driven back, two of their des- 
troyers sunk, and, what was more important, it was made quite 
impossible for them to carrv through a torpedo attack against the 
English ships. But just as the enemy boats had been unable to get 
a favorable position for attacking the British battle cruisers, so, too, 
the English boats, delayed by this engagement, were unable to get 
the desired oosition on the enemy bow for employing their torpe- 
does to the best pdvantage. Only 5 torpedoes out of 48 carried by 
the attacking British torpedo-boat destroyers could be fired against 



NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND « 

the line of the German battle cruisers before they turned at 4^2 
to northwest. Three destroyers, though unable to attack from 
ahead, pressed forward for a broadside attack on von Hipper's 
ships, and naturally came under a lierce lire from the secondary ar- 
mament of these vessels. One of them, Nomad, was badly hit and 
had to stop between the line. She was ultimately lost. Five other 
destroyers — Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent, Termagant, and Mores- 
by — pushed home the attack; five torpedoes were fired at about 
4.20 by Nestor, Nomad, and Nicator, at 6,000 yards' range, at the 
battle cruiser line. The Petard, coming into contact with a group 
of three or four torpedo-boat destroyers at 4.25, fired a torpedo at 
the group, sinking the leader. Within the next 15 minutes she fired 
three more torpedoes at the second ship in the German line, at 
7,000 yards' range. All three passed very close to Moltke, but it is 
doubtful if they hit. 

At 4.38 Commodore Goodenough, in command of the Second 
Light Cruiser Squadron (Southampton, Birmingham, Lowestoft, 
Nottingham, and Dublin), which had gotten to its action station 
ahead of Admiral's Beatty's line a little before the engagement 
opened with von Hipper at 3.30, reported the advent of Scheer 
with the German battle squadron from the south. At 4.42 Ad- 
miral Beatty, from Lion, made out the German battle fleet. He im- 
mediately went column right for 18 points and headed to the 
northward. 

At the same time Admiral Hipper performed exactly the same 
maneuver, taking station ahead of the German battle fleet. Five 
more torpedoes were fired on the German battle cruisers at 7,000 
yards after the turn to northwest, two by Nerissa, one of the at- 
tacking flotilla, and three from the British battle cruiser line — two 
from Lion and one from Moresby, stationed on her engaged bow. 
Moresby and Nerissa both claimed hits on the rear ship of the line 
at approximatelv the same time. As Fearless reported a battle 
cruiser leaving the line at 5.10, it appears probable that one hit at 
least was obtained. This may have been Von Der Tann, but there 
is considerable doubt as to whether this ship was actually torpe- 
doed. 

While Admiral Beatty turned, Conunodore Goodenough in 
Southampton took position to ascertain the precise number and 
composition of the German forces. To do so the commodore took 
his sauadron under the fire of the German dreadnaughts. He went 
on until a range of about 13,000 yards was reached, and, having ob- 
tained the information he wanted, returned to form with the 
cruiser fleet on its northerly course. His squadron was barely 
hit. for thought the fire was intense, the change of range was too 
rapid and far too difficult for the German fire control to surmount. 

On the German battle fleet being sighted in the rear of the bat- 
tle cruisers, thev were attacked by the British cruiser Nottingham 
with an extreme ran^e at 16.500 yards (4.41 p. m.). Four minutes 
later (4.45) the British destroyers Nestor and Nicator, which had 
fallen behind during the destroyer attack on the battle cruisers at 
4.15, pressed home an attack on the leading squpdron of the battle 
fleet. Nestor fired two torpedoes at 3,000 yards before she was 
stonned and sunk bv pun fire. Nicator escaned to the westward, 
under heavy fire, after firing one torpedo at 3,000 yards. 

Admiral Evan-Thomas, with the Fifth Battle Sauadron. kept 
on and encn^pd the German battle cruisers, while Admiral Beatty 
made his 18-point turn. 



•4 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

At 4^2 Admiral Evan-Thomas countermarched upon a signal 
from Admiral Beatty. At 4.57 the turn was completed and this 
force fell in behind the battle cruiser fleet under long-range fire 
from the leading ships of the German battle fleet. 

At 4.57 the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons took sta- 
tion ahead of the battle cruiser fleet, as did the First Flotilla. The 
Thirteenth Flotilla took station near the Fifth Battle Squadron. 
The Second Light Cruiser Squadron took station on the port quar- 
ter of the battle cruiser fleet. 

At 4.57 Admiral Scheer took command of all the German forces. 
The group of light cruisers and one destroyer flotilla were in the 
lead. On the port quarter were the battle cruisers, followed at a 
considerable interval by the battle fleet. The remaining destroyers 
and light cruisers were on the unengaged side of the battle cruisers 
and battle fleet. 

From the time when Scheer came into action, at 4.57, till 6, 
Admiral Beatty kept the range at 14,000 yards. Moorsom, one of 
the ships of the second light cruiser squadron, attacked the battle 
fleet at 8,500 yards, firing two torpedoes at 5.10 against the second 
ship of the German line, and 20 minutes later two more against 
the third ship. 

Nomad, which had remained stopped between the lines as a 
result of a hit by the battle cruisers at 4.20, was sunk by the gun- 
fire of the battle fleet at 5.15. 

At 5.35 Scheer began hauling roimd to the east, changing his 
course gradually away from the British line, having probably by 
this time received information of the approach of the Grand Fleet. 
Admiral Beatty turned with the enemy, increasing speed so as to 
maintain his general relation to the head of the German line. 
Scheer realized that if the High Seas Fleet were to be saved he 
must make good his escape during the deployment of the Grand 
Fleet, which was advancing in three columns. TTie circumstances 
of the moment were especially favorable for such tactics. The 
conditions of the atmosphere that made long range gunnery dif- 
ficult made the establishment of smoke screens to render it more 
difficult still more easy. The wind had dropped, the air was heavy 
and vaporous, the ships were running from one bank of light fog 
to another. It was a day on which smoke would stay where it 
was made, and cling to the surface of the sea, mingling with and 
permeating the water-laden atmosphere. These were just the con- 
ditions in which, were a torpedo attack delivered, it would have 
a maximum deterrent effect upon the enemy. Scheer's gradual turn 
to the east may therefore be interpreted as an attempt to open up 
the range preliminary to escape under cover of a concentrated tor- 
pedo attack. A favorable opportunity for this move did not pre- 
sent itself tiU 6.45. 

By 5.35 the English Grand Fleet had reached the immediate 
vicinity of the scene of battle and its advance detachments were 
entering into the engagement. The Grand Fleet consisted of the 
First, Second, and Fourth Battle Squadrons, under the command 
of Jellicoe, in Iron Duke. While the main body advanced at high 
speed, probably 20 knots, towards the English forces under Ad- 
miral Beatty, the cruiser force, being able to steam at from 3 to 8 
knots faster than the battleshins, had been sent ahead to reinforce 
Admiral Beatty. The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Ad- 
miral Hood, in Invincible (flagship), with Indomitable and Inflexi^ 



NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 6* 

ble, led the advance, followed by the First and Second Cruiser 
Squadrons. The First Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear Ad- 
miral Arbuthnot, was composed ot the armored cruisers Defence, 
Warrior, Black Prince, and Duke of Edinburgh. The Second Cruis- 
er Squadron, commanded by Rear Admiral Heath, was composed 
of live armored cruisers — Achilles, Cochrane, Hampshire, Shan- 
non, and Minotaur. The light cruisers Chester and Canterbury 
were attached to the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron. 

At 5.30 Admiral Hood made out the fire of guns to the south- 
west. He sent Chester, one of the two light cruisers attached to his 
squadron, to clear up the situation. Chester ran into four German 
light cruisers and fought them single handed for some time. The 
melee between the Chester, English destroyers, and German light 
cruisers at the head of the German line now developed into a very 
bitter struggle, each side throwing fresh forces into the engagement. 

At about 5.57 the English First and Second Cruiser Squadrons 
(Rear Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot) en- 
tered the fight from northeast, and at 6.00 light cruiser Canterbury 
and the entire Third Battle Squadron reached the scene. In face 
of this overwhelming force, the German light cruisers retired 
towards the battle cruisers. At 6.00 Shark torpedoed a cruiser 
with four funnels, probably the Rostock, which appeared to catch 
lire. At 6.05 Onslow fired a torpedo at 8,000 yards range at the 
leading ship of the German battle cruisers. The light cruiser Wies- 
baden was crippled and lost all speed. She was torpedoed by Ons- 
low at 6.15, the torpedo hitting under fore conning tower at 4,500 
yards range. Falmouth also claimed a hit on a disabled light 
cruiser at 6.21, but there is no evidence that Wiesbaden was hit 
twice. At 6.18 Onslow fired two more torpedoes at 8,000 yards at 
the fourth German ship of the Kaiser class before she was disabled 
by gunfire. 

Rear Admiral Arbuthnot, with the First Cruiser Squadron, in 
pursuit of the German light cruisers, stood about west-southwest 
into a position directly between the two battle fleets. The Ger- 
mans overwhelmed it by a heavy fire. At 6.17 Defence, flagship 
of Admiral Arbuthnot, sank. Black Prince, Warrior, badly dam- 
aged, made off to the northwest. Duke of Edinburgh, the last ship 
in the column, escaped and joined the second cruiser squadron. 
Admiral Jellicoe reports that "it is probable that Sir Robert Ar- 
buthnot, during his engagement with the enemy light cruisers and 
in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the 
approach of the enemy heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he 
found himself in close proximity with the main fleet, and before 
he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire 
and disabled." 

At 6.14 Admiral Jellicoe gave the order to deploy from the 
formation of approach into line of battle. Hood, in Invincible, 
with Inflexible and Indomitable, was ordered bv Admiral Beatty 
at 6.20 to take station ahead of the line. The fifth battle squadron, 
under Evan-Thomas, took position in the rear of the deploying 
Grand Fleet. During this maneuver the Warspite's steering gear 
jammed and she headed toward the German battle fleet. Although 
hit many times, she was able to escape by steering with her en- 
gines. 

The British ships after the deployment were arranged as fol- 
lows: Hood, in Invincible, followed bv Inflexible and In<1omitnble; 
Beatty, in Lion, followed by Tiger, Princess Royal, and New Zeal- 



66 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

and; the Second Battle Squadron, commanded by Vice Admiral Jer- 
ram; the Fourth Battle Squadron, including the flagship Iron Duke, 
commanded by Admiral Jellicoe; the First Battle Squadron, com- 
manded by Vice Admiral Burney (Colossus, Collingwood, Neptune, 
St. Vincent, Marlborough, Revenge, Hercules, Agincourt); and last- 
ly, the Fifth Battle Squadron, commanded by Admiral Evan- 
Thomas, now consisting of three ships — Barham, Valiant, and Ma- 
laya. 

But before the deployment could be completed the Battle 
Fleet became engaged. At 6.17 the first squadron opened fire on 
the leading German battleships. The other two squadrons opened 
fire on the crippled Wiesbaden, and at 6.30 shifted their fire onto 
the German battle fleet. 

By 6.25 the English battle cruisers had closed the range to 
8,000 yards and had Luetzow, von Kipper's flagship, under heavy 
fire. Simultaneously with this movement, the third light cruiser 
squadron, under Rear Admiral Napier, composed of Falmouth, 
Liverpool, Gloucester, Yarmouth, and Ophelia, from its position on 
the starboard bow of the British battle cruisers, pushed on to with- 
in 7,000 yards of the German battle cruisers. Ophelia and Yar- 
mouth both fired torpedoes at 6.30 against the leading ship of the 
German line. As the Luetzow is reported to have left the line 
about six minutes later, it is quite probable that the torpedo of 
Yarmouth, fired at 7,000 yards range, reached its mark. The 
Luetzow, flagship of Admiral von Hipper, had previously been se- 
verely damaged by 15 shells of large caliber. Admiral von Hipper 
entered a destroyer to shift his flag to another of his ships. At 
about the same time the Invincible, flagship of Admiral Hood, was 
destroyed by the first and almost the only shell that hit her. 

Between 6.20 and 6.40 the heaviest fighting of the day occurred. 
The English fire was concentrated on the battle and light cruisers 
at the head of the line and on the four leading battleships. The 
EngUsh battle cruisers bore the brunt of the punishment on the 
English side. 

By 6.40 the visibility conditions had become much worse. At 
about 6.30 the two leading English battle squadrons opened fire; 
the German commander-in-chief had probably begun to realize the 
danger of his position with the English fleet so far forward on his 
port bow. Scheer by this time had had his fleet on an easterly course 
for 35 minutes, awaiting the opportunity to turn a right angle or 
more, so as to retreat under cover of torpedo attacks. At 6.45, 
therefore, Scheer launched a concentrated torpedo attack on the 
First Battle Squadron. The Third Destroyer Flotilla attacked the 
First Battle Squadron, and at the same time covered the German 
battle fleet with a smoke screen. One German destroyer was lost 
in the attack. Eight or nine toroedoes were seen; the first stopped 
short on the starboard bow of St. Vincent, the second struck Marl- 
borough at 0.54 on the starboard bow. Another stopped short 100 
yards on starboard quarter of St. Vincent, who had altered course 
awav on sighting it. The remainder crossed the track and were 
avoided bv use of helm. (See "Tornedoes Fired by the Enemv." — 
III. Concentrated Attack on First Battle Squadron, 6.45 to 7.15 p. 
m., p. 18.) 

This concentrated toroedo attack had the desired effect. The 
enemv, Jellicoe reports, "constantly turned away and opened the 
range under the cover of destroyer attack and smoke screens as the 



NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 67 

effect of British fire was felt." "Opened the range" meant that the 
object of the torpedo attacks had been attained. For a quarter of 
an hour the closing movement of the Grand Fleet was converted to 
an opening movement. Scheer had prevented the close action that 
he dreaded. He had gained the time needed to turn his whole force 
from an easterly to a southwesterly course. By 6.50 Admiral Beatty 
reports "the battle cruisers were clear of the leading British battle 
squadron, then bearing north-northwest, 3 miles from Lion, the 
third ship in the line." "At 7.07," he continued, "we hauled round 
gradually to southwest by south to regain touch with the enemy 
(who were lost to sight at about 6.50). At 7.14 again sighted them 
at a range of about 15,000 yards * * *; we re-engaged at 7.17 
and increased speed to 22 knots." 

About 7.14 the opposing forces again sighted each other. The 
British battle fleet again entered into action, but the First Battle 
Squadron was probably the only one to get in any effective lire, 
as it was stated by Admiral Jeilicoe that the Second Battle Squad- 
ron was not engaged until 7.20. The Fourth Battle Squadron seems 
to have been too far behind, and the Fifth Battle Squadron prob- 
ably took little part in the action between the two battle fleets, 
having been under severe fire at the time of the deployment of the 
Grand Fleet. 

Again, to disengage the German battle fleet, Admiral Scheer 
ordered another destroyer attack. At 7.25 two flotillas, backed up 
by the light cruisers, advanced against the English Fleet. Admiral 
Jeilicoe ordered the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron to counter the 
attack. This squadron quickly moved out between the lines and 
drove the German destroyers back with the loss of one boat. Dur- 
ing this torpedo attack. Inflexible at 7.25 reported "Saw the track 
of a torpedo pass astern at 150 yards." Calliope at the same time 
was attacked by eight torpedo boats bearing starboard 75° 7,000 
yards on parallel course. Speed of CalHope, 27 ¥2 knots; enemy 
estimated 33 knots. Four torpedoes seen. 

Seen. Passed. 

(a) 100 yards off to 5 yards ahead. 

(b) 150 yards off 5 to 15 yards astern. 

(c) Well ahead 100 to 150 vards ahead. 

(d) Well ahead 400 to 500 yards ahead. 

The torpedoes were running straight and were leaving tracks 
like cold torpedoes. Ten minutes later a torpedo passed down port 
side of Caroline; a second down starboard side surfaced when 
abeam at end of run and passed close to stern; enemy fired from 
behind smoke screen. 

At 7.33 Scheer launched a third concentrated torpedo attack 
against the First Battle Squadron, which again caused them to open 
the range by turning away in order to avoid torpedoes. This gave 
Scheer, under cover of a smoke screen, his second opportunity to 
lose touch with the Grand Fleet. 

In this attack, from 7.33 to 7.48. 11 (probably 12) torpedoes 
were seen. One appeared to pass under Marlborough. The others 
were avoided bv a general turn away and by use of helm. (See 
"Torpedoes Fired bv t>ip Enprnv." — IV. Concentrated attack on 
First Battle Squadron, 7.33 to 7.38 p. m., p. 55.) 

Admiral Beatty described this part of the action: 

At 7.32 my course was south\vP"5t, sneod 18 knots, the lending enemy battle- 
ship bearing nortliwest by west. The destroyers at the head of the enemy line 



68 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

emitted volumes of gray smoke, covering their capital ships as with a palU 
under cover of wliich they turned away, and at 7.45 we lost sight of them. 

Admiral Jellicoe, in the attempt to close the enemy, changed 
course to west, but he could see them only for short periods and 
his fire was apparently ineffective. At 7.58 Admiral Beatty sent in 
the First and Third Light Cruiser Squadrons to pick up the German 
Fleet. At the same time Admiral Jellicoe sent in the Fourth Light 
Cruiser Squadron and the Eleventh Flotilla for the same purpose. 
At 8.20 the English battle cruisers advanced to the north in support 
of the light cruisers, which had apparently met the German Fleet, 
and an action of some 10 minutes developed between the English 
battle cruiser fleet, the First, Third, and Fourth Light Cruiser 
Squadrons, and the Eleventh Flotilla on the one hand, and the Ger- 
man battle cruisers, light cruisers, and two battle squadrons on the 
other. 

» • ♦ 

During this short encounter Calliope at 8.28 fired a torpedo at 
a 7,000-yard range against the leading ship of Kaiser class, and 
at 8.30 Princess Royal fired a torpedo at a 10,000-yard range against 
the center ship of three ships of Deutschland class. No hits were 
claimed by the firing ships, but an explosion was seen to take place 
on a large ship, apparently of the Kaiser class, at 8.40. If the times 
are correct, this explosion may have been caused by Calliope's 
torpedo. The ship may have been the Markgraf, but it is not 
known at what time she was torpedoed. 

During this engagement Inflexible at 8.35 saw the track of a 
torpedo which crossed her bow. After 10 minutes' engagement the 
English forces withdrew from the unequal conflict. The Grand 
Fleet seems to have lost sight of the Germans until after 8.20, and 
Admiral Beatty's scouts saw the last of the enemy at 8.38. The 
Vice Admiral continued search for 40 minutes longer and then fell 
back east into the line which was the course of the Grand Fleet 
when he was last in touch with it by wireless. Both fleets seem 
to have proceeded some distance south and to have waited for the 
night in the proximity of a point about equidistant (80 miles) from 
the Horn Reef and Heligoland. 

One destroyer flotilla, the Thirteenth, and one light cruiser 
squadron were retained with the Grand Fleet for protection of the 
capital ships. The rest were disposed, as the commander-in-chief 
said, "in a position in which they could afford protection to the 
fleet and at the same time be favorably situated for attackmg the 
enemv's heavy ships." They must have been placed north of the 
British force. 

No British battle or battle cruiser squadron was attacked dur- 
ing the night. 

There were ntmierous torpedo attacks on the German capital 
ships during the night. At 9.05 the First Light Cruiser Squadron, 
commanded by Commodore Sinclair, made contact with the Ger- 
man battle fleet. Caroline fired two torpedoes at 7,600 yards 
range at the center ship of three ships of the Deutschland class, 
while Royalist fired one torpedo at the center ship of three ships 
of the Nassau class. Between 9.50 and 10.50 p. m. Castor, MagiQ, 
and Marne made an attack on several German cniisers. Four tor- 
pedoes were fired at a ranse between 1,500 and 3.000 yards. Other 
torpedo-boat destrOvers did not fire, apparently because they^ were 
blinded bv the glare of Castor's guns or because they thought the 



NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 69 

enemy might be their own ships. Marne and Magic claimed hits, 
apparently on diflferent ships. Ships not identifiable. 

The Second Light Cruiser Squadron got into action at 10.20 
with five enemy cruisers. One torpedo was fired by Southampton 
at a group of searchlights, at 1.500 yards range, hitting the leading 
ship, Frauenlob, which sank rapidly. 

From 11.10 to 12.25 the Fourth Flotilla made persistent attacks 
on German cruisers and battleships. The enemy appears to have 
consisted of a battle squadron preceded by light cruisers, and it is 
uncertain from many of the reports whether the one fired at ^as 
a light cruiser or a battleship. Eleven torpedoes were fired at the 
cruisers between 11.10 and 11.43 p. m. Four hits are claimed, an- 
other doubtful. Muenchen and Stettin were probably torpedoed 
in this attack. The range was under a thousand yards. Five 
torpedoes apparently were fired at the battleships between .11.30 
D ra and 12.30 a. m. Three hits and one probable hit are claimed. 

During this encounter Tipperary and Fortune were sunk by 
gunfire at 11.10, Sparrowhawk was disabled by gunfire at 11.30, and 
Ardent was sunk by gunfire at 12.25. 

From 2 to 2.30 a. m. the Twelfth Flotilla made an attack on a 
squadron of four dreadnaught battleships or battle cruisers. The 
enemy appears to have consisted of four two-funneled ships, class 
uncertain. Seventeen torpedoes were fired at an average range of 
3 000 yards, and eight hits are claimed on the second, third, ana 
fourth ships of the line. The second ship appeared to blow up, 
but this has not been confirmed. Actual hits appear to be as fol- 
lows: 

Second ship. — At least one hit, perhaps more; two under 
bridge, one abreast mainmast. Appeared to blow up. 

Third ship. — One between funnels. 

Fourth ship. — One amidships. 

These ships were probably Rheinland, Nassau, and Westfalen. 
All returned to harbor. 

During this engagement the upper deck of Onslaught was 
cleared by gunfire at 2:08, after she had fired four torpedoes. 

At 2.37 Moresby sighted four predreadnaughts, possibly a 
squadron of the Deutschland type. One torpedo was f^red at 3,700 
vards. Moresby claimed a hit on the third ship of the Ime, but the 
shiD is not identifiable. Champion was attacked at 3.30 a. m. by 
four torpedo-boat destroyers with two torpedoes, which were 
avoided bv use of helm; one passed under bow one close astern. 
Eight torpedoes in all were fired, three of which ran on the sur- 
face Champion's encounter with four destrovers at 3.30 a. m. was 
the only engagement after daybreak until a Zeppelin was encoun- 
tered at 4 a. m. 

The battle of Jutland was over; the German Fleet had made 
good its escape . 

The only other occurrences were the attacks on the morning 
of 1 June against single shins of the Grand Fleet bv submarines. 
Marlborough at 9.30 a. m. sighted two submarines 8 miles away 
steering for the ship. At 10.52 a. m. she observed oil P^^tches 2 
Ssfstern- one torpedo nn^sed along broadside 2 cables off; 
S,eed of sh?p, 14 knots'^ At 9.35 a. m. Warspite saw two torpedoes 
paS close to ship, one on each side. No track of submarine was 



70 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

seen; speed of ship, 19 knots. At 11.42 a. m. Warspite saw a peris- 
cope close to bow, tried to ram, but missed by a few yards. At 
2.15 a. m. St. Vincent saw the track of a torpedo, which was con- 
tinually breaking surface and stopped about 300 yards short. 

REPLY TO PERSIUS BY CAPT. SHEIBE. 

Source: Berliner Tageblatt, 4 December 1918. — (Enemy Press Sup- 
plement, Daily Review of Foreign Press.) 

19 December 1918. 

As a long-standing contributor to Nauticus and Marine-Rund- 
schau, and as first officer of a modern armored cruiser, in which 
capacity during the war I superintended the gunnery for two 
years and took part in the Skagerrak battle, I may be permitted to 
give an expert reply, so far as the materiel of our High Seas Fleet 
comes in question, to Gapt. Persius's article in the Berliner Tage- 
blatt, which, under the title "How it happened," vigorously at- 
tacked the naval direction and the system of our fleet construction. 
A ship's type is in its complexity one of the most difficult of tech- 
nical compromises. The German constructors in adjusting weight 
pursued a middle course in relation to armament, armor, resis- 
tance, speed and bulk. England subordinated protection, security, 
and resistance to offensive attributes, gun armament, and speed. 
The touchstone of a weapon is battle. Granted that the calibre of 
our guns was almost below what was requisite, that with the lO.o 
centimeter gun on the small cruiser it did not fully comply with 
military requirements, still, after our successes in battle, it can 
by no means be maintained that our materiel was universally in- 
ferior" to the English and "wanting." The material success m 
battle proves the exact contrary. 

In the Skagerrak battle the proportion in strength of the fleets 
was as 1 :2, the proportion of loss in battleships 1 :4, in smaller ves- 
sels 1:2. Consequently the material success was wholly on the 
German side. Admiral Lord Fisher was reproached, when the 
first dreadnaught construction was announced, with these ships 
being 10-minute ships; that is, they would be overcome in 10 
minutes, for they did not posses the necessary resisting power, 
That more or less occurred. The battle cruisers Indefatigable and 
Invincible were blown to bits some 15 minutes after fire was opened 
and the battle cruiser Queen Mary after about half an hour. Our 
armament was in effect and accuracy superior to the British. The 
gun caliber was sufficient. On the German side one large battle 
cruiser, the Luetzow, was put out of action, but it sank only dur- 
ing the return. Ships with about 25 severe hits, and very danger- 
ous damage below the water line, got back to the home ports. 
The Sevdlitz continued the fight to the end with undiminished 
5-oieed. although struck by a torpedo in the fore part at the very 
beginning of the action. 

These are only some few examples in striking confirmation of 
the quality of our materiel. The artillerv successes were achieved 
not, as Capt. Persius savs, in thick weather, but mainly during 
the first part of the brittle, when verv clear weather prevai'ed. 
It is therefore untenable for Car>t. Persius to state that m clear 
weather the outf-nme of the battle must have been annihilating 
for us. as "the British guns with their far grea+er range would 
bp^Tf. shot to Dieces our weaklv armed shins." The battle of t^e 
Falkland Islands can not be adduced as proof that the German ma- 



NARRATIVE OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 71 

teriel was inferior, because in that case ships of the dreadnaught 
type on the English side were pitted against older ships of the 
predreadnaught type on the German side. The absolute inferiority 
of the predreadnaught type in comparison with the modern battle- 
ship is an obvious fact, which was apparent in the Skagerrak bat- 
tle also, when the older English armored cruisers were destroyed. 
But the naval battle of Coronel is a proof that the older German 
materiel was also superior to the older English. 

That the tactical leadership of the English Fleet was "unskill- 
ful" no expert will be willing 1o grant offhand. If Capt. Persius 
emphasizes the skillful leadership of the German Fleet, he 
mentions only one cause of our fleet's brilliant success in the mat- 
ter of armament. As soon as Tiring by ship against ship begins, 
materiel and gunnery are decisive. Both proved superior on the 
German side. If the English Fleet was so sure of its victory, why 
did Admiral Jellicoe break off the Skagerrak battle, and not fight 
it out, which he was quite in a position to do? Why did he not 
energetically pursue the German Fleet on 19 August 1916 and force 
it to battle when it was announced near the English coast, where 
the English Fleet was fully assembled? 

Capt. Persius further thinks that "for a year it had been pos- 
sible to speak of a German High Seas Fleet only in a restricted 
sense," and maintains this by asserting that a great many ships 
of the predreadnaught type had been withdrawn from the first 
battle line, because they had to be used for providing material for 
submarine construction. In reality the withdrawal from the first 
line was effected because the predreadnaught type is universally 
so inferior that every artillery battle must be regarded as hoi)e- 
less for the predreadnaught type. For this reason the English did 
not put their squadrons of older ships in their battle fleet and for 
the same reason Admiral Scheer, after the experience of the Ska- 
gerrak battle, decided to withdraw them from the first line of bat- 
tle. That from the material of some of older ships nickel had been 
obtained for submarine construction has nothing to do with this 
withdrawal. 



IV 
THE BATTLE OF THE SKAGERRAK 

The bombardment of April 25 had not failed to make an im- 
pression in England. The expectation that the fleet was bound 
to succeed in warding olT all German attacks on British shores 
had repeatedly been disappointed. On each occasion the Eng- 
lish main fleet had arrived too late — in December, 1914; in Jan- 
uary, 1915; and now again this year — so that, to the great an- 
noyance of the English, the German "raiders" got away each 
time unpunished. Wherefore Mr. Balfour, the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, felt called upon to announce publicly that should the 
German ships again venture to show themselves ofi" the British 
coast, measures had been taken to ensure their being severely 
punished. However, we were ready to take our chance. 

The question was whether it would be advisable to include 
Squadron II in an advance which in all probability would in- 
volve us in a serious battle. Early in May I ordered the squad- 
ron temporarily into the Jade Basin that I might have an op- 
portunity of discussing with the Squadron Commander the action 
to be observed in battle under the most varied conditions. Mili- 
tary reasons entered into the question as to whether the squad- 
dron should be taken out or left behind, as well as consideration 
for the honour and feeling of the crews, who would not hear of 
being reduced, themselves and their ships, to the second class. 
For battleships to have their activity limited absolutely to guard- 
ing the German Bight without any prospect of getting into touch 
with the enemy — to which they had been looking forward for 
a year and a half — would have caused bitter disappointment; 
on the other hand, however, was the responsibility of sending 
the ships into an unequal fight where the enemy would make use 
of his very best material. I cannot deny that in addition to the 
eloquent intercession of Rear-Admiral Mauve, the Squadron Com- 
mander, my own former connection with Squadron II also in- 
duced me not to disappoint it by leaving it behind. And thus 
it happened that the squadron played its part on May 31, and in 
so helpful a manner that I never had cause to regret my de- 
cision. 

The repairs on the Seydlitz, damaged on April 24, were not 
completed until the end of May, as the reconstruction of the 
mine-shattered torpedo tubes necessitated very heavy work. I 
hpd no intention, however, of doing without that battle-cruiser, 
although Vice-Admiral Hipper, Chief of the Reconnaissance 
Forces, had meanwhile hoisted his flag in the newly repaired 
battle-cruiser Luetzow (Captain Harder, formerly on the Stral- 
sund.) The vessels belonging to Sauadron HI were also having 
their condensers repaired, as on their last trin there had been 
seven cases of damaged machinery in that squadron. The advan- 
tage of having three engines, as had each of these shins, was 
proved bv the fact that two engines alone were able to keep up 
steam almost at full speed: at the same time, verv faultv con- 
struction in the nosition of the engines was annarent, which un- 
fcrtunatelv cou'd not be rectified owing to limited space. Thus 
it happened that when a condenser went wrong it was impossi- 

73 



74 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ble to conduct the steam from the engine with which it was con- 
nected to one of the other two condensers, and thus keep the 
engine itself working. It was an uncomfortable feeling to know 
that this weakness existed in the strongest unit at the disposal 
of the Fleet, and how easily a bad accident might result in leak- 
ages in two different condensers and thus incapacitate one ves- 
sel in the group I 

The object of the next undertaking was a bombardment of 
the fortifications and works of the harbour at Sunderland which, 
situated about the middle of the East coast of England, would 
be certain to call out a display of English fighting forces as pro- 
mised by Mr. Balfoiu*. The order issued on May 18 in this con- 
nection was as follows: 

"The bombardment of Sunderland by our cruisers is intended 
to compel the enemy to send out forces against us. For the at- 
tack on the advancing enemy the High Sea Fleet forces to be 
south of the Dogger Bank, and the U-boats to be stationed for 
attack off the East coast of England. The enemy's ports of sortie 
will be closed by mines. The Naval Corps will support the under- 
taking with their U-boats. If time and circmnstances permit, trade- 
war will be carried on during proceedings. 

The squadrons of men-of-war had made over the command 
of prizes to the torpedo-boat flotillas, as torpedo-boats are the 
best adapted for the examination of vessels, but have not a crew 
large enugh to enable them to bring the captured vessels into 
our ports. The First and Second Scouting Divisions were placed 
at the disposal of the Chief of Reconnaissance, and the Second 
Leader of the torpedo-boats with Flotillas II, VI, and IX. Scout- 
ing Division IV* and the remainder of the flotillas were with the 
Main Fleet. Sixteen of our U-boats were told off for the positions 
of attack, with six to eight of the Flanders boats. On May 15 
they started to reconnoitre in the North Sea, and from May 23 to 
June 1 inclusive were to remain at the posts assigned to them, 
observe the movements of the English forces, and gain any in- 
formation that might be of use to the Fleet in their advance; at 
the same time they were also to seize every opportunity to at- 
tack. Provision was also made for the largest possible niunber 
of our airships to assist the enterprise by reconnaissance from 
the air. The fact that the U-boats could only remain out for a 
certain period put a limit to the execution of the plan. If re- 
connaissance from the air proved impossible, it was arranged to 
make use of the U-boats, and so dispense with aerial reconnais- 
sance. 

As the weather each day continued to be unfavourable and 
the airship commander could only report that it was impossible to 
send up any airships, the plan was so far changed, though with- 
out altering other preparations, that it was decided to embark on 
a campaign asainst cruisers and merchantmen outside and in the 
Skagerrak, vv-ith the expectation that the news of the appearance 
of our cruisers in those waters would be made known to the ene- 
mv. With this obiect in viev% thev had been told to keeii in sight 
of ^iV co^^st cf Norway, so that the enem" x^ilc^t be noti'^ied. In 
frjctlt?^ describing the course of this uij^ferte^'vtg, which led to 



*TlTLe Third Scouting Division, which contpined the oldest armoured 
cruiser?, Prinz Adalbert, Prinz Hefnrich, and Boon, had lona, since been 
handed over to the commander of the Baltic forces, as, owing to their lack 
of speed and inferior armourplating, the vessels were not suitable for use 
in tlie North Sou. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 75 

the Battle of the Skagerrak, I shall keep strictly to the official re- 
port I sent in. 

In judging the proceedings it must be borne in mind that at 
sea a leader adapts his action to the events taking place around 
him. It may possibly reveal errors which can only be accounted 
for later by reports from his own ships or valuable information 
from enemy statements. The art of leadership consists in se- 
curing an approximately correct picture from the iro'pression of 
the moment, and then acting in accordance with it. The writer 
of history can then form a tactical inference where obvious mis- 
takes were made, or where a better grasp of the situation would 
have led to a more advantageous decision. In this event a certain 
reticence should be observed in making definite assertions that a 
different movement would have been more successful, for armed 
efficiency plays the chief part in success and cannot be deter- 
mined wtih mathematical precision. I have in mind one hit that 
did so much damage to our battle-cruiser Seydlitz on January 24, 
1915, that one almost came to the conclusion that such ships 
could not stand many shots of such heavy calibre, and yet the 
following battle proved the contrary. At all events, a good hit 
can seal the fate of a ship, even one of the strongest. A naval bat- 
tle may be open to criticism as to why it happened thus, but any- 
one who asserted that it might have happened otherwise would 
be in danger of losing his case. 

1 
THE ADVANCE 

On May 30, as the possibility of a long-distance aerial recon- 
naissance was still considered uncertain, I decided on an advance 
in the direction of the Skagerrak, as the vicinity of the Jutland 
coast offered a certain cover against surprise. An extensive aerial 
reconnaissance was an imperative necessity for an advance on 
Sunderland in the north-west, as it would lead into waters where 
we could not allow ourselves to be forced into giving battle. As, 
however, on the course now to be adopted, the distance from the 
enemy points of support was considerably greater, aerial recon- 
naissance was desirable, though not absolutely necessary. As 
already stated, our U-boats were in position, some of them in fact 
facina Scapa Flow, one boat off Morav Firth, a large number off 
the Firth of Forth, several off the Humber and the remainder, 
north of the Terschelling Bank, in order to be able to operate 
against enemv forces that might chance to come from a south- 
westerly direction. The combination of our total forces taking 
part was as follows: 

A list of warships which on Mav 30 to June 1, 1916, took part 
in the Battle of the Skagerrak and the operations connected ther- 
with: 

Chief of the Fleet: Vice-Admiral Scheer in Friedrich der Grosse. 
Chief of Staff: Captain von Trotha (Adolf). 
Chief of the Oner'iting Section: Caotain von Levetzow, 
Admiraltv Staff Officer: Captain Quaet-Faslem (Hans). 
Commander of "Friedrich der Grosse": Captain Fuchs (Theodor). 

SQUADRON I 
Chief of Squadron: Vice-Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt, Ostfriesland. 
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Wegener (Wolfgang). 



76 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Admiral: Rear-Admiral Engelhardt, Posen. 
Ostfriesland: Captain von Natzmer. 
Thueringen: Captain Kuesel (Hans). 
Helgoland: Captain von Kamieke. 
Oldenberg: Captain Hoepfner. 
Posen: Captain Lange. 
Rheinland: Captain Rohardt. 
Nassau: Captain Klappenbach (Hans). 
Westfalen: Captain Redlich. 

SQUADRON H 

Chief of Squadron: Rear-Admiral Mauve, Deutschland. 
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Kahlert. 

Admiral: Rear-Admiral Baron von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels. 
Hanover. 

Deutschland: Captain Mem-er (Hugo). 

Pommern: Captain Boelken. 

Schlesien: Captain Behncke (Fr.). 

Schleswig-Holstein: Captain Barrentrapp. 

Hannover: Captain Heine (Wilh.) 

Hessen: Captain Bartels (Rudolph.) 

SQUADRON in 

Chief of Squadron: Rear-Admiral Behncke, Koenig. 
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Baron von Gagern. 
Admiral: Rear-Admiral Nordmann, Kaiser. 

Koenig: Captain Brueninghaus. 

Grosser Kurfuerst: Captain Goette (Ernst). 
. Markgraf: Captain Seiferling. 

Kronprinz: Captain Feldt (Constanz). 

Kaiser: Captain Baron von Kayserling. 

Prinz Regent Luitpold: Captain Heuser (Karl). 

Kaiserin: Captain Sievers. 

Kaiserin: Captain Sievers. 

GERMANY'S HIGH SEA FLEET 

Chief of the Reconnaissance Forces: Vice-Admiral Hipper, 

Luetzow. 
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Raeder (Erick). 

SCOUTING DIVISION I 

Seydlitz: Captain von Egidy (Moritz). 

Moltke: Captain von Karps. 

Derfflinger: Captain Hartog. 

Luetzow: Captain Harder. 

Von der Tann: Captain Zenker. 
Leader of Scouting Division II: Rear-Admiral Boedicker, Frankfurt 
Admiralty Staff Officer: Commander Stapenhorst. 

SCOUTING DIVISION II 

Pillau: Captain Mommsen. 
Elbing: Captain Madlung. 
Frankfurt: Captain von Trotha (Thilo). 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 77 

Wiesbaden: Captain Reiss. 

Rostock: Captain Feldmann (Otto). 

Regensburg: Captain Neuberer. 
Leader of Scouting Division IV: Commodore von Reuter, Stettin. 
Admiralty Stafif Officer: Captain Weber (Heinrich). 

SCOUTING DIVISION IV 

Stettin: Captain Rebensburg (Friedrich). 
Muenchen: Captain Boecker (Oskar.) 
Frauenlob: Captain HofTmann (Georg). 
Stuttgart: Captain Hagedorn. 
Hamburg: Captain von Gaudecker. 

TORPEDO-BOAT FLOTILLAS 

First Leader of the Torpedo-Boat Forces: Commodore Michelsen, 

Rostock. 
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Junkermann. u • • u 

Second Leader of the Torpedo-Boat Forces: Commodore Hemncn, 

RGfiTcnsburfiT* 
Chief of Flotilla I: Commander Conrad Albrecht, "G39." ,.^„n„ 
Chief of 1st Half-Flotilla: Commander Conrad Albrecht, bdV- 
Chief of Flotilla II: Captain Schuur, "B98." ^^^^ „ 
Chief of 3rd Half-Flotilla: Captain Boest, "GlOl. ..„,^q„ 

Chief of 4th Half-Flotilla: Captain Dittamar (Adolf), B109. 
Chief of Flotilla III: Captain Hollmann, "853." ^^ 

Chief of 5th Half-Flotilla: Commander Gautier, VVl. 
Chief of 6th Half-Flotilla: Commander Karlowa, "854. 
Chief of Flotilla V: Captain Heinecke, "GU-" ^„„ „ 
Chief of 9th Half Flotillas: Commander Hoefer y2. 
Chief of 10th Half-Flotilla: Commander Klein (Fnednch), G8. 
Chief of Flotilla VI: Captain Max Schultz, "G41." 
Chief of 11th Half -Flotilla: Commander Ruemann, y44. 
Chief of 12th Half-Flotilla: Commander Laks, "V69. 
Chief of Flotilla VII: Captain von Koch, "S24." 
Chief of 13th Half-Flotilla: Commander von Zitzewitz (Gerhard), 

"315 " 
Chief of'l4th Half-Flotilla: Captain Cordes (Hermann), "S19." 
Chief of Flotilla IX: Captain Goehle, "V28." 
Chief of 17th Half-Flotilla: Commander Ehrhardt, V27. 
Chief of 18th Half -Flotilla: Captain Tillessen (Werner), V30. 

SUBMARINES 

Leader of the Submarines: Captain Bauer, Hamburg. 
Admiralty Staff Officer: Captain Luetzow (Friednch). 
«U24" — Commander: Lieut. Schneider (Rudolf). r^ , , 

"U32" — Commander: Lieut. Baron Spiegel von und zu Feckcl- 

sheim. 
"U63" — Commander: Lieut. Schultze (Otto). 
"U66" — Commander: Lieut, von Bothmer. 
«U70" — Commander: Lieut. Wuensche. 
««U43" — Commander: Lieut. Juerst. 
"U44" — Commander: Lieut. Wapenfuehr. 
"U52" — Commander: Lieut. Walther (Hans). 
"U47" — Commander: Lieut. Metzger. 
«'U45" — Commander: Lieut. Hillebrand (Leo). 
"U22" — Commander: Lieut Hoppe. 



78 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

"U19" — Commander: Lieut. Weizbach (Raimund). 

"UB22" — Commander: Lieut. Putzier. 

"UB21" — Commander: Lieut. Hashagen. 

"U53" — Commander: Lieut. Rose. 

«U64" — Commander: Lieut. Morath (Robert). 

AIRSHIPS 
"Lll" — Commander: Captain Schuetze (Viktor). 
"L17" — Commander: Lieut. Ehrlich (Herbert). 
"L14" — Commander: Lieut. Boecker. 
"L21" — Commander: Lieut. Dietrich (Max). 
"L23" — Commander: Lieut, von Schubert. 
"LI 6" — Commander: Lieut. Sommerfeidt. 
"L13" — Commander: Lieut. Proelt. 
"L9 " — Commander: Captain Stelling. 
"L22" — Commander: Lieut. Dietrich (Martin). 
"L24" — Commander: Lieut. Koch (Robert). 

Vice-Admiral Hipper, Chief of the Reconnaissance Forces was 
ordered to leave the Jade Basin with his forces at 4 a. m.. May 31, 
to advance towards the Skagerrak out of sight of Horns Reef, and 
the Danish coast, to show himself off the Norweigian coast before 
dark, to cruise in the Skagerrak during the night, and at noon the 
next day to join up with the Main Fleet. The ships under his 
command comprised the Scouting Division I and II. To the latter 
was attached the light cruiser Regensburg, flagship of the Second 
Leader of the torpedo-boats; under his command were the Flotil- 
las II, VI, and IX. The Main Fleet, consisting of Squadron I, II, and 
III, of Scouting Division IV, the First Leader of torpedo-boats, 
in the Rostock, and Torpedo-Boat Flotillas I, II, V, and VII, were 
to follow at 4.30 a. m. to cover the reconnaissance forces dur- 
ing the enterprise and take action on June 1. The sailing order 
of the battleships was as follows: Squadron III in van. Squad- 
ron I following, and Squadron II in the rear. 

The Koenig Albert was absent from Squadron II, having been 
incapacitated a few days previously through condenser trouble. 
Notwithstanding the loss of this important unit, I could not bring 
myself further to postpone the enterprise, and preferred to do with- 
out the ship. Squadron II was without the Pruessen, which had 
been placed at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Bal- 
tic forces to act as guard-ship at the south egress from the Sound. 
Lothringen was deemed unfit for service. Scouting Division IV, 
and the Leader of Torpedo-Boats in the light cruiser Rostock, to- 
gether with the Torpedo-Boat Flotillas I, II, V, and VII, were at- 
tached to the battleships. 

To the west of the Amrum Bank a passage had been cleared 
through the enemy minefields which led the High Sea Forces safe- 
ly to the open sea. Visibility was good, with a light north-wester- 
Iv wind, and there was no sea on. At 7.30 a. m. "U32" reported at 
about 70 miles east of the Firth of Forth, two battleships, two 
cruisers, and several torpedo-boats taking a south-easterly course. 
At 8.30 a second wireless was received stating that she had inter- 
cepted EngliCsh wireless messages to the effect that two large bat- 
tleships and grouos of destroyers had run out from Scapa Flow. 
At 8.48 a. m. a third message came through from "U66" that about 
fJO nautical mi^es east of Kinnairel (sic, ? Kinnaird Head), eight 
enemv battleships, light cruisers, and torpedo-boats had been 
sighted on a north-easterly course. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 7» 

These reports gave no enlightenment as to the enemy's pur- 
pose. But the varied forces of the separate divisions of the fleet, 
and their diverging courses did not seem to suggest either com- 
bined action or an advance on the German Bight or any connection 
with our enterprise, but showed a possibility that our hope of 
meeting with separate enemy divisions was likely to be fuUilled. 
We were, therefore, all the more determined to keep to our plan. 
Between 2 and 3 p. m. "L" 9, 14, 16, 21 and 23 ascended for long- 
distance reconnaissance in the sector north to west of Heligoland. 
They took no part in the battle that so soon was to follow, neither 
did they see anything of their own Main Fleet, nor of the enemy^ 
nor hear anything of the battle. 

2 

THE FIRST PHASE OF THE BATTLE: CRUISER ENGAGEMENT 

At 4.28 p. m. the leading boat of the 4th Torpedo-Boat Half- 
Flotilla, "B 109," reported that Elbing, the west wing cruiser on 
the Chief of Reconnaissance's line, had been sent to examine a 
steamer about 90 nautical miles west of Bovbjerg, and had sighted 
some enemv forces. It was thanks to that steamer that the engage- 
ment took place; our course might have carried us past the English 
cruisers had the torpedo-boat not proceeded to the steamer and 
thus sighted the smoke from the enemy in the west. 



ORDER OF SMLING — R!:CGMUAlSS^NCt FORCES 
rif-.^„i/f,,.-4- 6 Wiesbaden 

Reqensburq '^^^ 
tPiUau _5creen Torpedo Boat^ ** 

'♦iTorpcdoBoa^s/ \ (c-lOl to C-104) 

CB-97.3a.iia) \ <X ' 

Battle Cruisers 



iElbinq 
^"Torpedo Boats 

(.B-lO9.llO,«0 



As soon as the enemy, comprising eight light cruisers of the 
"Caroline" tvpe, sighted our forces, he turned off to the north. 
Admiral Boedicker gave chase with his cruisers. At 5.20 p. m. the 
Chief of the Reconnaissance then sighted in a westerly direction 
two columns of large vessels taking an easterly course. These soon 
showed themselves to be six battle-cruisers, three of the "Lion" 
class, one "Tiger," and two "Indefatigables," besides numbers of 
lighter forces. The Chief of Reconnaissance called back Scout- 
ing Division H, which he had sent to give chase in the north, 
and prepared to attack. The enemv deployed to the south in fight- 
ing line. It was Vice-Admiral Beatty with the First and Second 
English Battle-Cruiser Squadrons, consisting of the Lion, Princess 



80 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger, New Zealand, and Indefatigable. That 
the enemy deployed to the south was a very welcome fact for us, 
as if offered the possibility of inducing the enemy to fall back on 
his own main fleet. The Chief of Reconnaissance therefore followed 
the movement, maneuvered to get within effective firing range, and 
opened fire at 5.49 p. m., at a range of about 130 hm." 





\2,nci. Scouting Div 


■J 

\ 

Sun \" 


GERMAN 


^ 


3 

/-^\Q Battle Cruisers 


^ Battle Cruisers ^.-^ 




^s BRITISH 


\ 


^ 


Si 


Liqht Cruisers & 
<i DestroMers 


POSITION AT 5-4-S P M 


J, 


(3:49 Brit time) 



The fighting proceeded on a south-easterly course. The Chief 
of Reconnaissance kept the enemy at effective distance. The bat- 
teries fixed their aim well; hits were observed on all the enemy 
ships. Already at 6.13 p. m., the battle-cruiser Indefatigable, the 
last in the line of the enemy cruisers, sank with a terrible explo- 
sion caused by the guns of the Von der Tann... Superiority in firing 
and tactical advantages of position were decidedly on our side up 
to 6.19 p. m., when a new unit of four or five ships of the "Queen 
Elizabeth" tvpe, with a considerable surplus of speed, drew up 
from a north-westerly direction, and beeinning at a range of 200 
hm. joined the fighting. It was the Fifth English Battle Squadron.** 
This made the situation critical for our cruisers. The new enemy 
fired with extraordinarv raniditv and accuracy, with the greater 
ease as regards the latter that he met with almost no opposition, as 
our battle-crujsers were fully engaged with Admirdl Realty's shins. 



* Earl Beattv gives the ranpe at about 18,500 yards, (hm. a hectometer,: 
100 meters or 109 yard«;., 2 ft., 9 in.). „ ,. 

**Aconrding to English accoimts, it comprised the Barham, Warspite, Va«- 
tmt and Malaya. Mention Is made of four ships only. According to various ob- 
servations on our side (by Sauadron Til and the leader of Scoutmg Division 
II), there were five ships. If Qr^ppn Eli~nheih. or a similar fr"pe of ship, was 
not in the unit, it is possible that another recently built ship replaced her. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 



81 






POSITION AT 


6 20 PM. ♦"o 









2nd.5coutinqD\v 


Queen 








Q aizabe.th& 













& 


♦ 






9 " 


BRIT. 






_.-t5 Battle Cruisers 




Battle 5^, 




^'^ 


^--^""^ 






CrjicerSg 






1* t> TXFIot 









♦ 






1^ / 


^ 






,' / 


>--'- 


""" ~~^N ' 


V-21,i9 , 


'■''' 




; 




^Tojpeclo Boats 




2, destro\;erb sunK j< 




^Reqensburq 




2, crippled (brit) " 


«. 


k 



At 6.20 p. m. the fighting distance between the battle-cruisers 
on both side was about 120 hm., while between our battle-cruisers 
and those with Queen Elizabeth the distance was something like 
180 hm. At this stage Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX was the only one of 
the flotillas under the Chief of Reconnaissance that was in a posi- 
tion to attack. The Second Leader of Torpedo-Boats, Commod9re 
Heinrich, on board the Regensburg, and some few boats belonging 
to Torpedo Flotilla II, were getting up steam with all speed in a 
diagonal line from the Chief of Reconnaissance's furthest point. 
The cruisers of Scouting Division II, together with the remain- 
ing torpedo flotillas, were forced by the "Queen Elizabeths" to 
withdraw to the east to escape their fire and had, therefore, in spite 
of working their engines to the utmost, not been able to arrive m 
position at the head of the battle-cruisers. 

In view of the situation, the Second Leader of the Torpedo- 
Boats ordered Torpedo Flotilla IX (whose chief, Captain Goehle, 
had already decided on his own initiative to prepare to attack) to 
advance to the relief of the battle-cruisers. 

At about 6.30 p. m. Torpedo Flotilla IX proceeded to attack, 
running through heavy enemy firing. Twelve torpedoes were fired 
on the enemy lines at distances ranging between 95 — 80 hm. It 
was imposible to push the attack closer on the enemy, as at the 
same time that Flotilla IX got to work, eighteen to twenty English 
destrovers, covered by light cruisers, appeared on the scene to 
counter-attack and beat ofT our torpedo-bofts. The result was a 
torpedo-boat fight at close range (LOOO — 1.500 m.). The Regens- 
burg, together with the boats of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II that were 
with her, and the centrallv situated guns on the battle-cruisers, 
then joined in the ficht. After about ten minutes the enemv turned 
awav. On our side "V27" and "V29" were sunk, hit by shots from 
heavy calibre guns. The crews of both the boats were rescued in 
spite of enemv fire, bv "V26" and "S35." On the enemv side ^vo or 
perhaps three, destrovers were sunk, and two others «;o badly 
damaged that they could not get away, and fell later into the hands 



82 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

of our advancing Main Fleet. The enemy made no attempt to rescue 
the crews of these boats. 

During the attack by the torpedo-boats, the English battle- 
cruisers were effectively held in check by the Scouting Division I 
with heavy artillery, which at the same time maneuvered so 
successfully that none of the numerous enemy torpedoes observed 
by Torpedo-Boat Flotilla IX hit their objectives. Towards 6.30 p. 
m. a powerful explosion was observed on board the third enemy 
cruiser — the Queen Mary. When the smoke from the explosion 
cleared away the cruiser had disappeared. Whether the destruc- 
tion was the result of artillery action or was caused by a torpedo 
^m the battle-cruisers or by a torpedo from Torpedo-Boat Flotilla 
IX can never be ascertained for certain, but most probably it was 
due to artillery action which caused an explosion of ammunition 
or oil on board the enemy vessel. It was not until night that 1 
heard of the destruction of the two battle-cruisers. 

The attack by Flotilla IX had at all events been successful in 
so far that for a time it checked the enemy's fire. Admiral Hipper 
took advantage of this to divert the cruisers to a north-westerly 
course and thus secure for himself the lead at the head of the 
cruisers in the new phase of the fight. Immediately following on 
the attack by the torpedo-boats, the German Main Fleet appeared 
on the scene of battle just in the nick of time to help the recon- 
naissance forces in their fight against considerably superior num- 
bers. 

3 

THE SECOND PHASE OF THE FIGHT: THE PURSUIT 

At 4.28 p. m.* about 50 nautical mile west of Lyngoig, on the 
Jutland coast, the first news of the sighting of enemy light forces 
was reported to the Main Fleet proceeding in the following order: 

Squadrons III, I, II, the flagship at the head of Squadron I, 
on a northerly course, speed 14 knots — distance between the ves- 
•els, 7 hm., distance between the squadrons, 35 hm., the torpedo- 
boats as U-boat escort for the squadrons, the light cruisers of 
Scouting Division IV allotted to the Main Fleet to protect their 
course. 

At 5.35 the first report was sent that heavy forces had been 
sighted. The distance between the Chief of Reconnaissance and 
the Main Fleet was at that time about 50 nautical miles. On re- 
ceipt of this message, the fighting line was opened (that is, the dis- 
tance between the squadrons was reduced to 1,000 m., and between 
the vessels to 500 m.), and the order was given to clear the ships 
for action. 

In the fighting line the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet is not 
tied to anv fixed position. When there is a question of leading sev- 
eral squadrons it is not advisable to tske up a position at the head 
of the line, as it is not possible from there to watch the direction 
in which the fight develops, as that greatly depends on the move- 
ments of the enemy. Being bound to any such position micht lead 
to the Commander-in-Chief finding himself at the rear instead of 

*In comparing the time given in the German and English accounts it must 
be ^emejm^p^od Ihat there is a difference of tM-o hours, for the refi«-.on that wo 
rec'.con according to sumrr>er-time in Tentrp.] Europe, while the difference be- 
tween ord-nary Central Europe and Greenwich time is one hour. Therefora 
4.28 German time corresponds to 2.28 English time. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 83 

at the head of his assembled line. A position in the centre or at a 
third of the line (according to the number of units) is more advan- 
tageous. In the course of events the place of the eighth ship in 
the line for the flagship has been tested and approved of. 

During the whole time that fighting was going on I had a clear 
look-out over the whole line and was able to signal with great ra- 
pidity in both directions. As the fighting line of the warships 
was more than 10 km. long, I should not have been able to over- 
look my entire line from the wing, especially under such heavy 
enemy firing. 

The message received at 5.45 p. m. from the Chief of Recon- 
naissance that he was engaged with six enemy battle-cruisers on a 
southeasterly course showed that he had succeeded in meeting 
the enemy, and as he fought was drawing him closer to our Main 
Fleet. The duty of the Main Fleet was now to hasten as quickly as 
possible to support the battle-cruisers, which were inferior as to 
material, and to endeavour to hinder the premature retreat of the 
enemy. At 6.5, therefore, I took a north-westerly course at a speed 
of 15 knots, and a quarter of an hour later altered it to a westerly 
course in order to place the enemy between two fires, as he, on his 
southerly course, would have to push through between our line 
and that of the battle-cruisers. While the Main Fleet was still 
altering course, a message came from Scouting Division II that an 
English unit of warships, five ships (not four!) had joined in the 
fight. 

The situation thus was becoming critical for Scouting Divi- 
sion I, confronted as they were by six battle-cruisers and five 
battleships. Naturally, therefore, everything possible had to be 
done to get into touch with them, and a change was made back 
to a northerly course. The weather was extremely clear, the 
sky cloudless, a light breeze from N. W., and a calm sea. At (>.30 
p. 'm. the fighting lines were sighted. At 6.45 p. m. Squadrons I and 
III opened fire, while the Chief of Reconnaissance, with the forces 
allotted to him, placed himself at the head of the Main Fleet. 

The light enemy forces veered at once to the west, and as soon 
as they were out of firing range turned northwards. Whether 
the fire from our warships had damaged them duing the short 
bombardment was doubtful, but their vague and purposeless hurry- 
ing to and fro led one to think that our fire had reached them r.nd 
that the action of our warships had so surprised them that they did 
not know which way to turn next. 

The English battle-cruisers turned to a north-westerly course; 
Queen Elizabeth and the ships with her followed in their wake, 
and thereby played the part of cover for the badlv damaged cruis- 
ers. In so doing, however, they came very much nearer to our 
Main Fleet, and we came on at a firing distance of 17 km. or less. 
While both the English units passed bv each other and jirovided 
mutual cover. Captain Max Schultz, Chief of Toruedo-Bor.t Flotilla 
VI, attacked at 6.49 p. m., with the Eleventh Torpedo-Boat Hi^U- 
Flotilla. The result could not be seen. 

The fighting which now ensued developed into a stern chn?-.e: 
our reconnaissance forces pressed on the heels of the enemv battle- 
cruisers, and our Main Fleet gave chase to the Oueen Flizabeth and 
the ships with her. Our ships in Squadron III attained a speed 
of over 20 knots, w'hich was also kept up on board the Kriperin. 
Just before fire was opened she had succeeded in repnirinp dnmnj*!? 
to one of her condensers. By the Friedrich der Grosse, the Fleet 



84 



TIIE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



POSITION AT 6:55 P.M. 



Queen \ 
\ 

Battle \\. 
Cruisers^ 




sso^*"- 



about 



Li.qht Cruisersiv X 
& Destroyers ^.^>»< 



2,nd.Scouh"nq ^ 
Div. p 



^ Destroyers 



Q Battle Cruisers 
6 




Mom Fleet 



Flagship, 20 knots was achieved and maintained. In spite of this, 
the enemy battle-cruisers succeeded soon after 7 o'clock in escap- 
ing from the fire of Scouting Division I. The Queen Elizabeth 
and her sister ships also made such good way that they were only 
under fire from the ships of Scouting Division I and of the Fifth 
Division (First Half of Squadron III). The hope that one of the 
ships pursued would be so damaged as to fall a prey to our Main 
Fleet was not fulfilled, although our firing was effective, and at 
7.30 p. m. it was seen that a ship of the "Queen Elizabeth" type 
after she had been hit repeatedly, drew slowly out of the fighting 
line with a heavy list to leeward. Two modern destroyers, the 
Nestor and Nomad, were all that fell to the share of the Main Fleet; 
they were hit and badly damaged in the attack by Torpedo-Boat 
Flotilla IX, and were overtaken and sunk by us; the crews were 
taken prisoner. 

At 7.20 p. m., when the fire from Scouting Division I and from 
the ships of the Fifth Division appeared to grow weaker, the 
leaders of the Fleet were under the impression that the enemy was 
succeeding in getting away, and gave orders to the Chief of Recon- 
naissance and to all the fighting forces "to give chase." Mean- 
while, the previously clear weather had become less clear; the 
wind had changed from N.W. to S.W. Powder fumes and smoke 
from the funnels hung over the sea and cut off all view from north 
and east. Only now and then could we see our own reconnais- 
sance forces. Owing to the superior speed of Beatty's cruisers, 
our own, when the order came to give chase, were already out- 
distanced by the enemy battle-cruisers and light craft, and were 
thus forced, in order not to lose touch, to follow on the inner cir- 
cle and adopt the enemy's course. Both lines of cruisers swung by 
degrees in concentric circles by the north to a north-easterly di- 
rection. A message which was to have been sent by the Chief of 
Reconnaissance could not be dispatched owing to damage done to 
the principal and reserve wireless stations on his flagship. The 
cessation of firing at the head of the line could only be ascribed to 
the increasing difficulty of observation with the sun so low on the 
horizon, until finally it became impossible. When, therefore, ene- 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 



85 



/ 



Liqht Cruisers 
^Battle Cruisers 



Queen Elizabeth^- 



BRIT 




2nd Scoutino 

0;v ' 



Nomad &unKx 



\ 



Nesior sunKy 



\ 

\ 



Mam Fleet 



\ 



POSITION AT 7:15 P.M. 



my light forces began a torpedo attack on our battle-cruisers at 
7.40 p. m., the Chief of Reconnaissance had no alternative but to 
maneuver and finally bring the unit round to S.W. in an endeavor 
to close up with Main Fleet, as it was impossible to return the 
•nemy's fire to any purpose. 



THE THIRD PHASE OF THE FIGHTING: THE BATTLE 

I observed almost simultaneously that the admiral at the bead 
of our squadron of battleships began to veer round to starboard in 
an easterly direction. This was in accordance with the instriic- 
tions signalled to keep up the pursuit. As the Fleet was slill di- 
vided in columns, steering a north-westerly course as directed, the 
order "Leader in Front" was signalled along the line at 7.4.') p. m., 
and the speed temporarily reduced to 15 knots, so as to make it 
possible for the divisions ahead, which had pushed on at high 
pressure, to get into position again. 

As long as the pursuit was kept up, the movements of the 
English gave us the direction, consequently our line by degrees 
veered round to the east. During these proceedings in the Main 
Fleet, Scouting Division II, under Rear-Admiral Boedicker, when 
engaged with a light cruiser of the "Calliope" class,* which was 

•According to English accounts the light cruiser Cheater was badly d!«m- 
aged. Her casualties were 31 killed and 50 wounded, and she had four boles 
Just above the water-Une. 



86 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



^ Destroyers \ 
Queen ^ ^<i\ ~~^^^-/» 

\ 




^^ Main Fleet \ ^\ 
entennq the battle ix 

W\esbaden X 

t ;«. 

^nd Scout- ^■'''-— X /"'^ 

y^'* "^XU-Half Flotilla 
\ ,^{!a -tKbc Flotilla 


POSIT !0r4 FROM 




1 " Bcit\-\e Cruisers 


^ 7--43 TO 8 P M. 




1 
1 (fRostocK 

t ^m Flotilla 
A A I Half Flotilla 

■ft Mam Body 

t g Y Flotillc 
A ^^m Flotilla 

t 



set on fire, sighted several light cruisers of the "Town" class, and 
several big ships, presumably battleships, of which the Agincourt 
was one. Owing to the mist that hung over the water, it was im- 
possible to ascertain the entire strength of the enemy. The group 
was at once heavily fired on, returned the lire, discharged torpe- 
does, and turned in the direction of their own Main Fleet. No re- 
sult could be observed, as artificial smoke§ was at once employed 
to protect the cruisers. In spite of the fog the Wiesbaden and 
Pillau were both badly hit. The Wiesbaden (Captain Reiss) lay 
in the thick of the enemy fire, incapable of action. 

The Chiefs of the 12th and 9th Torpedo-Boat Half Flotillas 
who were stationed behind the cruisers, recognising the gravity of 
the situation, came to the front. Both came under fire from a line 
of numbers of big ships on a N.W. course, and fired their torpe- 
does from within 60 hm. of the enemy. Here, too, it was impossible 
to observe what success was achieved, as dense clouds of smoke 
hid the enemy from view directly they veered round. But both 

§Artlflcial fog or smoke, prepared by a special process at the largest dy»- 
works, and supplied to all the lighter forces to enable them to withdraw front 
the fire of superior forces. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 87 

the above-mentioned commanders reckon that they met with suc- 
cess, having attacked under favourable conditions. 

While this encounter with the advance guard of the English 
Main Fleet was taking place, we, on our flagship were occupied 
debating how much longer to continue the pursuit in view of the 
advanced time. There was no longer any question of a cruiser 
campaign against merchantmen in the Skagerrak, as the meeting 
with the English fighting forces which was to result from such 
action had already taken place. But we were bound to take into 
consideration that the English Fleet, if at sea, which was obvious 
from the ships we had encountered, would offer battle the next 
day. Some steps would also have to be taken to shake off the Eng- 
lish light forces before darkness fell in order to avoid any loss 
to our Main Fleet from nocturnal torpedo-boat attacks. 

A message was then received from the leader of Scouting Di- 
vision II that he had been fired on by some newly arrived large 
ships. At 8.2 p. m. came a wireless: "Wiesbaden incapable of 
action." On receipt of the message I turned with the Fleet two 
points to larboard (port) so as to draw nearer to the group and 
render assistance to the Wiesbaden. From 8.20 onwards there was 
heavy fighting round the damaged Wiesbaden, and good use was 
made of the ship's torpedoes. Coming from a north-north-westerly 
direction, the "Queen Elizabeth" ships and also probably Beatty's 
battle-cruisers attacked (prisoners, however, stated that after 7.0 
p. m. the latter took no part in the fight). 

A fresh unit of cruisers (three "Invincibles" and four "War- 
riors") bore down from the north, besides light cruisers and des- 
troyers. A further message from the torpedo-boat flotillas which 
had gone to support Scouting Division II, stated that they had 
sighted more than twenty enemy battleships following a south- 
easterly course. It was now quite obvious that we were con- 
fronted by a large portion of the English Fleet and a few minutes 
later their presence was notified on the horizon directly ahead of 
us bv rounds of firing from guns of heavy calibre. The entire arc 
stretching from north to east was a sea of fire. The flash from 
the muzzles of the guns was distinctly seen through the mist and 
smoke on the horizon, though the ships themselves were not dis- 
tinguishable. This was the beginning of the main phase of the 
battle. 

There was never any question of our line veering round to 
avoid an encounter. The resolve to do battle with the enemy 
stood firm from the first. The leaders of our battleship squndrons, 
the Fifth Division turned at once for a running fight, carried on 
at about 13000 m. The other divisions followed this movement 
on orders signalled from the flagship. By this time more than a 
hundred heavy ouns h?d joined in the fight on the enemy's side, 
directing fire chiefly at our battle-cruisers and the ships of the 
Fifth Division (the "Koenig' class). The position of the English 
line (whose centre we must have faced) to our leading point 
brought fire on us from three sides. The "Queen Elizabeths" fired 
di^Ponn^'v from Inrbonrd (nort); the ships of the main floot, 
which .Tolb'coe had brought un. from the forecastle stnrbonrd. 
Many shots were aimed at the Friedrich der Grosse, but the ship 
was never hit. 

During this stage of the fight the crusiers Defence, Black 
Prince, and Warrior came up from the north, hut were a^l de- 
stroyed by the fire from our battleships and our battle-cruisers. 



n 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



Cruisers '^'^ 



uc5h^\ 

Cruisers 




BR ITI S H 




* Wiesbaden 
crippled 



liOhm. 




Division -^.^^dScoulinqD.v 



. Battle Cruisers 



€ 



L 



POSITION AT 8:15 PM. 



Fire from the Friedrich der Grosse was aimed at one of the three, 
■which in a huge white cloud of steam was blown into the air, at 
3,000 m. distance. I observed several enemy hits and consequent 
explosions on the ships at our leading point. Following the move- 
ment of the enemy they had made a bend which hindered free 
action of our Torpedo-Boat Flotilla II stationed there. 

I could see nothing of our cruisers, which were still farther 
forward. Owing to the turning aside that was inevitable in draw- 
ing nearer, they found themselves between the fire of both lines. 
For this reason I decided to turn our line and bring it on to an op- 
posite course. Otherwise an awkward situation would have arisen 
round the pivot which the enemy line by degrees was passing, 
as long-distance shots from the enemy would certainlv have hit 
our rear ships. As regards the effectiveness of the artillery, the 
enemy was more favourably situated, as our ships stood out 
against the clear western horizon, whereas his own ships were 
hidden by the smoke and mist of the battle. A running artillery 
fight on a southerly course would therefore not have been advan- 
tageous to us. The swing round was carried out in excellent style. 
At our peace maneuvers great importance was always attached to 
their being carried out on a curved line and everv means employed 
to ensure _the working of the signals. The trouble spent was now 
well rer^aid: the cruisers were liberated from their cramped posi- 
tion and enabled to steam away south and appeared, as soon as 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 



8» 



Queen 'v !n 
Dizabeths f' t^ 



Wiesbaden 



vi/ornor 
B\acK Prmce 



BRITISH 



•jtDefenoR 




GCRMAN 



ZndScoutinq /'^/» / 
Div- y^ '/' 




1%. Flot. 
6 torpedoes 



Ist.ScouVinq 
O'w. 



qreot 
explosion 



POSITION AT 8 35 RM. 



the two lines were separated, in view of the flagship. The torpedo- 
boats, too, on the leeside of the fire had room to move to the at 
tack and advanced. 

While the veering round of the line was proceeding, two boats 
of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla III ("G88" and "V73") and the leading 
boat of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla I ("S32") had attacked. The re- 
maining boats of Torpedo-Boat Flotilla III had ceased the attack 
on an order to retire from the leader. The weakening of the ene- 
my fire had induced the First Leader to give the order, being ner- 
suaded that the enemy had turned away and that the flotilla, which 
v'ould be urgently needed in the further development of the battle, 
would find itself without support. Owing to the shortening of the 
line at the head, the boats of the other flotillas were not able to at- 
tack. One division (Torpedo-Boat Flotillas IX and VI) had just 
returned from the 8 o'clock attack. The enemy line did not follow 
our veer round. In the position it was to our leading point, it 
should have remained on, and could have held us still further sur- 
rounded if by a simultaneous turn to a westerly course it had keot 
firmly to our line. It may be that the leader did not grasp the 
situation, and was afraid to come any nearer for fear of torpedo 
attacks. Neither did any of the other officers on the enemv side 
think of holding firmly to our line, which would have greatly im- 
peded our movements and rendered a fresh attack on the enemy 
line extremely difficult. 

Immediately after the line was turned the enemy fire ceased 
temporarily, partlv because the artificial smoke sent out by the 
torpedo-boats to protect the line — the battle-cruisers in particu- 
lar — greatlv impeded the enemy's view, but chiefly no doubt on 
account of the severe losses the enemy had suflFered. 



90 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

_ Losses that were observed for certain as sunk were: a ship of 
the .Queen Elizabeth' class (name unknown), a battle-cruiser 

(Invincible), two armoured cruisers (Black Prince and Defence), 
the hght crmser Shark, and one marked "024." Heavily damaged 
and partially set on fire were: One cruiser (Warrior, sunk later), 
three light crmsers, three destroyers (of which the Acasta was 
one) . 

On our side "V48" was the only destroyer sunk, the Wies- 
baden was rendered incapable, and the Luetzow so badly damaged 
that the Chief of Reconnaissance was subsequently compelled at 
Ii-P-,!?-, *,° ^^^^ *,^^ ^^^ under the enemy's fire, and transfer to 
the Moltke. The leadership of Scouting Division I was thus made 
over to the Derfflinger (Captain Hartog) until 11 p. m. The other 
battle-cruisers and the leading ships of Squadron III had also suf- 
fered, but kept their place in the line. No one reported inability 
to do so; I was, therefore, able to reckon on their being fully pre- 
pared to fight. After the enemy was forced to cease firing on pur 
hne steering S.W., he flung himself on the already heavily damaged 
Wiesbaden. The ship put up a gallant fight against the overwhelm- 
ingly superior forces, which was clearly to be seen as she had 
emerged from out of the clouds of smoke and was distinctly visible. 

It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If the enemy fol- 
lowed us our action in retaining the direction taken after turn- 
ing the line would partake of the nature of a retreat, and in the 
event of any damage to our ships in the rear, the Fleet would be 
compelled to sacrifice them or else to decide on a line of action 
enforced by enemy pressure, and not adopted voluntarily, and 
would therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. Still 
less was it feasible to strive at detaching oneself from the enemy, 
leaving it to him to decide when he would elect to meet us the 
next morning. There was but one way of averting this — to force 
the enemy into a second battle by another determined advance, 
and forcibly compel his torpedo-boats to attack. The success of 
the turning of the line while fighting encouraged me to make the 
attempt, and decided me to make still further use of the facility 
of movement. The maneuver would be bound to surprise the ene- 
my, to upset his plans for the rest of the day, and if the b^ow fell 
heavily it wouM facilitate the breaking loose at night. The fight 
of the Wiesbaden helped also to strengthen my resolve to make 
an eff'ort to render assistance to her and at least save the crew. 

Accordingly, after we had been on the new course about a 
quarter of an hour, the line was again swung round to starboard 
on an easterly course at 8.55 p. m. The battle-cruisers were or- 
dered to operate with fu^ strength on the enemv's leading point, 
all the torpedo-boat flotillas had orders to attack, and the First 
Leader of the torpedo-boats, Commodore Michelsen, was instructed 
to send his boats to rescue the Wiesbaden's crew. The boats told 
off for this puroose were compelled to relinquish the attempt. The 
Wiesbaden and the boats making for her were in the midst of 
such heavy fire that the leader of the torpedo-boat<; thought it use- 
less to sacrifice his boats. In turning to go bark "V7S" and "G88" 
together fired off four torpedoes at the "Queen Elizabeths." 

The battle that developed after the second change of course 
and led to the intended result very soon brought a full resumption 
of the firing at the van which, as was inevitable, became the same 
running fight as the previous one. in order to bring the whole of 
the guns into action. This time, however, in spite of "crossing the 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 



91 



T," the acknowledged purpose was to deal a blow at the centre of 
the enemy line. The fire directed on our line by the enemy con- 
centrated chiefly on the battle-cruisers and the Fifth Division. The 
ships suffered all the more as they could see but little of the enemy 
beyond the flash of fire at each round, while they themselves ap- 
parently offered a good target for the enemy guns. The behaviour 
of the battle-cruisers is specially deserving of the highest praise; 
crippled in the use of their guns by their numerous casualties, 
some of them badlv damaged, obeying the given signal, "At the 
enemy," they dashed recklessly to the attack. 

The conduct of Squadron II (Rear-Admiral Behncke) and the 
action of the ships of the Fifth Division are equally worthy oi 
recognition. They, together with the battle-cruisers, bore the 
brunt of the fight, and thus rendered it possible for the torpedo- 
boat flotillas to take so effective a share in the proceedings. The 
systematic procedure of our ships in the line was a great help to 
the flotillas on their starboard side in opening the attack. The 
first to attack were those ahead with the cruisej"s, the boats of Flo- 
tillas VI and IX. Next came Flotilas III and V from the Main Fleet. 
Flotilla II was kept back by the Second Leader of torpedo-boats. 



Queen Qizabeths 



» Wiesbaden 



;<^^ 3 boats of m not 
,'' 1 about 915 



^^^777^^^v^^> 



X2IL Half not 



"J, ..XSD. Half 



TSLFloViUa -;/---_ 
" 




}* 9 X5 



■--About 9:40 l\ 
* be tee-.T // 

// 



POSITION AT 917 P.M. 




»2 THE BATTLE OF JUTIJ^D 

for fear it might be left unprotected behind VI and IX. This 
action was justiiied by the course of events. The 1st Torpedo 
Half-Flotilla and a few boats from Flotillas VI and IX were occur 
pied in covering the damaged Luetzow. There was no longer any 
opportunity for an attack by Flotilla VII which had been in the 
rear of our fighting line. As they advanced Flotillas VI and IX 
were met by the heavy enemy fire that until then had been directed 
against the battle-cruisers; they carried the attack to within 70 
hm. against the centre of a line comprising more than twenty 
large battleships steering in a circle E.S.E. to S., and opened lire 
under favourable conditions. In the attack "S35" was hit midships 
and sank at once. All the other boats returned, and in doing so 
sent out dense clouds of smoke between the enemy and our own 
Main Fleet. The enemy must have turned aside on the attack of 
Flotillas VI and IX. Flotillas III and V that came after found noth- 
ing but light craft, and had no opportunity of attacking the battle- 
ships. The action of the torpedo-boat flotillas had achieved its 
purpose. 

At 9.17 p. m., therefore, the line was again for the third time 
swung round on to a westerly covu'se, and this was carried out at 
the moment when the flagship Friedrich der Grosse was taking 
a southerly course close by the turning point. Although the sig- 
nal to swing round hung on the starboard side and was being car- 
ried out by the neighboring ships, I made the Chief of the Fried- 
rich der Grosse carry out the turn to larboard (port). 

This might have led the ships following behind to think that 
from a difficult situation in carrying out the maneuver was rightly 
understood by Vice-Admiral Ehrhardt Schmidt in the Ostfriesland, 
the Leader of Squadron I. He did not wait, therefore, for the 
carrjdng out of the movement from the rear — which is the general 
rule to avoid all danger of collision — but himself gave the lead 
in the turning of his squadron by starting the turn to starboard 
with the Ostfriesland — and thus forced his ships round. This 
action vvas a very satisfactory proof of the capable handling of the 
ships and the leaders' intelligent grasp of the situation. 









«:^*0^^ 




.^' ^ 






■ TURNING TO STARBOARD 


f 







After the change to a westerly course the Fleet was brought 
round to a south-westerly, southerly, and finally to a south-easterly 
course to meet the enemy's encircling movement and keep open 
a way for our return. The enemy fire ceased very soon after we 
had swung round and vvfe lost sight of our adversary. The enemy's 
casualties af this stage of the fighting cannot be given. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 03 

Excepting the effects of direct hits which we were able to con- 
firm from the flames of explosions, the enemy has only admitted 
the damage to the Marlborough by torpedoes/ On our side all the 
ships were in a condition to keep up the speed requisite for night 
work (16 knots) and thus keep their place in the line. 

5 
NIGHT MOVEMENTS AND BATTLES 

Twilight was now far advanced ,and it was only by personal 
observation that I could assure myself of the presence and external 
condition of those ships that chiefly had been under fire, and 
especially that the Luetzow was able to keep with the unit. At 9.30 
the battle-cruiser was seen to larboard (port) of the flagship, and 
had reported that she could do 15 knots. The report made by 
the torpedo-boat flotilla as to the enemy's strength and the exten- 
sion of his firing line made it quite certain that we had been in 
battle with the entire English Fleet. It might safely be expected 
that in the twilight the enemy would endeavour by attacking with 
strong forces, and during the night with destroyers, to force us 
over to the west in order to open battle with us when it was light. 
He was strong enough to do it. If we could succeed in warding off 
the enemy's encircling movement, and could be the first to reach 
Horns Reef, then the liberty of decision for the next morning was 
assured to us. In order to make this possible all flotillas were or- 
dered to be ready to attack at night, even though there was a dan- 
ger when day broke of their not being able to take part in the 
new battle that was expected. The Main Fleet in close formation 
was to make for Horns Reef by the shortest route, and, defying all 
enemy attacks, keep on that course. In accordance with this, 
preparations for the night were made. 

The Leaders of the torpedo-boats were instructed to arrange 
night attacks for the flotillas. At 9.20 a southerly course was or- 
dered. In changing to this course Squadron II had fallen out on 
the starboard side as the leading ship of Squadron I fell into the 
new course, not being able to fix the position of Squadron II. Ow- 
ing to the latter's inferior speed it fell behind the ships of Squad- 
rons III and I in the last part of the day's battle. Squadron II 
now attempted, at full speed and maneuvering to larboard (port). 
to resmne its place in front of Squadron I, which was its rightful 
position, after the Fleet had been turned. It came, therefore, just 
in time to help our battle-cruisers that were engaged in a short but 
sharp encounter with the enemy shortly before it was quite dark. 
While Scouting Divisions I and II were trying to place themselves 
at the head of our line they were met at 10.20 by heavy fire coming 
from a south-easterly direction. Nothing could be seen of the 
enemy bevond the flash of the guns at each round. The ships, al- 
ready heavily damaged, were hit again without being able to re- 
turn the fire to anv purpose. They turned back, therefore, and 
passed in between Squadrons II and I to leeward of the firing. 

The head of Squadron I followed the movements of the cruis- 
ers, while Souadron II (Rear-Admiral Mauve) stood by and took 
the enemv's fire. When Squadron II became aware that the failing 
light made anv return fire useless it withdrew, thinking to at- 



•Admfral JelUcoe admits that torppdoes reached his line, hut claims to 
have escaped further damage by the clever handling of his ships. Our as- 
sumption that he had already turned back before the attack by the torpedo- 
boats it thus confirmed. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



tract the enemy to closer quarters with Squadron I. The enemy 
did not follow, but ceased firing. 



mSquodron 
I Squadron 



USquadrorii 



I Scouhnq 
, Div. 



hiScoutinq 
*i- Div. 






SITUATION AT 10:30 P.M. 




Almost at the same time the Leader of Scouting Division IV. 
Commodore von Reulher, under similar conditions, had been en- 
gaged in a short encounter with four of five cruisers, some of them 
ships of the "Hampshire" class . 

Following on this attack, we took a south-easterly course 
which was at once seen to be necessary and adopted by Squadron 
I, bringing Squadron II again on the starboard side of the Fleet. 
In view of the fact that the leading ships of the Main Fleet would 
chiefly have to ward off the attacks of the enemy, and in order that 
at daybreak there should be powerful vessels at the head, Squad- 
ron II was placed in the rear. At 11 p. m. the head of the line 
stood at 36, 37 North Latitude, and 5, 30 East longitude. At 11.6 
p. m. the order for the night was "Course S.S.E. ^ E, speed 16 
knots." 

Out of consideration for their damaged condition. Scouting Di- 
vision I was told off to cover the rear. Division II to the vanguard 
and the IVth to cover the starboard side. The Leaders of the tor- 
pedo-boat forces placed the flotillas in an E.N.E to S.S.W. direction, 
which was where the enemy Main Fleet could be expected. A 
great many of the boats had fired off all their torpedoes during 
the battle. Some were left behind for the protection of the badly 
damaged Luetzow; others were retained by the flotilla leaders in 
case of emergencv. The rescue of the crews of the Elbing and Ros- 
tock was due to that decision. 

The Second, Fifth and Seventh, and part of the Sixth and 
Ninth were the only Flotillas that proceeded to the attack; the 
boats had various nocturnal fights with enemy light forces. They 
never sighted the Main Fleet. At 5 a. m. on June 1 "L24" sighted 
a portion of the Main Fleet in Jammer Bay. It was as we sur- 
ipissed — after the battle the enemy had gone north. Flotilla II, 
which had been stationed at the most northerly part of the sector. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 95 

■was forced back by cruisers and destroyers, and went round by 
Skagen; at 4 o'clock when day broke the other flotillas collected 
near the Main Fleet. 

The battleship squadrons proceeded during the night in the 
following order: Squadron I, Flagship of the Fleet, Squadron III 
and Squadron II. Squadrons I and II were now in reversed posi- 
tions; that is to say, the ships previously in the rear were now at 
the van. 

Other attempts to bring the admirals ahead were abandoned 
owing to the darkness and lack of time. The conduct of the line 
was entrusted to Captain Redlich on the Westfalen. The enemy 
attacked from the east with both light and heavy forces during 
the night almost without ceasing. Scouting Divisions I and II and 
the ships in Squadron I in particular were to ward orF the attacks. 
The lesult was excellent. To meet these attacks in time, bring the 
enemy under fire and by suitable maneuvering evade his torpedoes, 
demanded the most careful observation on board the vessels. Con- 
sequently the line was in constant movement, and it required great 
skill on the part of the commanders to get into position again, and 
necessitated a perpetual look-out for those maneuvering just in 
front of them. Very little use was made of the searchlights. It 
had been proved that the fire from the attacking boats was aimed 
chiefly at these illuminated targets. As our light guns and the navi- 
gation control on the ships were close to the searchlights, and be- 
cause of the better view to be obtained the officers and men on duty 
there would not take cover, several unfortunate casualties oc- 
curred. On board the Oldenburg the commander. Captain Hoepf- 
ner, was severely wounded by a shell, and several officers and 
many of the crew were killed. 

Utterly mistaking the situation, a large enemy cruiser with 
four funnels came up at 2 a. m. (apparently one of the "Cressy' 
class), and was soon within 1,500 metres of Squadron I s battle- 
ships, the Thueringen and Ostfriesland. In a few seconds she was 
on fire, and sank with a terrible explosion four minutes after open- 
ing fire. The destruction of this vessel, which was so near thai 
the crew could be seen rushing backwards and forwards on the 
burning deck while the searchlights disclosed the flight of the 
heavy projectiles till they fell and exploded, was a grand but ter- 
rible sight. Squadron I reported during the night that after carry- 
ing out an evading maneuver the Nassau had not returned in her 
place and as she did not answer a call it was feared she had been 
torpedoed. Towards morning, however, there was a faint wire- 
less from her reporting that she was standing by the Vyl Light- 
ship at Horns Reef, and during the night had rammed and cut 
through a destroyer. After this exploit the commander preferred 
not to return to our darkened line but made for the morning s ren- 
dezvous. 

A careful estimation showed that during the night one battle- 
cruiser one light cruiser and seven destrovers were sunk on the 
enemv's side, and several battle-cruisers and destroyers badly dam- 
aged The 2nd Division of Souadron I at the head of the line were 
specially successful in the defence they put up against torpedo at- 
tacks, as they themselves accounted for six destroyers. 

On our side the old light cruiser Franenlob, the battleship 
Pommern and "V4" were sunk; Rostock and Elbine were aban- 
doned and blown up. At 12.45 a. m. the Frauenlob (Cantam Georg 
Hoffmann), during a fight between Scouting Division IV and four 



96 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

cruisers of the "Town" class, was hit by a torpedo and, accord- 
ing to the accounts of the few siu-vivors, went down fighting to the 
last. 

The Pommern (Captain Boelken) was torpedoed at 4.20 a. m. 
and went down with a violent explosion. Unfortunately none pi 
the crew could be saved, as the wreckage drifted away so quickly 
that nothing was seen on the water by a ship following at 500 m. 
distance. 

At 4.50 a. m. "V4" struck an enemy mine; the crew was not 
saved. At 1.30 a. m. the Rostock and Elbing to the larboard (port) 
of the head of Squadron I were engaged in a fight with destroyers, 
but had finally to withdraw from the enemy's torpedoes and break 
through Squadron I's line, so as not to impede the firing from the 
ships of the line. While doing this the Rostock was hit by a tor- 
pedo, and the Elbing and Posen collided. Both cruisers were put 
out of action. The Rostock kept afloat till 5.45 a. m., but as enemy 
cruisers were then sighted she was blown up, the entire crew and 
the wounded having previously been taken off by the boats of 
Flotilla III. The crew of the Elbing was also taken over by a boat 
belonging to Flotilla III. The Commander, Captain Madlung, the 
First Officer, the Torpedo Officer and a cutter's crew remained on 
board to keep the ship afloat as long as possible. When, however, 
enemy forces were sighted at 4 a. m. the Elbing was also blown up. 
The remainder of the crew got away in the cutter and were sub- 
sequently picked up by a Dutch fishing-smack and returned home 
via Holland. 

The Luetzow was kept above water until 3.45 a. m. The Kpe- 
nig, the rear ship of the Fleet, lost sight of her at 11.15 p. m. The 
vessel was at last steered from the stern. All efforts to stop the 
water pouring in were fruitless; the fore part of the ship had been 
too badly damaged, and she had at last 7,000 tons of water in her. 
The screws revolved out of the water, and she had to be given 
UP The crew with all the wounded were taken off by the tor- 
pedo-boats "G40," "G37," "G38" and "V45," and the Luetzow was 
sunk by a torpedo. Altogether the four boats had 1,250 men from 
the Luetzow on board. Twice they encountered enemy cruisers 
and destroyers, but on each occasion, led by the senior officer. 
Commander Beitzen (Richard), they attacked and successfully 
made their way into the German Bight. In the last engagement 
"G40" had her "engines hit and had to be towed. 

When this report reached the Main Fleet the Second Leader 
of Torpedo-Boats on the Regensberg turned at once, regardless as 
to whether he might meet with superior English forces or not, and 
took over the towing party. "S32," Leader of Flotilla I (Captam 
Froehlich), was hit in her boiler at 1 a. m. and rendered tempora- 
rily useless. By feeding the boiler with sea water the captain 
succeeded however, in taking the boat into Danish waters. From 
thence she was towed through the Nordmann Deep by torpedo- 
boats dispatched to her assistance. 

These events prove that the English Naval forces made no ef- 
fort to occupy the waters between the scene of battle and Horns 
Reef. 

It was only during the night that there was •fiportunity for 
the ships to report on the number of prisoners they had on board 
and to gather from them some idea of the enemy's losses. Then 1 
learned that the Warspite, which we had observed to be badly 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 97 

damaged in the battle, was sunk. Among other vessels reported 
sunk were the battle-cruisers Queen Mary, Indefatigable, and In- 
vincible. This was all news to me, and convinced me that the 
English losses were far more considerable than our own. 

On arriving at Horns Reef at 5 a. m. I decided to remain there 
and await the Luetzow. I had not then heard of her fate. From 
11.30 p. m. on, the vessel had been able to do 13 knots. The last 
report from her was at 1.55 a. m. — transmitted by convoy-boat 
"G40" — stating that she was making very slow way, that the 
means of navigation were limited, that the gun power was reduced 
to a fifth, course south, station E 16. At 5.30 a. m. came a message 
that the Luetzow had been abandoned at 4 a. m. 

After that I had no difficulty in drawing my own conclusions. 
As the enemy did not come down from the North, even with light 
forces, it was evident that he was retiring, especially as nothing 
more could be seen of him nothwithstanding that his torpedo-boats 
were about until daw^n. 

6 
THE SITUATION ON THE MORNING OF JUNE 1 

"L" 11, 13, 17, 22 and 22 had gone up during the night for an 
early reconnaissance. At 5.10 a. m. "Lll" reported a squadron of 
twelve English battleships, numerous light craft and destroyers 
on a northerly course about the centre of the line Terschellin^ — 
Horns Reef, and immediately afterwards enemy battleships and 
battle-cruisers north of the first unit. The airship was heavily 
fired at but kept in touch until compelled to retire and lost siaht 
of the enemy in the thick atmosphere. The airship's reports 
taken from it war diary are as follows: 

Reconnaissance Trip of "Lll" on June 1, 1916 

"On June 1 at 1.30, after midnight 'Lll' went up at Nordholz 
vdth the following orders: As fourth airship to cover flank of 
High Sea forces, course N.W. to W. by Heligoland. Full crew on 
board, fresh south-westerly wind, visibility limited owing to 
ground fog and later to a fog-like atmosphere high up extending 
over 2 or at most 4 nautical miles. Heligoland was not visible 
through the fog. At 5 a. m. clouds of smoke were seen north of the 
ship in Square O 33 B and were made for. At 5.10 it was possible 
to make out a strong enemy unit of twelve large warships with 
numerous lighter craft steering north-north-east full speed ahead. 
To keep in touch with them *L11' kept in the rear and sent a 
wireless report, circling round eastwards. At 5.40 a. m. east of 
the first unit the airship sighted a second squadron of six big Eng- 
lish battleships with lighter forces on a northerly course; when 
sighted, they turned bv divisions to the west, presumably to get in- 
to contact with the first unit. As this groun was nearer to t>»p 
Main Fleet than the first one, 'Lll' attached itself to it, but at 5.50 
a group of three English battle-cruisers and four smaller craft 
were sighted to the north-east, and, cruising about south of the 
airshin. put themselves between the enemy Main Fleet and 'Lll.' 
Visibility was so poor that it was extremely difficult to keep in 
contact. For the most part only one of the units was vi«5ible at a 
time, while, apparentlv. the airship at an altitude of 1.100 — 1.900 
m. was plainly visible to the enemy against the rising sun. 



98 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

"At 5.15. shortly after sighting the first group of batUeships, 
the enemy opened fire on the airship from all the vessels with an- 
ti-aircraft guns and guns of every calibre. The great turrets fired 
broadsides; the rounds followed each other rapidly. The flash 
from the muzzles of the guns could be seen although the ships were 
hidden by the smoke. All the ships that came in view took up the 
firing with the greatest energy, so that 'Lll' was sometimes ex- 
posed to fire from 21 large and numbers of small ships. Although 
the firing did not take effect, that and the shrapnel bursting all 
around so shook the ship's frame that it seemed advisable to take 
steps to increase the range. The firing lasted till 6.20 a. m. At 
that time the battle-cruisers bearing down from S. W. within close 
distance of 'Lll' forced her to retire to N. E. to avoid their fiyre. 
At the same time the visibility became worse and the enemy was 
lost to view. 

" 'Lll' again took a northerly course and went as low down as 
500 metres, in the hope of better visibility. It was impossible to 
see beyond 1 to 2 nautical miles, and as under these conditions no 
systematic plan for keeping in contact could be made, N. and S. 
course was followed so as to keep between the enemy and our own 
Main Fleet. The enemy did not come in sight again. 

"At 8 a, m. the Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet dis- 
missed the airship, and *L11' returned. On the way back the ship 
came across a number of our own torpedo-boats exchanging bases, 
and messages were given for further transmission. The airship re- 
mained close to those boats as far as Sylt. Landed at Nordlitz 
at 2 p. m." 

At 4 a. m., 50 nautical miles west of Bovbjerg, "L24" sighted 
a flotilla of enemy destroyers, was fired at and returned the fire 
with bombs, then got away further north, and at 5 a. m. discovered 
a unit of twelve ships in Jammer Bay, steaming rapidly to the 
south. It was impossible to keep in contact for further recon- 
naissance as there was a bank of cloud as low down as 800 m. 

From the Main Fleet itself no signs of the enemy were visible 
at daybreak. The weather was so thick that the full length of a 
squadron could not be made out. In our opinion the ships in a 
south-westerly direction as reported by "Lll" could only just have 
come from the Channel to try, on hearing the news of the battle, 
to join up with their Main Fleet and advance agamst us. There 
was no ocassion for us to shun an encounter with this group, but 
owing to the slight chance of meeting on account of visibility con- 
ditions, it would have been a mistake to have followed theni. 
Added to this the reports received from the battle-cruisers showed 
that Scouting Division I would not be capable of sustaining a seri- 
ous fight, besides which the leading ships of Squadron III could not 
have fought for any length of time, owing to the reduction m their 
supply of munitions by the long spell of firing. The Frankfurt, 
Pillaii and Regensburg were the only fast light cruisers now 
available, and in such mi'^ty weather there was no depending on 
aerial reconnaissance. There was, therefore, no certain propect of 
defeating the enemy reported in the south. An encounter and the 
consequences thereof had to be left to chance. I therefore aban- 
doned the idea of further operations and ordered the return to port. 

On the way back, west of List, the Ostfriesland, at 7.30 a. m., 
struck a mine, one that evidently belonged to a hitherto unknown 
and recently laid enemy minefield. The damage was shght; the 
vessel shipped 400 tons of water, but her means of navigation did 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 99 

not suffer, and she was able to run into harbour under her own 
steam. I signalled, "Keep on." The last ships passed through the 
area without coming across further mines. 

Several submarine attacks on our returning Main Fleet failed 
entirely, thanks partly to the vigilance of the airmen who picked 
up the Main Fleet over List, and escorted them to the mouth of the 
river. During the course of the day all the ships and boats were 
safely in their haven. Special mention must be made of the bring- 
ing-in of the Seydlitz (Captain von Egidy) badly damaged at her 
bows. That the vessel ever reached the harbour is due to the re- 
markable seamanship of her commander and crew. Finally she 
was run astern into the dock at Wilhelmshaven. 

The U-boats lying off English harbours were told to remain at 
their posts a day longer. At 6.20 p. m., 60 miles north of Terschel- 
ling, the "U46" came across a damaged vessel of the "Iron Duke" 
class (the Marlborough). She was, however, so well protected 
that it would have been impossible to get within firing distance 
of her A torpedo was fired, but failed to reach the objective. 
Among the U-boats Iving off enemy harbours the "U21" on May 
31 and "U22" on June 1 both succeeded in hitting a destroyer. In 
each case, however, the sinking could not be observed owing to 
enemy counter-action. Besides this, one of our minelayers, oc- 
cupied in laying mines west of the Orkney Islands, achieved an 
important success. The English armoured crmser Hampshire 
(11 000 tons) struck one of these mines on June 5 and sank; with 
her perished Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener and all his staff. 

LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES 

According to careful estimation made by us the enemy lost: 

Tons. 

1 Dreadnaught of "Queen Elizabeth" class -- 28,500 

3 Battle-cruisers (Queen Mary, Indefatigable and Invin- .. . . . 

cible) od,OOU 

4 Armoured Cruisers (Black Prince, Defence, Warrior 

and one of the "Cressy" type) ahnn 

2 Light Cruisers .^'""" 

13 Destroyers io,wv 

Total 169,200 

"We lost: oRn(\{\ 

1 Battle-cruiser (Luetzow*) To onn 

1 older Battleship (Pommern) -- -^-^ id.^uu 

4 Light Cruisers (Wiesbaden, Elbmg, Rostock and Frau- ^^.^n 

5 Torpedo-boats ^'^^^ 

Total 60,730 

The enemy's were almost complete losses, whereas we had 
rescued the crews of the Luetzow, Elbing, Rostock and half of 
those of the torpedo-boats. 

'In mv first report of the battle sent to the Admiralty at Berlin the loss 
of the Luetzow was mentioned. The announcement of this loss ^as sup- 
pressed by the Naval Staff, though not at my request. The enemy could not 
have seen the ship go down. In the interests of naval warfare It was right 
?o suppress the news. Unfortunately the secrecy observed produced the Im- 
trp.sslon that it was necessary to enlarge our success to that extent. 



leO THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Our losses in personnel amounted to: 2,400 killed; 400 wound- 
ed. 

The enemy's losses may be estimated at over 7,000 killed. 

According to a list which he added to his report of June 18, 
1916, Admiral Jellicoe endeavoured to exaggerate our losses in the 
following manner: 

BATTLESHIPS OR BATTLE-CRUISERS 

Correct facts. 

2 Battleships, "Dreadnaught" type (certain) none 

1 Battleship, "Deutschland" type (certain) one 

1 Battleship or Battle-cruiser (probable) one 

1 Battleship, "Dreadnaught" type (probable) none 

LIGHT CRUISERS 

4 Light cruisers (certain) four 

1 Large ship or light cruiser (certain) none 

^ P TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS 

6 Torpedo-boat destroyers (certain) five 

3 Torpedo-boat destroyers (probable) none 

SUBMARINES 

1 Submarine (certain) none 

3 Submarines (probable) none 

With regard to the submarines he was totally mistaken, as 
none took part in the battle. I sent my final impressions of the 
battle in a written report of 4-7 16 to H.M. the Emperor as fol- 
lows: 

"The success achieved is due to the eagerness in attack, the 
efficient leadership through the subordinates, and the admirable 
deeds of the crews full of an eminently warlike spirit. It was only 
Dossible owing to the excellence of our ships and arms, the syste- 
matic neace-time training of the units, and the conscientious^ de- 
velooment on each individual ship. The rich experience gained 
will be carefully applied. The battle has proved that in the en- 
laraement of our Fleet and the development of the different types 
of Ihips we have been guided by the right strategical and tactical 
ideas and that we must continue to follow the same system. AH 
arms'can claim a share in the success. But, directly or indirectly, 
the far-reaching heavy artillery of the great battleships was the de- 
ciding factor, and caused the greater part of the enemy's losses 
that are so far known, as also it brought the torpedo-boat flotillas 
to thefr successful attack on the ships of the Main F eet. This does 
not detract from the merits of the flotillas m enabling the battle- 
shiDS to slip away from the enemy by their attack. The big ship — 
battleship and battle-cruiser - is therefore, and will be, the main 
strength of naval power. It must be further developed by in- 
creasing the gun calibre, bv raising the speed, and by perfecting 
the armour and the protection below the water-line. 

"Finally I beg respectfully to report to your Majecty that 
bv the middle of August the High Sea Fleet with the exception 
of the Derfflinger and Seydlitz, will be ready for fresh actipn. 
With a favourable succession of operations the enemy may be 
made to suffer severely, although there can be no doubt that even 
Se most successful result from a high sea battle will not compel 
Eneland to make peace. The disadvantages of our geographical 
Situation as compared with that of the Island Empire and the ene- 
my"rva"t material superiority cannot be coped with to such a de- 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER 101 

gree as to make us masters of the blockade inflicted on us, or even 
of the Island Empire itself, not even were all the U-boats to be 
available for military purposes. A victorious end to the war at not 
too distant a date can only be looked for by the crushing of Eng- 
lish economic life through U-boat action against English com- 
merce. Prompted by the convictions of duty, I earnestly advise 
Your Majesty to abstain from deciding on too lenient a form of 
procedure on the ground that it is opposed to military views, and 
that the risk of the boats would be out of all proportion to the 
expected gain, for, in spite of the greatest conscientiousness on the 
part of the Chiefs, it would not be possible in English waters, 
where American interests are so prevalent, to avoid occurrences 
which might force us to make humilating concessions if we do not 
act with the greatest severity." 

I followed up my report on the battle with a more detailed 
account on July 16, 1916, after Admiral Jellicoe's report had ap- 
peared in the English Press. I quote here from the above-men- 
tioned account: 

"Admiral Jellicoe's report, published in the English Press, 
confirms as follows the observations made by us: 



Grouping of the English Forces 

Under Vice-Admiral Beatty: 
1st and 2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadrons. 
5th Battle Squadron ("Queen Elizabeths"). 
1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons. 
1st, 9th, 10th and 13th Destroyer Flotillas. 

Admiral Jellicoe led: 
1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons (Fleet Flagship at the head of 

4th Battle Squadron). 
3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron ("Invincibles"). 
1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons. 
4th Light Cruiser Squadron. 
4th, 11th and 12th Destroyer Flotillas. 



Intervention in the Battle by the English Main Fleet 

"When he first had news that the enemy was sighted, Admiral 
Jellicoe was north-west of Admiral Beatty's forces. He thereupon 
advanced at full speed in column formation on a S.E. course, put 
the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons for reconnaissance at the head 
of his formation, and sent forward the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron 
(apparentlv reinforced bv the Agincourt*), to support Admiral 
Beatty. The 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron passed east of Admiral 
Beattv's leader at 7.30 p. m.; thev heard in the south-west the 
thunder of guns, and saw the flashes, sent out the light cruiser 
Chester to reconnoitre, and themselves took a N.W. course. Short- 
Iv before 8 o'clock the Chester encountered our Scouting Division 
II and was set on fire bv them. After pursuing the Chester, 
Scouting Division II came across the 3rd Bnttle-Cruiser Snuadron, 
which opened fire on them. The attacks at 8 p. m. bv our Torpedo- 
Boat F'otil^a IX and the 12th Half-Flotilla were launched against 
this 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron. 

•Observed by Scouting Division 11. 



102 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

"Admiral Beatty sighted the 3rd Battle-Cruiser Squadron at 
8.10 p. m., and at 8.21 p. m. had it ahead of the 1st and 2nd Battle- 
Cruiser Squadrons he was leading. 





«. 


\^I Squadron 


f'"-i 


\ 


\ 


^Sq\ /< 


»^-'--»- 'v^ 


\ 


esq 




BRITISH ^^ 




\ 


^"^M Battle Cruiser '\fc^utt 
^^^^^^^^'- ' ,Ch4ter \'sq. \ 


(Queen Elizabeths^ 








V Battle ^-^ ^ 






V^^^ \ / 




^^ 


"v^ J* 


GtRt^AN \'2-ncl Scoutinq 
^ Div. 


iX^-^-^ 






c.^ 


^-,>' 












Battle Crui'o 
' 1 ' 
















1 
1 


POSITION 0"^ 






ENGLISH FORCES ^T 






/ 


8RM. 






MG\n Fleet 




-"S 









"At 7.55 p. m. Admiral Jellicoe sighted the fire from the guns. 
It was impossible for him to make out the position of our Fleet. 
The difference between his and Admiral Beatty's charts added to 
the uncertainty in judging of the situation. The report says it was 
difficult to distinguish between friend and foe. At 8.14 p. m. the 
battleship squadrons turned east into the line between the 1st and 
2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadrons and the 5th Battle Squadron. At 
817 p. m. the 1st Battle Squadron opened fire on the leaders of 
our ships of the line. Up to 10.20 p. m. those squadrons, with some 
few pauses, took part in the fighting. 

"Shortly before the battleship squadrons arrived, the 1st 
Cruiser Squadron, together with light forces from the Main Fleet, 
joined in the fighting. At 8.50 p. m., therefore, between our first 
and second blows. Admiral Beatty put the 3rd Battle-Crmser 
Squadron in the rear of the 2nd. At 9.6 p. m. the leaders of the 
battleships made for the south. The total impression received by 
us of the battle is made more complete by the statements m the 
English Press, and is not altered. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL SCHEER lOS 

3 

The Enemy's Action During the Night 

"At 9.45 p. m. Admiral Beatty had lost sight of our forces. He 
sent the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons to reconnoitre in 
the west, and at 10.20 p. m. went to their support with the 1st and 
2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadrons, also on a westerly course. Imme- 
diately after came the encounter decribed in my report with the 
leading ships of our Main Fleet, consisting of Scouting Divisions 
IV and I and Squadron II. The fact that our forces turned west- 
ward must have led the English Admiral to assume that our Main 
Fleet had taken a westerly course, and made him follow in that 
direction. The fact that we at the same time put Squadron II in 
the rear, and with the new leader. Squadron I, again took a S.E. 
course, resulted in Admiral Beatty's forces passing west in front of 
us and ultimately losing contact. It was obvious that after the 
battle the English Main Fleet was divided into two. Admiral Jel- 
licoe's report makes no mention of this. The one portion, con- 
sisting of large battleships and light craft, took apparently norther- 
ly and easterly courses, as one group of ships was sighted by 'L24' 
at 5 a. m. on June 1 in Jammer Bay, close under land. It may 
perhaps have been both those rear squadrons which made off on 
the attack by our Torpedo-Boat Flotillas VI and IX, and then ap- 
parently lost touch with the Main Fleet." The other portion, under 
Admiral Jellicoe, consisting according to observations by 'Lit,' of 
eighteen large battleships, three battle-cruisers (probably the 3rd 
Battle-Cruiser Squadron) and nimierous light forces, had, up to 
10.46 p. m., been steering south and th^n south-west. It would 
appear, from intercepted English wireless messages, that he cov- 
ered 15 nautical miles. Based on these courses and the speed, he 
must have crossed our course at midnight, 10 to 15 nautical miles 
in front of us, and have taken later a covu-se to the centre of the 
line Horns Reef — Terschelling, where he was seen at 5 a. m. by 
Til' on a N.N.E. course. 



The Consequence of the Enemy's Action during the Night 

"Admiral Jellicoe must have intended to resume the battle 
with us at dawn. It is inexplicable, therefore, why a portion of 
the Main Fleet made for Jammer Bay during the night. Nor can 
it be understood how it was that the enemy's light forces, which 
were engaged with our Main Fleet up to 4.36 a. m. and thus were 
in touch with us the whole night, could find a way to inform Ad- 
miral Jellicoe and Admiral Beatty of our course and navigation. 
But even apart from that, it must be assumed that the fire from our 
guns and the enemy's burning cruisers and destroyers would have 
pointed out the way to the English Main Fleet. In any case it is 
a fact that on the morning of June 1 the enemy's heavy forces 
were broken up into three detachments; one in the North, a second 
with Admiral Beatty in the North-west, and the third with Ad- 
miral Jellicoe South-west of Horns Reef. It is obvious that this 
scattering of the forces — which can only be explained by the fact 
that after the dav-battle Admiral Jellicoe had lost the general 
command — induced the Commander to avoid a fresh battle. 



•Accordinx to Admiral Jelllcoe's book, one group of battleships did not 
rejoin him till 6 p. m. on June 1. 



V 
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 
Account by Admiral Jellicoe 

On May 31st, 1916, the Grand Fleet and the High Sea Fleet 
fought the action which has become known as the Battle of Jut- 
land. The despatch describing the battle, as published some weeks 
later, was not quite in its original form as written by me. After 
a conference held at the Admiralty, early in June, modifications 
were made; some of them because it was considered that certain 
passages might convey useful information to the enemy, and 
other because it was thought to be undersirable to draw atten- 
tion to certain features of British design. Amongst the latter 
was the insufficiency of the armour protection of our earher 
battle cruisers. 

Throughout the War it had been our policy to cause our bat- 
tle cruisers, with their attendant light cruisers, to occupy when 
at sea an advanced position, often at a considerable distance from 
the Battle Fleet. Battle cruisers were designed and built in order 
that they might keep in touch with the enemy and report his 
movements when he had been found; hence the heavy guns 
which they carried. They were intended to find the enemy for 
the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy's strength in order 
to report to the Battle Fleet. Had this policy not been adopted 
the enemy's battle cruisers could not have been brought to ac- 
tion on such occasions as the engagement of January 24th, lyio. 
And in the cases of raids on our coast, the battle cruisers were 
always sent ahead at full speed to endeavor to cut off the enemy 
battle cruisers. 

Bearing in mind our superiority in numbers in the middle 
of 1916 and the heavier armaments carried by our ships, the real 
risk involved in this policy was that of our battle cruisers being 
drawn on to the enemy's Battle Fleet, and one or more of pm- 
vessels being disabled. Provided that our shios were not disabled, 
they would; owing to their higher speed, have no difficulty in 
clear weather in keeping out of range of the enemy s Battle fleet, 
if it were sighted, whilst still maintaining touch with it, ana 
driving off lighter vessels. With the added support of the ships 
of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been grouped with the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet owing to the absence of the 3rd Battle i>quaa- 
ron at Scapa Flow, the tactical advantage of our ships was even 
stronger, provided always that the 5th Battle Squadron had an 
excess of speed over the fastest enemy's Battle Squadron. 

In these circumstances, when preparing my despatch, I had 
felt it necessary on the highest grounds, as well as only just to the 
officers and men of our battle cruisers, to give some explanation 
of the heavy losses incurred by our ships in the early part of the 
action, when we were opposing six battle cruisers (^upported, 
though at long range by four battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth 
class, comprising the 5th Battle Squadron) to five enemy battle 
cruisers, which were not then supported by the German Battle 
Fleet. Inquiry into this matter showed that one explanation was 
that our ships were very inadequately protected by armour as 
compared with the German vessels of the battle cruiser type, ll 

105 



106 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

was considered undesirable to draw attention to this publicly 
while the "War was in progress. 

The relative values of protection and gun power had fre- 
quently engaged my serious attention. It was also a subject of 
much discussion amongst writers on naval matters, some of whom 
went to the length of suggesting that all available weight should 
be put into gun power and that ships should be left practically 
without armour. Their views were based on the argument that 
"the best defence is a powerful offensive." Although this argu- 
ment is very true when applied to strategy, the War has shown 
it fallacy as applied to materiel. The loss of the Good Hope, 
Monmouth, Queen Mary, Indefatigable, Invincible, Defence, and 
Warrior, and the considerations to which these losses gave rise, 
convinced naval officers afloat, even if it did not convince others 
less intimately associated with the Fleet during the War, that 
ships with inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those 
which possess them to a considerably greater degree, even if the 
former are superior in gun power. The conviction was strength- 
ened by the knowledge we obtained, that German ships, far more 
frequently hit by gunfire, torpedo, or mine than many of our 
ships that sank, were yet taken safely into port owing partly to 
their defensive qualities, but partly to the limitations of our ar- 
mour-piercing shell at that time. 

There has been in the past a tendency in some quarters, 
when comparing the relative strength of the British and German 
Fleets for the purpose of future provision of large vessels in the 
Navy Estimates, to make comparison only on the basis of the 
gun power of the vessels of the two Navies. Great superiority 
in fighting qualities on the part of the British Fleet was sug- 
gested by this blindness to other considerations. During my pre- 
War service at the Admiralty this question was often imder dis- 
cussion, and I consequently demurred to this line of argument 
as being very misleading and pointed out that the true compari- 
son lay between the displacement of the ships of the various 
classes, because if we assumed, as War experience has since shown 
that we were justified in assimiing, that the German naval de- 
signers and constructors were not inferior in ability to our own, it 
was obvious that, taking ships of equal displacement and eaual 
speed, and about contemporary date, if our vessels possesed su- 
periority in gunfire, the Germans must possess superiority in 
some other direction. It was well known at the Admiralty that 
their superiority lay in greatly increased protection, combined 
with heavier torpedo armament. 

We were also aware that the German vessels were fitted 
with small tube boilers, which were very economical in weight 
for a given horse-power, and, consequently, the German vessels 
obtained thereby a further advantage, the weight saved being pre- 
sumably utilised in giving the ships additional protection. In 
other words, they adopted a different disposition of the weight 
available in each ship. 

The tables (see brown print insert) give particulars of the 
armament, protection, and displacement of the capital ships of the 
two Navies engaged in the Battle of Jutland, so far as they are 
known to me: 

The main facts revealed by an examination of these tables 

are : '% 



TABLE L BRITISH 



Ships 



Programme 



Year 
" Royal Sovereign " | 1913-14 
Class (5) 

" Queen Elizabeth " | 1912-13 

Class (5) 
Iron Duke " Class | 1911-12 

(4) 
" King George V." j 1910-11 

Class (3) 
"Orion " Class (4) 1909-10 



Canada 

Erin . 
Agincourt . 

" Hercules " Class' 

(3) 
" St. Vincent " 

Class (2) 
" Bellerophon " 

Class (3) 
Dreadnought 



Emer- 
gency 
War 
Pro- 
gramme 

1909-10 

1907-8 

1906-7 

1905-6 



Designed 
Load 

displace- 
ment 


Speed 


Fuel 

capacity 


Tons 


Knots 


Tons 


25,750 


21.5 


3,400 


27,500 


25.0 


3,400 


25,000 


21.0 


4,300 


23,000 


21.0 


4,000 


22,500 


21.0 


4,100 


28,000 


22.75 


3,800 


23,000 


21.0 


2,800 


27,500 


22.0 


3,800 


20,000 


21.0 


3,700 


19,250 


21.0 


3,700 


18,600 


21.0 


3,500 


17,900 


21.0 


4,000 



Alain and 

secondary 

guns 



14 



12 
10 
12 
10 
12 
10 
13 
10 
12 

10 
16 
14 
20 
10 
12 
10 
13 
10 
12 
10 
20, 



15" 
6' 

15" 

6" 
13''.5 

6' 
13'.5 

4" 
13''.5 

4" 
IV 

6' 

13'.5 

6' 
12" 

6" 
12' 

4" 
12" 

4" 
12" 

4" 

12' 

12 pds. 



Sub- 
niisrgcd 
torpedo 

tubes 



TABLE II. BRITISH 



Ships 


i 
Programme 


Designed 
Load 

displace- 
ment 


Speed 


Fuel 

capacity 


Main and 

secondary 

guns 


Sub- 
merged 
torpedo 

tubes 


(1) . 

" Lion " Class (3) 

" New Zealand " 

Class (3) 
"Inflexible" Class 

(3) 


Year 
1911-12 

1909-10 

1905-6 


Tons 
28,500 

26,350 
18,800 
17,250 


Knots 
29.0 

28.0 
26.0 
25.0 


Tons 
6,800 

4,600 
4,000 
3,800 


8, 13'.5 
12, 6" 

8. 13".5 
15, 4' 

8, 12" 
14, 4" 

8, 12' 
12, 4' 


2 

2 
2 
4 



BATTLESHIPS 



Armour 



MhIii 
belt 



Upper 
belt 



13' 6' 

] 
13* j G* 

12' ig' and 8' 



Belt 
at 
bow 



12' 


9' and 8' 


12' 


9' and 8' 


9' 


7' and 4 J 



12' 
9' 
11' 
10' 
10' 
11' 



9' and 8" 
6' 



l^f ary gun 
.'^^ battery 
^^^^''. armour 



4' 



6' 



4' i G' 

4' I 6' 

2J'| nil 
nil 
G' 

5' 
6' 
nil 
nil 
nil 
nil 



Tur- 
ret 
front 
plates 



4' 


2r 


4' 


4' 


4' 


4' 


4' 


4' 


2V 


2r 


2" 


2' 


6' 


5' \ 

j 


6' 


r- 



13' 

13' 
11' 
11' 
11" 
10' 

11' 
12' 
11' 
11' 
11' 
11' 



Rem.srics 



Protective 
decks 



1' to 4' 
1' to 3' 

ir to2r 
li'to4' 
lJ'to4' 
ir to 4' 

IJ'toS' 

1' toli' 

ir to4' 

I' to 3' 

J' to 3' 

i' to 3' 



; Side oniioiind up t 
: uppcrtli »nindsecon<l 
i ary bat Ur>' id><>vf thai 
I Dillo 

; Dillo 

I 

i Side armoured up I 
\ upper deck. 
Ditto 

Side armoured up 
upper deck and secoii 
ary battery above th: 
Ditto 

Ditto 

Side annoured up 

main deck only. 

Ditto 

Ditto 

Ditto 



BATTLE CRUISERS 



Armour 



Main 
belt 



0" 
6' 
6' 



Upper 
belt 



Belt at 
bow 



B61t 

at 

stern 



6" 



Second 
ary gun 
battery 
armour 



4* 
4' 

nU 



Tur- 1 

ret 

front 

plates 



Protective 
decks 



nU 


9' 


nO 


7' 


nil 


T 



V to 3' 

1' to2r 

1' to2J' 

rto2r 



Remarks. 



Side armoured up 
upper deck 
secondary ba; 
above that. 

Side nrmoured up 
upper deck. 

Side armoured ui 
main deck. 
Ditto 



TABLE III. GERMAN 



Designed 
I Load 

;Pi-°g''^"""H displace. 

■ ment 



KSnig" Class (4)^ 1911-12 25,390 



Kaiser" Llass (5) , 1909-11 ,24,410 



Speed 



23.0 



21.0 ' 



Fuel 
capa- 
city 



H.'lltfolaud" Class i 1908-9 | 22,440 20.5 



Nassau" Class (1) ! 1907-8 \ 18,600 \ 20.0 



Tons 
4,200 



3,700 
3,100 

2,800 



Main and 

secondary 

guns 



10, 12' 
14, 5*. 



10, 12" 
14, 5'.S 

12, 12" 
14, 5'.9 



12, 11' 
12, 5'.9 



Sub- 
merged 
torpedo 

tubes 



TABLE rV. GERMAN 



Siiirs 



Programme 



" Derfflingcr " 
Class* 



Von dvr 
*Lulzow was simil 



Designed 
Load 

displace- 
ment 



Speed 



Year 



Tons 



Fuel 
capa- 
city 



Tons 



1911-12 I 26,180 28.0 | 5,600 



1910-11 24,610 ; 26.75 3,700 



1908-9 1 22,640 i 27.25 
1907-8 19,100 I 26.0 



3,200 
2,900 



Main and 

secondary 

guns 



8, 12' 
14, 5'.9 

10, 11' 
12, 5'.9 
10, 11' 
12, 5'.9 
8, 11' 
10, 5'.9 



Sub- 
merged 
torpedo 

tubes 



TABLE V. Comparison of weight ol armour 
N.B.— T/ie German 



« 


Displacement 


Weight of 
armour 


Battleships — 

Monarch Briti-sh 
Kaiser German . 

B.\TT-LE Cruisers — 
Queen Alary British 
Seyillitz German 


tons 
22,500 
24,410 

27,000 
24,610 


Ton* 
4,560 
5,430 

3,900 
5,200 



Noie. — Similar comparisons between other ships 



BATTLESHIPS 









Abmolk 






Main 
belt 


Upper 
belt 


i3elt 

at 

bow 


Belt 

at 

stern 


Second- 
ary cun 
ballery 
arniour 


Tur- 
ret 
front 
plates 


Protective j 
decks 


14' 


10' 


6' 


6' 


8" 


14» '?'" 'o'^" 


13'.75 


9' 


7r 


1 


11J'! I'/'tn t" 


11'.75 


7r 


w 


ly li' 


IJ^ li in.:,- 


11'.75 


7}' 


6' , r , er 

i . 1 


11" 2" lo4r 

'i 



I il. MARKS 



Side armoured ui) ' ' 
upper deck aini 
secondary linfttry 
above that 

Ditto, but III i 

side only :iriiii>iiii 'I 
up to ui:iin di'ik. 

Side armoured up to 
main ilcck and 
secondary iinH«rv 
above tliat. 
Ditto 



BATTLE CRUISERS 



Armour 




Main 


Upper 


Bell 

at 

bow 


Belt' 

at 

stern 


Second- 
ary gun 


Tur- 1 
ret ' Protcclivc 


P.IC.MARKS 


belt 


belt 


battery 
armour 


front 1 decks 
plates 




12' 


8' 


5' 


5' 


r 


11' l"to 3.2" 


Side armoured up to 
upperdeckwithsecnnil- 
ary battery above tluit. 


111' 


8' 


V 


4" 


6' 


10' V to 31" 


Ditto 


"'1 


taper- 
ing 


4' 


4' 


5- 


10" ? same as 
Sei/dlilz 


Ditto 


91' J 


4' 


4" 


5' 


9" ? same as 


Side armourid i i' I" 










r Scijdlilz 


main deck wit li - 














ary battery ani 














to upper deck. 



in British and German ships of the same dale. 
figures are approximalc. 




of the same date would show similar results. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 107 

BATTLESHIPS 

1. The German ships of any particular period were of con- 
siderably greater displacement as compared with contemporary 
British ships. 

2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of ar- 
mour than their British contemporaries. 

3. All German Dreadnaughts were provided with side ar- 
mour to the upper deck, whilst nine of the earliest British Dread- 
noughts were provided with armour protection to the main deck 
only, thus rendering them far more open to artillery attack. 
The "Orion" class of battleship and the "Lion" class of battle 
cruiser, designed during my service at the Admiralty as Con- 
troller, were the first of our Dreadnoughts armoured to the up- 
per deck. 

4. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships 
was in nearly all cases thicker than in their British contempor- 
aries, whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in all cases 
considerably greater in the German ships. 

5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually 
greater than in the British vessels and the watertight subdivision 
more complete. 

6. The German ships carried a greater number of sub- 
merged torpedo tubes than the British vessels. 

BATTLE CRUISERS 

1. The earlier German battle cruisers were of greater dis- 
placement than their British contemporaries. 

2. The German ships carried a greater weight of armour 
than their British contemporaries. 

3. Five out of our nine battle cruisers were without pro- 
tection above the main deck, the whole of the German vessels 
being provided with protection to the upper deck. 

4. The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all po- 
sitions, including deck protection, as well as more complete 
watertight subdivision. 

5. The German ships carried a greater number of sub- 
merged torpedo tubes than the British ships. 

As against the additional protection of the German ships our 
vessels of contemporary design were provided in all cases with 
heavier turret guns, whilst the German ships carried heavier 
secondary armaments. 

A point of considerable interest, which should also be men- 
tioned because it was to prove important, was that the Germans 
possessed a delay-action fuse which, combined with a highly ef- 
ficient armour-piercing projectile, ensured the burst of shell tak- 
ing place inside the armour of British ships instead of outside, or 
whilst passing through the armour, which was the case with 
British shells of that date fired against the thick German armour. 

The fuel capacity of the ships of the two Navies was not 
widely different, although the British ships, as a rule, were fitted 
to carry more fuel. Although I arranged, after the first few- 
months of war, to reduce the amount of fuel carried by our ships 



ito THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

very considerably — in fact, by more than 25 per cent. — I was 
unsd)le to reduce it further in coal-burning ships without sacri- 
ficing some of the protection afforded by the coal, since in our 
case it was necessary to be prepared to do a considerable amount 
of steaming at high, speed, involving expenditure of coal, before 
obtaining contact with the enemy. It would have been unwise 
to contemplate meeting the Germans with coal below what I may 
call the "safety line." On the other hand, it was well known, 
that, as the Germans had no intention of fighting in action far 
from their bases, they had effected a very much greater reduc- 
tion in the quantity of fuel carried, with consequently a corr_es- 
ponding advantage in speed. 

There was yet one other matter of great importance, namely, 
the vulnerability of the ships of the two Navies in regard to 
under-water attack. Here the Germans possessed a very real 
advantage, which stood them in good stead throughout the war. 
It arose from two causes: 

1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside the 
ships, and in many cases its greater thickness. 

2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer skin 
of the ship and the consequent additional protection to under- 
water attack afforded thereby. 

In regard to the first point, the great majority of our ships 
only carried partial internal protection, that is, protection over 
a portion of the length of the ship. The protection was usually 
confined to the region of the magazine and shell-rooms. In the 
German ships it ran throughout the length of the vessel. 

As to the second point it was possible to place the protective 
bulkhead farther "inboard" in the German ships without cramp- 
ing machinery and magazine spaces, because the ships themselves 
were of much gre-iter beam. Consequently the explosion of a 
mine or a torpdo against the hull of the ship was far less likely 
to injure the protective bulkhead and so to admit water into the 
vitals of the ship than was the case with a British vessel. The 
result was that, although it is known that many German capi- 
tal ships were mined and torpedoed during the war, including 
several at the Jutland battle, the Germans have not so far ad- 
mitted that any were sunk, except the pre-Dreadnought battle- 
ship Pommern and the battle cruiser Lutzow, whose inquiries from 
shell fire were also very extensive. 

On the other hand, British capital ships mined or torpedoed 
rarely survived. The recorded instances of escape are the in- 
flexible (mined in the Dardanelles) and the Marlborough (tor- 
pedoed at Jutland), and the in latter case, although the torpe- 
do struck at about the most favourable spot for the ship, she had 
some difficulty in reaching port. 

The question will be asked why it was that British ships 
were under this disadvantage. The reply is that the whole of our 
Dreadnoughts battleships designed before the War were ham- 
pered by the absence of proper dock accommodation. The Ger- 
man Emperor once remarked to me at Kiel on this subject, that 
we had made the mistake of building our ships before we had 
proper dock accommodation for them, whilst in Germany they 
had provided the dock accommodation first and had designed 
the ships consequently. He was quite right, although, since docks 
took a long time to construct, the German policy involved delay 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 109 

in shipbuilding, whereas we got ships of a type, and hen:e our 
margin of superiority in 1914. As each successive type of .'^read- 
nought was designed, our constructive staff were faced with the 
fact that if they went beyond a certain beam the number of docks 
available would be insufficient; and to obtain money with which 
to construct adequate docks was always a matter of difhcuity. 
Docks make no appeal to the imagination of the public and a cost 
a great deal of money. The result was that August, 1914, tound 
us with superiority in ships, but woefullv lacking in dock accom- 
modation; and for this reason alone a Fleet action early in the 
War, resulting in considerable damage to heavy ships, would have 
produced embarrassing resmts. 

It is only just to our very able constructive staff at the Ad- 
miralty to point this out; it was one of the reasons which led 
to the German ships being much better equipped to withstand 
under-water attack than were our own. It is devoutly to be 
hoped that this lesson will be borne in mind in the future, and 
adequate dock accommodation provided for the Fleet. 

The matter is one of which I have considerable person;' 
knnw'edee, since it came within my province as Controller in 
1909-11 and was also given to me to examine whilst Second Sea 
Lord in 1913. It is needless to say that on both occasions th- 
necessities were pointed out with emphasis. These remarks n 
not out of place, as will be shown, as an introduction to a con- 
sideration of the Battle of Jutland, if that action is to be rightly 
judged. 

In following the proceedings of the Fleet it is essential to 
bear in mind that the time of receipt of signals, especially of re- 
ports emanating from the bridge of a ship, is not a true indication 
of the time at which the officer making the report began his 
task A varying but considerable interval is bound to elapse; 
this includes the time taken to write out the report, transmit it 
to the wireless office or signal bridge, code it, signal it, decode it 
on board the receiving ship, write it out and transmit it to the 
bridge. The interval is greater with wireless than with visual 
signals. 

1. — THE BATTLE CRUISER FLEET'S ACTION 

The Grand Fleet put to sea on May 30th for the purpose of 
carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea. The 
orders from me under which the Fleet acted were as follows: 

Vice-Admiral Sir Martvn Jerram, with the 2nd Battle Squad- 
ron from Cromarty, was directed to pass through a position in 
Lat. 58.15 N., Long. 2.0 E., and to meet the remainder of the Bat- 
tle Fleet at 2 p. m. on the 31st at position (A) in Lat. 57.45 N., 
Long. 4.15 E. 

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with the Battle Cruiser Fleet 
and the 5th Battle Squadron, was directed to proceed to a posi- 
tion in Lat. 56.40 N., Long. 5.40, economising fuel in the destroy- 
ers as much as possible; it was expected that he would be in that 
position bv about 2 p. m., on the 31st, after which he was directed 
to stand to the northward to get into visual touch with the Bat- 
tle Fleet. 

The Iron Duke and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, together 
with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the newly commis- 



110 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

sioned light cruisers Chester and Canterbury, which had been 
carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices at Scapa, left that 
base during the evening of May 30th, and proceeded towards 
position (A), Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E., having met the 2nd 
Battle Squadron en route at 11.15 a. m. in Lat. 58.13 N., Long. 2.42 
E. Sir David Beatty had been informed before sailing that the 
Battle Fleet would steer towards the Horn Reef from the position 
in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E. 

At 2 p. m. on May 31st the Battle Fleet was about 18 miles 
to the north-westward of the position being actually in Lat. 
57.57 N., Long. 3.45 E., in organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been 
slightly delayed to enable the usual and necessary practice of ex- 
amining trawlers and other vessels met with en route to be car- 
ried out without causing the examining vessels to expend un- 
necessary fuel in regaining station. We had to be on our guard 
against disguised enemy scouts. The divisions were in line ahead 
disposed abeam to starboard in the order: lst-6th Divisions 
(screened by the 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas) with the 4th 
Light Cruiser Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. 
The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were stationed 
16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six miles apart on a 
line of direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.; the cruisers being eight 
miles apart and their positions being in the order from east to 
west: 

Cochrane Shannon Minotaur (F.) Defence (F.) Duke of Edinburgh Black Prince 

Warrior 
Hampshire (linking ship 6 miles astern of the Minotaur) 

The attached cruisers, the Active, Boadicea, Blanche, and 
Bellona, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and the 3rd Bat- 
tle Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers Chester and Can- 
terbury, about 20 miles ahead, the whole steering S. 50 E., and 
zigzagging, the speed of advance being 14 knots. 

The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below: 

Line of Advance. 
1st Div.; King George V. (P.), Ajax, Centurion, Erin. 
2nd Div.; Orion (P.), Monarch, Conqueror, Thunderer. 
3rd Div.; Iron Duke (P.P.), Royal Oak, Superb (P.), Canada. 
4th Div.; Benbow (P.), Bellerophon, Temeraire, Vanguard. 
5th Div.; Colossus (P.), CoUingwood, Neptune, St. Vincent. 
6th Div.; Marlborough (P.) Revenge, Hercules, Agincourt. 
P., Flagship; F.F., Pleet-Plagship. 

It may be added in further explanation that the flagships of 
the Battle Fleet were: 

Iron Duke, Fleet-Flagship. — Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe 
(Commander-in-Chief). 

King George V. — Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram, Com- 
manding 2nd Battle Squadron. 

Orion. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear -Admiral 
in the 2nd Battle Squadron. 

Superb. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral A, L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in 
the 4th Battle Squadron. 

Benbow. — Flagship of Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Com- 
manding the 4th Battle Squadron. 

Colossus. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, Rear-Ad- 
miral in the 1st Battle Squadron. 

Marlborough.! — Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Com- 
manding 1st Battle Squadron and second in com- 
mand of the Grand Fleet. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 111 

The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron, with des- 
troyers, were at 2 p. m. in Lat. 56.46 N., Long. 4.40 E., and had 
turned to the northward, steering N. by E., speed 19 Va knots, in 
the order: 

The Lion and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead, 
screened by the light cruiser Champion and 10 destroyers of the 
13th Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron in single 
line ahead three miles E.N.E. of the Lion, screened by six des- 
troyers.* The 5th Battle Squadron, in single line ahead, was five 
miles N.N.W. of the Lion, being screened by the light crmser 
Fearless and nine destroyers of the 1st FlotUla. The Light Cruis- 
er Squadrons formed a screen eight miles S.S.E. from the Lion, 
ships spread on a line of direction E.N.E. and W.S.W., five miles 
apart in the order from west to east: 

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; Southampton (F.), Nottingham, Birmingham, 

3«i Light Cruiser Squadron; Falmouth (F.), Birlienhead, Gloucester. 
1st Light Cruiser Squadron; Inconstant, Galatea (F.), Cordelia, Phaeton. 

It should be added that the flagships were: 
Lion. — Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice Admiral Sir David 

Beatty. ^ , x, , 

Princess Royal. — Flagship of Rear- Admiral O. de Brock, com- 
manding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. 
New Ze?Jand. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, com- 
manding 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron. 
Bar ham. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, com- 
manding 5th Battle Squadron. 
The Engadine, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed between 
the light cruisers Gloucester and Cordelia, and the light cruiser 
Yarmouth acted as linking ship between the Lion and the light 
cruiser screen. 

The first report of enemy vessels was received from the Ga- 
latea, the flagship of Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, com- 
manding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, who, at 2.20 p. m., 
sighted two enemv vessels to the E.S.E. apparently stopped and 
engaged in boarding a neutral steamer. Sir David Beatty, recog- 
nising the possibilities of the situation, immediately turned his 
fleet to the S.S.E., the course for the Horn Reef, so as to get be- 
tween the enemy and his base. 

At 2.35 p. m. the Galatea reported a large amount of smoke 
"as from a fleet" bearing E.N.E.. followed by a report that the 
vessels were steering north. The course of the Battle Cruiser 
Fleet was then altered to the eastward and N.E. towards the 
smoke, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p. m. and identified as 
five battle cruisers accompanied by destroyers. 

Meanwhile the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed 
their direction, and, iudging the situation accurately, spread to 
the east without waiting for orders, forming a screen in advance 
of the heavy ships. Our Light Cruisers sighted and ^"f^-^l* 
enemy vessels of a similar class at long range. The 2nd Lignt 
Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore W. E. Goodenough, with 
his broad pendant in the Southampton, came in at high speed 
towards the battle cruisers and formed ahead of them on an 
E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 p. m. sighted enemy battle cruisers 
bearing E.N.E. 

•These destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but happened to be at Rosyth. 



112 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

On receipt of the Galatea's report. Sir David Beatty ordered 
the Engadine to send up a sea-plane to scout to the N.N£. This 
was the first time that sea-pianes had been used tor reconnais- 
sance work with a fleet in an action, and the event is notable for 
that reason. The low-lying ciouds made observation difficult, 
but the seaplane, with Hignt -Lieutenant F. S. Rutland R.N., as 
pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. 'irewin, R. N., as observer, 
was able by flying low under the clouds, to identify and report 
four enemy light cruisers, the report being received on board the 
Lion at 3.30 p. m. The sea-plane was under heavy fire from the 
light cruisers during the observation. By this time the line of 
battle was being tormed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 
forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron with the 
destroyers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas taking station ahead. 
The course was E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, the 
speed 25 knots, and the range 23,000 yards. Sir David Beatty 
formed his ships on a line of bearing in order to clear the smoke. 

The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the move- 
ments of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing N.N.W., dis- 
tant 10,000 yards; the weather was favourable, the sun being be- 
hind our ships, the wind S.E., and the visibility good. 

Meanwhile the wireless reports from the Galatea to the Lion 
had been intercepted on board the Iron Duke, and directions were 
at once given to the Battle Fleet to raise steam for full speed, the 
ships being at the time at short notice for full speed. The cruisers 
had been ordered to raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 
p. m. the Battle Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 
3.30 p. m. I directed Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their 
ships of the situation. The earliest reports from the Galatea had 
indicated the presence of light cruisers and destroyers only, and 
my first impression was that these vessels, on sighting the British 
force, would endeavour to escape via the Skagerrak, as they were 
to the eastward of our vessels and were consequently not in so 
much danger of being cut off as if they turned to the southward. 
The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well placed for cut- 
ting the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place, was or- 
dered to frustrate any such intention; but at 4 p. m., on the re- 
ceipt of the information of the presence of enemy battle cruisers, 
it was directed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. About 3.40 p. m. 
I received a report from Sir David Beatty that he had sighted 
five battle cruisers and a number of destroyers, and he also gave 
his position. 

As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was re- 
ported, course was altered in the Battle Fleet to close our battle 
cruisers, and speed increased as rapidlv as possible. By 4 p. m. 
the "Fleet speed" was 20 knots, being higher than had previously 
been obtained. Zigzagging was abandoned on receipt of the Ga- 
latea's first report. The battleships were also directed to keep 
clear of the wake of the next ahead in order to prevent loss of 
speed from the wash. 

At 3.48 p. m. the action between the battle cruisers began 
at a range of about IS.-'^OO yards, fire being opened by the two 
forces practically simultaneously. At the commencement the fire 
from the German vessels was rapid and accurate, the Lion being 
hit twice three minutes after fire was opened, and the Lion, Tiger, 
and Princess Royal all receiving several hits by 4 p. m.; observers 
on board our own ships were of opinion that our fire was also 
effective at that stage. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 113 

At about 4 p. m. it was evident by the accuracy of the ene- 
my's fire that he had obtained the range ot our ships, which was 
then about 16,000 yards. The enemy bore well abaft the beam, 
and course was altered slightly to the southward to confuse his 
fire control. Course was altered two or three times subsequently 
for the same purpose. The German ships frequently zigzagged 
for the purpose of confusing our fire control. 

At this period the fire of the enemy's ships was very rapid 
and accurate; the Lion received several hits, the roof of one of 
her turrets being blown off at 4 p. m. At about 4.6 p. m. the In- 
defatigable was hit, approximately at the outer edge of the upper 
deck level in line with the after turret, by several projectiles of 
one salvo; an explosion followed (evidenty that of a magazine) 
and the ship fell out of the line, sinking by the stern. Sne was 
again hit by another salvo forward, turned over and sank. 

About this time (4.8 p. m.) the 5th Battle Squadron came into 
action, opening fire at a range between 19,000 and 20,000 yards. 
This slower squadron was some distance astern of the battle 
cruisers and, by reason partly of the smoke of the ships ahead 
of the enemy vessels and partly of the light to the eastward hav- 
ing become less favourable, difficulty was experienced in seeing 
the targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time. 
At 4.12 p. m. the range of the enemy's battie cruisers from our 
own was about 23,000 yards, and course was altered from S.S.b. 
to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire had slackened owing to the in- 
crease in range. 

The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing the 
line of our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the periscopes 
of enemy submarines were also made by more than one ship. 

In accordance with the general directions given by Sir David 
Beatty to the destroyers to attack when a favourable opportunity 
occurred, the Nestor, Nomad, Nicator, Narborough, Pelican, Pet- 
ard, Obdurate, Nerissa, Moorsom, Morris, Turbulent and Terma- 
gant moved out at 4,15 p. m.; at the same time a similar move- 
ment took place on the part of an enemy force of one light 
cruiser and 15 destroyers. Both sides first steered to reach an 
advantageous nosition at the van of the opposing battle cruiser 
lines from which to deliver their attacks, and then turned to the 
northward to attack. A fierce engagement at close quarters be- 
tween the light forces resulted, and the enemy lost two destroy- 
ers, sunk by' our vessels, and, in addition, his torpedo attack was 
nartiallv frustrated; some torpedoes were fired by the enemy, 
two of which crossed the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which 
had been turned away to avoid the attack. 

During this action, which reflected the greatest credit on our 
destrovers, several of our attacking vessels, owing to their hav- 
ing dropned back towards the rear of our line, were not m a good 
position 'to attack the enemy's battle cruisers with torpedoes. 
The Nestor, Nomad, and Nicator, most gallantly led bv Command- 
er the Hon. E. B. S. Bingham in the Nestor, were able to press 
home their attack, causing the enemy's battle cruisers to turn 
away to avoid their torpedoes. The Nomad was damaged and 
forced to haul out of line before getting within torpedo range of 
the battle cruisers, but the Nestor and Nicator succeeded m hr- 
ing torpedoes at the battle cruisers under a heavy fire from the 
German secondarv armaments. The Nestor was then hit, haoiy 
damaged bv the fire of a light cruiser, and remained stopped be- 



114 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

tween the lines. She was sunk later by the German Battle Fleet 
when that force appeared on the scene, but not before she had 
fired her last torpedo at the approaching ships. The Nomad 
was also sunk by the German Battle Fleet as it came up, but this 
vessel also fired her torpedoes at the fleet as it approached. In 
both these destroyers the utmost gallantry in most trying cir- 
cumstances was shown by the officers and men. It is gratifying 
to record that a considerable proportion of the ships' companies 
of these destroyers was picked up by German destroyers as the 
German Battle Fleet passed the scene. After completing her at- 
tack upon the battle cruisers, the Nicator was able to rejoin her 
flotilla. The Moorsom also attacked the enemy's Battle Fleet and 
returned. In the meantime, the Petard, Nerissa, Turbuljent and 
Termagant succeeded in firing torpedoes at long range (7,000 
yards) at the enemy's battle cruisers. For his gallantry on the 
occasion of this destroyer attack Commander the Hon. E. B. S 
Bingham, who was rescued from the Nestor and taken prisoner 
by the Germans, received the Victoria Cross. 

Meanwhile the engagement between the heavy ships had be-. 
come very fierce, and the effect on the enemy battle cruisers be- 
gan to be noticeable, the third ship in the line being observed to 
be on fire at 4.18 p. m., whilst our ships of the 5th Battle Squad- 
ron were also inflicting and receiving some punishment. The 
accuracy and rapidity of the fire from the enemy's vessels vfas 
deteriorating at this period; our own ships were much handi- 
capped by the decreasing visibility, due partly to the use by the 
enemy of smoke screens, under cover of which he altered coujrse 
to throw out our fire. 

The flagship Barham, of the 5th Battle Squadron, received her 
first hit at 4.23 p. m. 

At about 4.26 p. m. a second disaster befell the British bat- 
tle cruisers. A salvo fired from one of the enemy's battle cruisers 
hit the Queen Mary abreast of "Q" turret and a terrific explosion 
resulted, evidently caused by a magazine blowing up. The Tiger, 
which was following close astern of the Queen Mary, passed 
through the dense cloud of smoke caused by the explosion, and 
a great deal of material fell on her decks, but othewise the 
Queen Mary had completely vanished. A few survivors from this 
ship and from the Indefatigable were afterwards rescued by our 
destroyers. The loss of these two fine ships with their splendid 
ships' companies was a heavy blow to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, 
the instantaneous nature of the disaster adding to its magnitude.* 

At 4.38 p. m. Commodore Goodenough, in the Southampton, 
Flagship of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been 
scouting ahead of the battle cruisers, reported that the enemy's Bat- 
tle Fleet was in sight bearing S. E., and steering? to the northward, 
and gave its position. Sir David Beatty recalled his destroyers, 
and on sighting the Battle Fleet at 4:42 p. m. turned the battle 
cruisers 16 points in succession to starboard. This movement 
was followed by the enemy's battle cruisers, and Sir David Beatty 
directed Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to turn his ships in succes- 
sion 16 points to starboard. Commodore Goodenough led the 2nd 
Light Cruiser Squadron to a favourable position from which 
to observe the movements of the enemy's Battle Fleet, with- 



* I was not aware of the loss of the Queen Mary and Indefatigable un- 
til the morning of June 1st. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 115 

in 13,000 yards range of the heavy ships, and, in spite of a very 
heavy lire, clung tenaciously to these ships and forwarded sev- 
eral reports of their position and movements; the skilful man- 
ner in which the Commodore, aided by his captains, handled 
the squadron under this lire undoubtedly saved the ships frpm 
heavy loss. Owing to the constant maneuvering of the ships 
of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron during the engagement, the 
position of the Southampton, as obtained by reckoning, was 
somewhat inaccurate, as was to be expected. This fact detracted 
from the value of the reports to me, the position of the enemy 
by latitude and longitude, as reported from time to time to the 
Iron Duke, being consequently incorrect. The discrepancy added 
greatly to the difficulty experienced in ascertaining the correct 
moment at which to deploy the Battle Fleet, the flank on which 
to deploy, and the direction of deployment. Such discrepancies 
are, however, inevitable under the conditions. 

The necessary move of the battle criusers to the southward 
in their pursuit of the enemy, at a speed considerably in excess 
of that which the Battle Fleet could attain, resulted in opening the 
distance between the two forces, so that at the lime of the turn ot 
Sir David Beatty's force to the northward, the Iron Duke and the 
Lion were over 50 miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 40 
miles per hour. 

As soon as the position of the Lion was known after the re- 
ceipt of the report of the enemy battle cruisers being m sight, 
Rear-Admiral the Hon. H. S. Hood was directed to proceed im- 
mediately to reinforce Sir David Beatty's force, whose position, 
course and speed was signalled to the Rear-Admiral. The latter 
officer reported his own position and gave his course and speea 
as S. S. E., 25 knots. At the same time the Battle Fleet was in- 
formed that our battle cruisers were in action with the enemj s 
battle cruisers, and an inquiry was addressed to Rear-Admiral 
Evan-Thomas to ascertain whether he was in company with bir 
David Beatty, a reply in the affiirmative being received, with a re- 
port that his squadron was in action. 

At this time I was confident that, under the determined leader- 
ship of Sir David Beatty, with a force of four of our best and fast- 
est battleships and six battle cruisers, very serious injury wQUld 
be inflicted on the five battle cruisers of the enemy if they could 
be kept within range. 

The report of the presence of the German Battle Fleet, which 
was communicated to our Battle Fleet, did not cause me any un- 
easiness in respect of the safety of our own vessels, since our 
ships of the 5th Battle Squadron were credited with a speed of 25 
knots. I did not, however, expect that they would be able to exceed 
a speed of 24 knots; the information furnished to me at this time 
gave the designed speed of the fastest German battleships as 2A).b 
knots only. Even after making full allowance for the fact that 
our ships were probably carrying more fuel and stores proportion- 
ately than the Germans, and giving the Germans credit 19^,^°"^^ 
excess over the designed speed, no doubt existed in my mind that 
both our battleships and our battle cruisers with Sir David B(!atty 
could keep well out of range of the enemy's Battle Fleet, if neces- 
sary, until I was able to reinforce them. I learned later, as an un- 
pleasant surprise, that the 5th Battle Squadron, when going at its 
utmost speed, found considerable difficulty in increasing its dis- 
tance from the enemy's 3rd Battle Squadron, consisting of ships 



116 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

of the **Koenig" class, and on return to Scapa I received a report 
from the Admiralty which credited this enemy squadron with a 
speed of 23 knots for a short period, this heing the first intimation 
I had received of such a speed being attainable by them. 

To return to Sir David Beatty. The action between the battle 
cruisers was renewed during the retirement of our ships to the 
northward, and the two leading ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, 
the Barham and Valiant, supported our battle cruisers by their 
fire, whilst the two rear ships of that force, the Warspite and Ma- 
laya, engaged the leading ships of the enemy's Battle Fleet as long 
as their guns would bear, at a range of about 19,000 yards. 

The light cruiser Fearless, with destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, 
was now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers, and the light 
cruiser Champion, with destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, joined tlie 
5th Battle Squadron. The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, 
which had been in the rear during the southerly course, now took 
up a position on the starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle 
cruisers, the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. 
During this northerly run the fire from our ships was very in- 
termittent, owing to the weather thickening to the eastward, al- 
though the enemy was able at times to fire with some accuracy. 

From 5 p. m. until after 6 p. m. the light was very much. in 
favour of the enemy, being far clearer to the westward than to 
the eastward. A photograph taken on board the Malaya at 5.15 p. 
m, towards the western horizon established this clearly. Our 
destroyers, shown silhouetted against the bright horizon, were at 
this time at least 16,000 yards distant. 

Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30 min- 
ute after 5.12 p. m. owing to the enemy's ships being invisible, 
fire being reopened at about 5.40 p. m. on the enemy's battle 
cruisers, three or four of which could be seen, although indis- 
tinctly, at a distance of some 14,000 yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52 
however, our fire seemed to be effective, the Lion alone firing 
some 15 salvos during this period. 

At 5.10 p. m. the destroyer Moresby, which had rejoined the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet after assisting the £ngadine with her sea- 
plane, fired a torpedo at the enemy's line at a range of between 
6,000 and 8,000 yards, from a favourable position — two points 
before the beam of the enemy's leading battle cruiser. 

At 5.35 p. m. the Lion's course was gradually altered from 
N.N.E. to N.E. in order to conform to the signalled movements 
and resulting position of the British Battle Fleet. The enemv's 
battle cruisers also gradually hauled to the eastward, being 
probabv influenced in this movement bv reports received from 
their light cruisers, which were by this time in contact with the 
light cruiser Chester and in sight of our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squad- 
ron led by Rear-Admiral Hood. 

The proceedings of these vessels will now be described. 

At 4 p. m., in accordance with my directions, the 3rd Battle 
Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, proceeded at full 
speed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 5 p. m. the squadron, 
comprising the Invincible (Flag), Inflexible, and Indomitable, in 
single line ahead in that or4er, with the destroyers Shark, 
Christopher, Ophelia, and Acaste, disposed ahead as a submarine 
screen, had the light cruiser Canterbury five miles ahead and the 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 117 

light cruiser Chester bearing N. 70° W., and was steering S. by E. 
at 25 knots. The visibility was rapidly decreasing. According to 
the Indomitable's report, objects could be distinguished at a dis- 
tinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bearings, and 
on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then onwards, according 
to the same report, the visibilty varied between 14,000 and 5,000 
yards, although other reports place it higher at times. 

At 5.30 p. m. the sound of gunfire was plainly heard to the 
south-westward, and the Chester turned in that direction to in- 
vestigate and, at 5.36., sighted a three-funnelled light cruiser on 
the ^larboard bow with one or two doi<ro>ers in company. The 
Chester challenged and, receiving no reply, altered course to west 
to close, judging from the appearance of the destroyer that the 
vessel was hostile. 

As the Chester closed, course was altered to about north, in 
order to avoid being open to torpedo attack by the destroyer on a 
bearing favourable to the latter. This turn brought the enemy 
well abaft the port beam of the Chester and on an approximately 
parallel course. During the tvu-n the Chester sighted two or more 
light cruisers astern of the first ship, and the leading enemy light 
cruiser opened fire on the Chester, the latter replying immedi- 
ately afterwards, at a range of about 6,000 yards. The visibility 
at this time, judging by the distance at which the enemy s light 
cruisers were sighted from the Chester, could not have exceeded 
8,000 vards. The enemy's fourth salvo hit the Chester, put No. 1 
gun port out of action, and killed and wounded a largepropor- 
tion of the gun crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 port guns. The light 
cruisers sighted by the Chester undoubtedly belonged to one of 
the enemy's scouting groups stationed on the starboard bow of 
their battle cruisers. 

Captain Lawson of the Chester, in view of the superior force 
to which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. and towards 
the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing the enemy's light 
cruisers, all of which had opened a rapid and accurate fire, astern 
of him. The enemy vessels turned after the Chester, and during 
the unequal engagment, which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain 
Lawson successfully maneuvered his ship with a view to im- 
peding the accuracy of the hostile fire, realising that she was m 
no condition to engage such superior forces successfully in her 
damaged state. 

The Chester closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron and took 
station N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd Cruiser Squadron 
at a later phase of the action. The ship suffered considerable 
casualties, having 31 killed and 50 wounded; three guns and her 
fire control circuits were disabled; she had four shell holes a 
little distance above the water line. It was on board the Chester 
that the second Victoria Cross of the action was earned, post- 
humouslv, bv Jack Corn well, Boy 1st Class, who was mortally 
wounded earlv in the action. This gallant lad, whose age was less 
than 16% years, nevertheless remained standing alone at a most 
exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, 
with the guns' crew, dead and wounded, all round him. 

Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd Battle 
Cruiser Squadron at 5.40 p. m., and Rear-Admiral Hood turned 
his ships to starboard and brought the enemy light cruisers, 
which were engaging the Chester, and from which vessels the 
flashes came, on to his port bow. During this turn the destroyers 



118 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

attached to the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were brought on to 
the port quarter of the squadron. As soon as Rear-Admiral Hood 
made out his position he led his squadron with the Canterbury 
between the enemy and the Chester, on a course about W.N.'W., 
and at 5.55 p. m. opened an effective fire on the German light 
cruisers with his port guns, at a range of about 10,000 to 12,000 
yards. The enemy vessels turned away from this attack and fired 
torpedoes at the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were 
seen later from the Indomitable. At about 6.10 p. m. the Invin- 
cible and Indomitable turned to starboard to avoid these tor- 
pedoes, three of which passed very close to the latter ship, and 
ran alongside within 20 yards of the vessel. The Inflexible turned 
to port. 

Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted astern of 
the first group, and the foiu" British destroyers, Shark, Acasta, 
Ophelia and Christopher, attacked them and the large destroyer 
force in company with them, and were received by a heavy fire 
which disabled the Shark and damaged the Acaata. On board 
the Shark the third V. C. of the action was earned by her gallant 
captain, Commander Loftus Jones, this award also being, I regret 
to say, posthumous. 

The attack of the British destroyers was carried out with 
great gallantry and determination, and having frustrated t^e 
enemy's torpedo attack on the 3rd Battle Cruiser Sqrnadron, Com- 
mander Loftus Jones turned his division to regain his position on 
our battle cruisers. At this moment three German vessels capae 
into sight out of the mist and opened a heavy fire, fm-ther disab- 
ing the Shark and causing many casualties on board; Commander 
Loftus Jones was amongst those wounded. Lieut.-Commander 
J. O. Barron, commanding the Acasta, came to the assistance of 
the Shark, but Commander Loftus Jones refused to imperil a sec 
end destroyer, and directed the Acasta to leave him. The Shark 
then became the target for the German ships and destroyers. 
Commander Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only 
undamaged gun in action, ordered the last torpedo to be placed 
in the tube and fired; but whilst this was being done the torpiedo 
was hit by a shell and exploded, causing many casualties. Tlipse 
gallant officers and men in the Shark who slill survived continued 
to fight the only gun left in action, the greatest heroism being ex- 
hibited. The captain was now wounded again, his right leg 
being taken off by a shell; but he still continued to direct the fire, 
until tho condition of the Shark and the approach ol German des- 
troyers made it probable that the ship would fall into the hands 
of the enemy, when he gave orders for her to be sunk, counter- 
manding this order shortly afterwards on realising that her re- 
maining gun could still be fought. A'little later, the ship was 
hit by two torpedoes, and sank with her colours flying. Only 
six survivors were picked up the next morning by a Danish 
steamer. In recognition of the great gallantry displayed, the 
whole of the survivors were awarded the Distinguished Service 
Medal. Their names are: W. C. R. Griffin, Petty Officer; C. Fil- 
leul. Stoker Petty Officer; C, C. Hope, A,B.; C. H. Smith, A. B.; 
T. O. G. Howell, A.B.; T. W. Swan, Stoker. 

At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of our ad- 
vanced cruiser line, which at 5 p, m. was about 16 miles ahead of 
the Battle Fleet, the latter being at that time in Lat. 57.24 N., Long. 
5.12 E., steering S.E. by S. at 20 knots It should be noted that. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 11» 

owing to decreasing visibility, which was stated in reports from 
the cruisers to be slightly above six miles, the cruisers on the 
starboard Hank had closed in and were about six miles apart by 
5.30 p. m. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was about 16 miles 
due east of the advanced cruiser line, but was steering more to 
the southward on a converging course at a speed of about five 
knots faster. 

At 5.40 p. m. firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line, and 
shortly afterwards ships were seen from the Minotaur to be 
emerging from the mist. Rear-Admiral Heath, the senior officer 
of the cruiser line, had recalled the ships of the 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron on hearing the firing and had ordered them to form 
single line ahead on the Minotaur. He then made the signal to 
engage the enemy, namely, the ships in sight ahead; but before 
fire was opened they replied to his challenge and were identified 
as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, engaged with 
the enemy's light cruisers and steering to the westward. 

At 5.47 p. m. the Defence, with the Warrior astern, sighted on 
a S. by W. bearing (namely on the starboard bow) three or four 
enemy light cruisers, and course was altered three points to port, 
bringing them nearly on a beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir 
Robert Arbuthnot, in the Defence, then signalled "Commence 
fire." Each ship fired three salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. 
The salvoes fell short, and the Defence altered course to star- 
board, brought the enemy first ahead, and then to a bearing on 
the port bow, evidently with the intention of closing. The lat- 
ter alteration of course was made at 6.1 p. m., and by this time 
projectiles from the light cruisers were falling in close proximity 
to the Defence and the Warrior. These ships opened fire with 
their port guns at 6.5 p. m. and shortly afterwards passed close 
across the bows of the Lion from port to starboard. One light 
cruiser, probably the Wiesbaden, was hit by the second salvoes 
of both ships, appeared to be badly crippled, and nearly stopped. 
Our ships continued to close her until within 5,500 yards. From 
about 6.10 p. m. onwards they had come under fire of guns of 
heavy calibre from the enemy's battle cruisers, but Sir Robert 
Arbuthnot, as gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, 
was evidently bent on finishing off his opponent, and held on. 
probably not realising in the gathering smoke and mist that the 
enemy's heavy ships were at fairly close range. At about 6.16 
p. m. the Defence was hit by two salvoes in quick succession, 
which caused her magazines to blow up and the ship disappeared. 
The loss of so valuable an officer as Sir Robert Arbuthnot and so 
splendid a ship's company as the officers and men of the Defence 
was a heavy blow. The Warrior was very badly damaged by 
shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain Molteno 
was able to bring his ship out of action, having first seen the 
Defence disappear. From diagrams made in the Warrior it ap- 
pears that the German battle cruisers turned 16 points (possibly 
with a view either to close their Battle Fleet or to come to the 
aid of the disabled Wiesbaden), engaged the Defence and Warrior, 
and then turned back again. This supposition is confirmed by 
sketches taken on board the Dake of Edinburgh at the same 
time. Owing to the smoke and the mist, however, it was diffi- 
cult to state exactly what occurred. From the observations on 
board the Warrior, it is certain that the visibility was much 
greater in her direction from the enemy's line than it was in the 
direction of the enemy from the Warrior. Although the Defence 



120 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

and Warrior were being hit frequently, those on board the War- 
rior could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly, and 
it is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert Arbuthnot 
not appreaciating that he was at comparatively short range from 
the German battle cruisers until he was already under an over- 
whelming fire. 

The Warrior passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron at the 
period when the steering gear of the Warspite had become tem- 
porarily disabled.* 

The Duke of Edinburgh, the ship next to the westward of 
the Defence and the Warrior in the cruiser screen, had turned 
to close these ships when they became engaged with the enemy's 
light cruisers in accordance with a signal from the Defence. 
The Duke of Edinburgh joined in the engagement, but, on sight- 
ing the Lion on her starboard bow, did not follow the other ships 
across the bows of the battle cruisers, as to do so would have 
seriously incommoded these vessels; she turned to port to a paral- 
lel course and eventually joined the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. 

The Black Prince was observed from the Duke of Edinburgh 
to turn some 12 points to port at the same time that the Duke of 
Edinburgh turned, but her subsequent movements are not clear; 
the German accounts of the action stated that the Black Prince 
was sunk by gunfire at the same time as the Defence, but she was 
not seen to be in action at this time by any of our vessels, and, 
moreover, a wireless signal, reporting a submarine in sight and 
timed 8.48 p. m., was subsequently received from her. It is 
probable that the Black Prince passed to the rear of the Battle 
Fleet at about 6.30 p. m., and that during the night she found her- 
self close to one of the German battle squadrons, and was sunk 
then by superior gunfire. In support of this theory, the German 
account mentions that a cruiser of the "Cressy" type was sunk 
in that manner during the night. None of the ships of this class 
was present during the engagement, but the Black Prince might 
well have been mistaken for a ship of this type in the circum- 
stances. 

We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about 6.10 p. m. 
at the termination of their engagement with enemy light cruisers, 
turning to avoid torpedoes fired at them. At about this time 
Rear -Admiral Hood sighted the Lion and the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron, and at about 6.16 p. m. hoisted the signal to his squad- 
ron to form single line ahead, and turned to take station ahead 
of the Lion and to engage the hostile battle cruisers, which at 
6.20 p. m. were sighted at a range of 8,600 yards. 

A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and the fire 
of the squadron was judged by those on board the Invincible to 
be very effective. Rear-Admiral Hood, who was on the bridge 
of the Invincible with Captain Cay, hailed Commander Dannreu- 
ther, the gunnery officer in the fore control, at about 6.30 p. m., 
saying, "Your firing is very good. Keep at is as quickly as you 
can; every shot is telling." At about 6.34 p. m. the Invincible 
which had already been hit more than once bv heavy shell with- 
out appreciable damage, was struck in "Q" turret. The shell ap- 
parently burst inside the turret, as Commander Dannreuther saw 
the roof blown off. A very heavy explosion followed immedi- 
atelv, evidently caused by the magazine blowing up, and the ship 
broke in half and sank at once, only two officers, including Cpm- 
t— 

*See page 127. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 121 

mander Dannreuther, and four men being subsequently picked up 
by the destroyer Badger. Ihe British Navy sustained a most seri- 
ous loss in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, one of the most 
distinguished of our younger flag oflicers, and in Captain Gay 
and the officers and men of his flagship. The difflculties of dis- 
tinguishing enemy ships even at the close range of this engage- 
ment is revealed by the fact that the officers in the Invincible 
and Indomitable were under the impression that they were en- 
gaging battle cruisers, whilst officers in the Inflexible, stationed 
between these two ships in the line, reported that her fire was 
being directed at a battleship of the "Kaiser" or "Koenig" class, 
and that only one ship could be seen. 

Just before the loss of the Invincible, the 3rd Light Cruiser 
Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral Napier, had carried out 
an effective torpedo attack on the enemy's battle cruisers; both 
the light cruisers Falmouth and Yarmouth fired torpedoes at the 
leading battle cruiser. It was thought that one of the torpedoes 
hit its mark, as a heavy under-water explosion was felt at this 
time. 

After the loss of the Invincible, the Inflexible was left as 
leader of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the Invincible had 
been passed, course was altered two points to starboard to close 
the enemy ships, which were disappearing in the mist. A further 
turn to starboard for the same purpose was made, but at this 
time, 6.50 p. m., the battle cruisers being clear of the leading 
battleships (which were bearing N.N.W. three miles distant), 
Sir David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron to 
prolong the line of battle cruisers, and the Inflexible and Indomi- 
table took station astern of the New Zealand. 

The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. The 
Chester with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which by 5.40 p. 
m. had got ahead of the Battle Fleet's cruiser screen, en- 
countered some of the light cruisers composing the enemy's 
screen and engaged them, and, in doing so, drew the enemj^'s 
light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which, 
with the Canterbury and destroyers, turned to about W.N.W. to 
assist the Chester and to engage the enemy vessels. 

In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was made 
by four British destroyers on the enemy's light cruisers. This at- 
tack was apparently thought by the Germans to come from the 
flotillas with the Battle Fleet, as iar as can be judged from their 
report of the action; the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron 
were undoubtedly mistaken by their vessels for the van of our 
Battle Fleet, since mention is made in the German report of the 
British Battle Fleet having been sighted at this time by the Ger- 
man light forces, steering in a westerly or north-westerly di- 
rection. The mistaken idea caused the van of the High Sea Fleet 
to turn off to starboard. 

So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course at 
this time, the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south-easterly 
course before, through, and immediately subsequent to deployment, 
graduallv hauling round afterwards, first through south to south- 
west, and then to west, but it was not until 8 p. m. that a westerly 
course was being steered. 

The onlv point that is not clear is the identitv of the light 
cruiser engaged and seriouslv damaged bv the 3rd Battle Cruiser 
Squadron. The ship engaged by the Defense and Warrior was 



122 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

apparently the Wiesbaden. It seems to be impossible that the 3rd 
Batt'e Cniiser Squadron engaged the same vessel, and it is more 
likely to have been another light cruiser in the enemy's screen. 
The two engagements took place at almost the same time, the 
3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron opening fire at 5.55 p. m. and the De- 
fence and the Warrior (the 1st Cruiser Squadron) commencing 
their engagement with the starboard guns at about 5:50 p. 'm. 
and continuing it with the port guns at 6.5 p. m. It is hardly 
possible, even in the conditions of low visibility that prevailed, 
that the two squadrons could have been engaging the same vessel. 

Mention should be made here of the work of the destroyer 
Onslow, commanded by Lieutenant Commander J. C. Tovey, which 
at 6:05 p. m. sighted an enemy's light cruiser in a position on the 
bows of the Lion and favourable for torpedo attack on that ship. 
The Onslow closed and engaged the light cruiser with gun- 
fire at ranges between 2,000 and 4,000 yards, and then, although 
severly damaged by shell fire, succeeded in closing a German Bat- 
tle cruiser to attack with torpedoes; she was struck by a heavy 
shell before more than one torpedo could be fired. Lieutenant 
Commander Tovey thought that his order to fire all torpedoes had 
been carried out, and finding that this was not the case, closed 
the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, and then sighting the 
Battle Fleet fired the remaining torpedoes at battleships. The On- 
slow's engines then stopped, but the damaged destroyer Defender, 
Liutenant Commander Palmer, closed her at 7:15 p. m. and took 
her in tow under a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during 
the night and the damaged condition of both destroyers, brought 
her back to home waters, transferring her on June 1st to the care 
of a tug. 

XL— THE BATTLE FLEET IN ACTION 

The "plot" made on the reports received between 5 and 6 p. 
m. from Commodore Goodenough, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron, and the report at 4:45 p. m. from Sir David Beatty in the Lion 
giving the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet, showed that we, of 
the Battle Fleet, might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately 
ahead and that the cruiser line ahead of the Battle Fleet would 
sight the enemy nearly ahead of the centre. Obviously, however, 
great reliance could not be placed on the positions given by the 
ships of 'lie Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had been in action for 
two hours and frequently altering course. I realised this, but when 
contact actually took place it was found that the positions given 
were at least twelve miles in error when compared with the Iron 
Duke's reckoning. The result was that the enemy's Battle Fleet 
appeared on the starboard bow instead of ahead as I had expected, 
andcontact also took place earlier than was anticipated. There 
can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the reckoning on board the 
Iron Duke, as the movements of that ship could be "plotted" with 
accuracy after leaving Scapa Flow, there being no disturbing el- 
ements to deal with. 

The first accurate information regarding the position of affairs 
was contained in a signal from the Black Prince of the 1st Cruiser 
Squadron (the starboard wing ship of the cruiser screen), which 
was timed 5:40 p. m., but received by me considerably later, and 
in which it was reported that battle cruisers were in sight, bear- 
ing south, distant five miles. It was assimied by me that these 
were our own vessels. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 123 

Prior to this, in view of the rapid decrease in visibility, I had 
directed Captain Dreyer, my Flag-Captain, to cause the range 
finder operators to take ranges of ships on bearings in every di- 
rection and to report the direction in which the visibility appeared 
to be the greatest. My object was to ascertain the most favourable 
bearing in which to engage the enemy should circvmistances ad- 
mit of a choice being exercised. Captain Dreyer reported that the 
visibility appeared to be best to the southward. 

At 5:45 p. m. the Comus (Captain Hotham), of the 4th Light 
Cruiser Squadron, which was stationed three miles ahead of the 
Battle Fleet, reported heavy gunfire on a southerly bearing, i. e., 
three points from ahead, and shortly afterwards flashes of gunfire 
were visible bearing south-south-west although no ships could be 
seen. 

At about 5:50 p. m. I received a wireless signal from Sir Rpb- 
ert Arbuthnot, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, reporting having 
sighted ships in action bearing south-south-west and steering 
north-east. There was, however, no clue as to the identity of these 
ships. It was in my mind that they might be the opposing battle 
cruisers. 

At 5:55 p. m. a signal was made by me to Admiral Sir Cecil 
Burney, leading the starboard wing division in the Marlborough, 
inquiring what he could see. The reply was: "Gun flashes and 
heavy gunfire on the starboard bow." This reply was received 
at about 6:05 p. m. 

The uncertainity which still prevailed as to the position of the 
enemy's Battle Fleet and its formation caused me to continue in 
the Battle Fleet on the course south-east by south at a speed of 
20 knots, in divisions line ahead disposed abeam to starboard, the 
Iron Duke at 6 p. m. being in Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 5.39 E. 

The information so far received had not even been sufficient 
to justify me in altering the bearing of the guides of columns from 
the Iron Duke preparatory to deployment, and they were still, 
therefore, on the beam, the destroyers also were still disposed 
ahead in their screening formation, as it was very desirable to 
decide on the direction of deployment before stationing them for 
action. 

At 5:56 p. m. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported strange ves- 
sels in sight bearing south-south-west and steering east, and at 6 
p. m. he reported them as British battle cruisers three to four 
miles distant, the Lion being the leading ship. 

This report was made by searchlight and consequently reached 
me shortly after 6 p. m., biit as showing the interval that elapses 
between the intention to make a signal and the actual receipt of it 
(even under conditions where the urgency is apparent, no effort 
is spared to avoid delav, and the signal staff is efficient), it is to 
be noted that whereas the report gave the bearing of our vessels 
as south-south-west, notes taken on board the Colossus placed our 
battle crmsers one point on the starboard bow of that ship, that is, 
on a south-south-east bearing and distant two miles at 6:05 p. m. 

Shortly after 6:00 p. m. we sighted strange vessels bearing 
south-west from the Iron Duke at a distance of about five miles. 
They were identified as oVir battle cruisers, steering east across 
the bows of the Battle Pleet. Owing to the mist it was not possible 
to make out the number of ships that were following the Li»b. 



124 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the posi- 
tion of the enemy's Battle Fleet; flashes of guniire were visible 
from ahead romid to the starboard beam, and the noise was heavy 
and continuous. Our cruisers ahead seemed to be hotly engaged, 
but the fact that they were not closing the Battie Fleet indicated to 
me that their opponents could hardly be battleships. 

In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to clearing 
up the situation without altering the formation of the Battle Fleet, 
a signal had been made to the Battle Fleet at 6:02 p. m. to alter 
course leaders together, the remainder in succession, to south (a 
turn of three points). Speed was at the same time reduced to 18 
knots to allow of the ships closing up into station. Immediately 
afterwards it became apparent by the sound of the heavy firing 
that enemy's heavy ships must be in close proximity, and the 
Lion, which was sighted at this moment signalled at 6 :06 p. m. that 
the enemy's battle cruisers bore south-east. Meanwhile, at about 
5:50 p. m., I had received a wireless report from Commodore 
Goodenough commanding the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, to the 
effect that the enemy's battle cruisers bore south-west from their 
Battle Fleet; in other words, that his Battle Fleet bore north-east 
from his battle cruisers. 

In view of the report from Sir Cecil Burney that our battle 
cruisers were steering east, and observing that Sir David Beatty 
reported at 6:06 p. m. that the enemy's battle cruisers bore south- 
east, it appeared from Commodore Goodenough's signal that the 
enemy's Battle Fleet must be ahead of his battle cruisers. On the 
other hand, it seemed to me almost incredible that the Battle 
Fleet could have passed the battle cruisers. The conflicting re- 
ports added greatly to the perplexity of the situation, and I deter- 
mined to hold on until matters became clearer. 

The conviction was, however, forming in my mind that 1 
should strike the enemy's Battle Fleet on a bearing a httle on the 
starboard bow, and in order to be prepared for deployment 1 
turned the Fleet to a south-east course, leaders together and the 
remainder in succession, and the destroyer flotillas were directed 
by signal, at 6:08 p. m., to take up the destroyer position No. 1 for 
battle. This order disposed them as follows: 




Mx. 5*1 ^ S** 

Dto. Dw. Div Ow 



I 111 h 



irtoMla 



IhMtiudi' I IrenDute M«)Gcan)eV 



X, 



This diaqram shows the leaders of (Jwisions 
en abeam beorinq 



There was, however, a very short interval between this signal 
to the destroyers and the signal for deployment, and consequently 
the destroyers did not reach their positions before deployment. 
The subsequent alterations of course to the southward and west- 
ward added to their difficulties and delayed them greatly m gain- 
ing their stations at the van of the Fleet after deployment. The 
correct position for the two van flotillas on deployment was three 
miles ahead of the Fleet, but slightly on the engaged bow. 

At 6:01 p. m., immediately on sighting the Lion, a signal had 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 125 

been made to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position of the en- 
emy's Battle Fleet. This signal was repeated at 6:10 p. m., and 
at 6.14 p. m. he signalled: "Have sighted the enemy's Battle Fleet 
bearing south-south-west"; this report gave me the first informa- 
tion on which I could take effective action for deployment. 

At 6:15 p. m. Rear Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, in the Barham, 
commanding the 5th Battle Squadron signalled by wireless that 
the enemy's Battle Fleet was in sight, bearing south-south-east. 
The distance was not reported in either case, but in view of the 
low visibilitv, 1 concluded it could not be more than some five 
miles. Sir Cecil Burney had already reported the 5th Battle 
Squadron at 6.07 p. m. as in sight, bearing south-west from the 
Marlborough. 

The first definite information received on board the Fleet 
Flagship of the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet did not, there- 
fore, come in until 6:14 p. m., and the position given placed it 
thirty degrees before the starboard beam of the Iron Duke, or 
fifty-nine degrees before the starboard beam of the Marlborough, 
and apparently in close proximity. There was no time to lose, 
as there was evident danger of the starboard wing column of 
the Battle Fleet being engaged by the whole German Battle Fleet 
before deployment could effected. So at 6.16 p. m. a signal was 
made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the port wing 
column, on a course south-east by east, it being assumed that the 
course of the enemy was approximately the same as that of our 
battle cruisers. 

Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to> admit of 
our battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle Fleet, as there was 
danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet being blanketed by them. 

During the short interval, crowded with events, that had 
elapsed since the first flashes and sound of gunfire had been noted 
on board the Iron Duke, the question of most urgent importance 
before me had been the direction and manner of deployment. 

As the evidence accumulated that the enemy's Battle Fleet 
was on our starboard side, but on a bearing well before the beam 
of the Iron Duke, the point for decision was whether to form line 
of battle on the starboard or on the port wing column. My first 
and natural impulse was to form on the starboard wing column 
in order to bring the Fleet into action at the earliest possible 
moment, but it became increasingly apparent, both from the sound 
of gunfire and the reports from the Lion and Barham, Ihat the 
High Sea Fleet was in such close proximity and on such a bear- 
ing to create obvious disadvantages in such a movement. I as- 
sumed that the German destroyers would be ahead of their Battle 
Fleet, and it was clear that, owing to the mist, l»ie operations of 
destrovers attacking from a commanding position in the^van would 
be much facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle rieet 
in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers dur- 
ing such a deployment. 

The further points that occurred to me were, that if the Ger- 
man ships were as close as seemed probable, there was considera- 
ble dpnger of the 1st Battle Squadron, and especially the Marl- 
borough's Division, beinp severely handled bv the concentrated fire 
of the High Sea Fleet before the remaining divisions could get into 
line to assist. Included in the 1st Battle Squadron were several 
of our old^r ships, with onW indifferent protection as compared 
with the German capital ships, and an interval of at least four 



126 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

minutes would elapse between each division coming into line 
astern of the sixth division and a further interval before the guns 
could be directed on to the ship selected and their fire become ef- 
fective. 

The final disadvantage would be that it appeared, from the sup- 
posed position of the High Sea Fleet, that the van of the enemy 
would have a very considerable "overlap" if line were formed on 
the starboard wing division, whereas this would not be the case 
with deployment on the port wing column. The overlap wovdd 
necessitate a large turn of the starboard wing division to port to 
prevent the "T" being crossed, and each successive division coming 
into line would have to make this turn, in addition to the 8-point 
turn required to form the line. I therefore decided to deploy on 
the first, the port wing, division. 

The further knowledge which I gained of the actual state of 
affairs after the action confirmed my view that the course adopted 
was the best in the circumstances. 

The reports from the ships of the starboard wing division 
show that the range of the van of the enemy's Battle Fleet at the 
moment of deployment was about 13,000 yards. The fleets were 
converging rapidly, with the High Sea Fleet holding a position of 
advantage such as would enable it to engage effectively, first the 
unsupported starboard division, and subsequently succeeding di- 
visions as they formed up astern. It is to be observed that it 
would take some twenty minutes to complete the formation of the 
line of battle. 

The German gimnery was always good at the start, and their 
ships invariably found the range of a target with great rapidity, 
and it would have been very bad tactics to give them such an ini- 
tial advantage, not only in regard to gunnery but also in respect 
of torpedo attack, both from ships and from destroyers. 

A subsequent study of the reports and the signals received 
has admitted of the diagrams which will be found on the brown 
prints appended to the text. 

The reports on being reviewed fit in very well, and show 
clearly how great would have been the objections to forming on 
the starboard wing divisions. The bearings of the enemy Batti • 
Fleet, as given by the Lion and the Barham at 6.14 and 6.15 
respectivelv, give a fair "cut," and the bearing on which the 
Marlborough opened fire enables the position of the Battle Fleet 
to be placed with considerable accuracy. 

Assvuning that the German Battle Fleet was steaming at 17 
knots on an easterly course between 6.14 and 6.31, it would be 
at the latter time bear approximately some 21 degrees before 
me starboard beam of the Iron Duke at a range of 12,000 yards. 
The Iron Duke actually engaged the leading battleship at this 
time on a bearing 20 degrees before the starboard beam at a 
range of 12,000 yards. The accuracy of the diagram is therefore 
confirmed, so far as confirmation is possible. It appears certain 
that between about 6.0 p. m., and 6.16 p. m. the German battle 
cruisers turned 16 points towards their Battle Fleet, and again 
turned 16 points to their original course. This is borne out by 
observations on board the Warrior, which ship was being en- 
gaged by the starboard guns of enemy vessels. The German 
account also shows such a turn at this period. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 127 

Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, commanding the 5th Battle 
Squadron, had sighted the Marlborough at 6.6 p. m. and the re- 
mainder of the 6th Division of the Battle Fleet a little later. Not 
seeing any other columns, he concluded that the Marlborough 
was leading the whole line, and decided to take station ahead 
of that ship. At 6.19 p. m., however other battleships were 
sighted, and Admiral Evan-Thomas realised that the Fleet was 
deploying to port, the 6th Division being the starboard wing 
column. He then determined to make a large turn of his squad- 
ron to port, in order to form astern of the 6th Division, which 
by this time had also turned to port to form line of battle. 
During the turn, which was very well executed, the ships of the 
5th Battle Squadron were under fire of the enemy's leading bat- 
tleships, but the shooting was not good, and our vessels received 
little injury. 

Unfortunately, however, the helm of the Warspite jammed, 
and that ship, continuing her turn through sixteen points, came 
under a very heavy fire and received considerable injury. The 
disabled Warrior happened to be in close approximity at this 
time, and the turn of the Warspite had the effect for the moment 
of diverting attention from the Warrior, so that the latter vessel 
got clear. 

The Warspite was well extricated by Captain Phillpotts from 
an unpleasant position and was steered to the northward to make 
good damages, and eventually, in accordance with directions 
from Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, returned independently to 
Rosyth, considerably down by the stern owing to damage aft, 
but otherwise not much injured. 

By 6.38 p. m. the remaining ships of the 5th Battle Squadron 
were in station astern of the Agincourt (1st Battle Squadron), the 
last ships of the line. 

At 6.33 p. m., as soon as the battle cruisers had passed clear, 
the speed of the Battle Fleet was increased to 17 knots, and this 
speed was subsequently maintained. The reduction of speed to 
14 knots during the deployment caused some "bunching" at the 
rear of the line, as the signal did not get though quickly. The re- 
duction had, however, to be maintained until the battle cruisers 
had formed ahead. 

Experience at all Fleet exercises had shown the necessity for 
keeping a reserve of some three knots of speed in hand in the 
case of a long line of ships, in order to allow of station being 
kept in the line under conditions of action, when ships were 
making alterations of course to throw out enemy's fire, to avoid 
torpedoes, or when other independent action on the part of sin- 
gle ships, or of divisions of ships, became necessary, as well as to 
avoid excessive smoke from the funnels; for this reason the Fleet 
speed during the action was fixed at 17 knots. In the 1st Battle 
Squadron, some ships had at times to steam 20 knots, showing the 
necessity for this reserve. Up to 7.10 p. m. also the flotillas were 
not in station ahead. 

At 6.14 p. m. the enemy's salvoes were falling near ships of 
the 1st Battle Squadron, and the Marlborough's Division of the 
Battle Squadron became engaged with some ships of the enemy's 
Battle Fleet at 6.17 p. m. immediately after turning for the ae- 
plovment. At this time fire was opened by the Marlborough on 
a ship stated to be of the "Kaiser" class, at a range of 13,000 yards 



128 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

and on a bearing 20° abaft the starboard beam; this knowledge 
enables us to deduce the position of the van of the German Battle 
Fleet at this time. 

Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy's Fleet 
steering to the eastward, the battle cruisers leading, followed by 
the Battle Fleet in single line, the order being, four ships of the 
"Koenig" class in the van, followed by ships of the "Kaiser" and 
"Helgoland" classes, the rear of the line being invisible. A report 
that had reached me at 4.48 p. m. from the Commodore of the 
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron indicated that ships of the "Kaiser" 
class were in the van of the Battle Fleet. The order of the Fleet 
may have been changed subsequent to this report, but there is. no 
doiibt that ships of the "Koenig" class led during the Fleet action. 
The point is not, however, of importance. 

At about 6.38 p. m. the 6th Division was in line and our de- 
ployment was complete. 

Enemy shells had been falling close to the Colossus and her 
5th Division since 6.11 p. m., and these ships opened fire at 6.30 
p. m.; but the condition of visibility made it difficult to distinguish 
the enemy's battleships. 

At 6.23 p. m. a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed down 
the line, on the starboard, or engaged, side of our Fleet, appar- 
ently partly disabled. Her identity could not at the time be 
clearly established, but her German colours were flying and she 
was in a position for attacking the Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 
6.20 p. m. the Iron Duke fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was 
fired at with turret guns by other vessels and was seen to sink 
at the rear of the line. 

At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most difficult 
to distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible to form an 
opinion on board the Iron Duke, in her position towards the 
centre of the line, as to the formation of the enemy's Fleet. The 
identity ot ships in sight on the starboard beam was not even 
sufficiently clear for me to permit of fire being opened; but at 
6.30 p. m. it became certain that our own battle cruisers had 
drawn ahead of the Battle Fleet and that the vessels then before 
the beam were battleships of the "Koenig" class. The order was, 
therefore, given to open fire, and the Iron Duke engaged what 
appeared to be the leading battleship at a range of 12,000 yards 
oh a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other ships of the 
3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squadron) opened fire at 
about the same time, and the van divisions (2nd Battle Squadron) 
very shortly afterwards; these latter ships reported engaging 
enemy battle cruisers as well as battleships. The fire of the Iron 
Duke, which came more directly under my obervation, was seen 
to be immediatelv eff"ective. the third and fourth salvoes fired 
registering several palpable hits. It appeared as if all the enem 
ships at that time in sight from the Iron Duke (not more than 
three or four, owing to smoke and mist) were receiving heavy 
punishment, and the second battleship was seen to turn out of 
the line badly on fire, and settling by the stern. A large number 
of observers in the Thunderer, Benbow, Barham, Marne, Morn- 
ing Star and Magic stated afterwards that they saw this ship 
blow up at 6.50 p. m. 

The visibilitv was very variable and perhaps averaged about 
12,000 yards to the southward, though much less on other bear- 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 129 

ings, but ranges could not at times be obtained from the range- 
finders of the Iron Duke at a greater distance than 9,0U0 yards, 
although at 7.15 p. m., in a temporary clear channel through the 
mist, good ranges of 15,000 yards were obtained of a battleship at 
which four salvoes were lired by the Iron Duke before she was 
again hidden by smoke and mist. The very baffling light was 
caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly also by the 
heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the opposing Fleets. 
The direction of the wind was about west-south-west with a force 
2, causing the enemy's funnel smoke to drift towards our line. 

The visibility at the rear of the battle line was apparentl\ 
greater than in the centre at about 7 p. m., and the enemy's fire, 
which was probably being concentrated on our rear ships, was 
more accurate at this period, but quite ineffective, only one ship, 
the Colossus, being hit by gunfire, although numerous projectiles 
were falling near the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons. 

Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the Battle 
Fleet could see only three or four enemy vessels at any one time, 
those in the ships of the rear division did occasionally see as 
many as eight, and were consequently better able to distinguish 
the formation and movements of the enemy's Battle Fleet. It 
was not possible, owing to the small number of ships in sight, 
due to smoke and mist, to distribute the fire of the battleships 
by signal in the customary manner; the only course to adopt 
was for the captains to direct the lire of their guns on to any tar- 
get which they could distinguish. 

The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south-east 
by east, as already stated, but the van had hauled in to southeast 
without signal shortly after deployment in order to close the 
enemy, and at 6.50 p. m., as the range was apparently opening, 
the course was altered by signal to south "by divisions" in order 
to close the enemy. The King George V., leading the van of the 
Battle Fleet, had just anticipated this signal by turning to south. 
The alteration was made "by divisions" instead of "in succession" 
In order that the enemy should be closed more rapidly by the 
whole Battle Fleet. 

This large turn (of four points) "by divisions" involved 
some small amount of "blanketing" of the rear ships of one di- 
vision by the leading ships of that next astern, and at one time 
the Thunderer was firing over the bows of the Iron Duke, caus- 
ing some slight inconvenience on the bridge of the latter ship; 
the "blanketing," however, was unavoidable and the loss of fire 
involved was inappreciable. 

At 6.45 p. m. one or two torpedoes crossed the track of the 
rear of our battle line, and the Marlborough altered coure to avoid 
one. They were apparently fired, at long range, by enemy des- 
troyers, which were barely visible to the ships in rear and quite 
invisible to those on board the Iron Duke, They might, however, 
have been fired by enemy battleships which were within tor- 
pedo range, or by a submarine, the Revenge reporting that it was 
thought that one had been rammed by that ship. The tracks of 
some of the torpedoes were seen by the observers stationed aloft, 
and were avoided by very skilful handling of the ships by their 
captains. 

At 6.54 p. m., however, a heavy explosion occurred under 
the fore bridge of the Marlborough, abreast the starboard for- 



130 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ward hydraulic engine-room. The ship took up a list of some 
seven degrees to starboard, but continued in action so effectively 
that she avoided three more torpedoes shortly afterwards, re- 
opened fire at 7.3 p. m., and at 7.12 p. m. fired fourteen rapid 
salvoes at a ship of the "Koenig" class, hitting her so frequently 
that she was seen to tvirn out of line. 

The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to his flag- 
ship stated that the vessel had been struck by a "mine or torpe- 
do." It was assumed by me that a torpedo had hit the ship, as 
so many vessels had passed over the same locality without injury 
from mine. This proved to be the case, the track of this torpe- 
do not having been sufficiently visible to enable Captain Boss 
to avoid it. 

The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy's torpedoes 
being visible was a matter of great surprise to me, and I think to 
other officers. Beports had been prevalent that the Germans had 
succeeded in producing a torpedo which left little or no track on 
the surface. The information as to the visibility of the tracks 
did not reach me until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as al- 
though one torpedo was reported by observers on board the des- 
troyer Oak to have passed close ahead of the Iron Duke at about 
7.35 p. m., finishing its run of 2,000 yards beyond that ship, and a 
second was observed by the Benbow to pass apparently ahead 
of the Iron Duke at 8.30 p. m., neither of them was seen on board 
the flagship by the trained look-outs specially stationed for the 
purpose. 

Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to south, a sig- 
nal was made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to take station ahead of 
the Iron Duke and for the 1st Battle Squadron to form astern. 
This signal had, however, been already anticipated by the vessels 
ahead of the Iron Duke in accordance with the general battle 
orders giving discretionary powers to the commanders of squad- 
rons, and the line had been partly reformed before the signal was 
made. 

An incident occurred at about 6.47 p. m. which was an in- 
dication of the spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which it is im- 
posisble to speak too highly. The destroyer Acasta, which had 
been badly hit aft during her attack on enemy light cruisers in 
company with the Shark and had her engines disabled, was passed 
by the Fleet. Her commanding officer, Lieut.-Commander J. O. 
Barron, signalled the condition of his ship to the Iron Duke as 
that ship passed, leaving the Acasta on her starboard or en- 
gaged side. The ship's company was observed to be cheering 
each ship as she passed. It is satisfactory to relate that this des- 
troyer and her gallant ship's company were subsequently brought 
into Aberdeen, being assisted by the Nonsuch. 

Shortly after 6.55 p. m. the Iron Duke passed the wreck of 
a ship with the bow and stern standing out of the water, the 
centre portion apparently resting on the bottom, with the destroyer 
Badger picking up survivors. It was thought at first that this was 
the remains of a German light cruiser, but inquiry of the Badger 
elicited the lamentable news that the wreck was that of the In- 
vincible. It was assumed at the time that she had been sunk ei- 
ther by a mine or by a torpedo and the latter appeared to be the 
more probable cause of her loss. Subsequent information, how- 
ever, showed that she was destroyed by gunfire, causing her 
magazines to explode, as already recorded. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 131 

At 7 p. m. Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that the enemy 
was to the westward. 

Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile, brought 
the enemy's line into view once more, and between 7.0 and 7.30 
p. m. the Battle Fleet was again in action with battleships and 
also battle cruisers, as they could be distinguished in the haze, 
which at that period was very baffling. The range varied from 
as much as 15,000 yai'ds at the van to as little as 8,500 in the rear, 
this dilference in range indicating that the enemy's Fleet was 
turning to the westward, as shown in the plan No. 9. 

In spite of the difficult conditions, the fire of many of our 
battleships was very effective at this period. Some instances 
may be given. At 7.15 p. m. the Iron Duke, as already mentioned, 
engaged a hostile battleship at 15,000 yards range and on a bear- 
ing 74 degrees from right ahead. At 7.20 she trained her guns 
on a battle cruiser of "Luetzow" type, abaft the beam, which hid 
herself by a destroyer smoke screen; at 7.17 p. m. the King 
George V. opened lire on a vessel, taken to be the leading ship 
in the enemy's line, at a range of about 13,000 yards; the Orion 
at a battleship*; the St. Vincent was "holding her target (a bat- 
tleship) effectively till 7.26 p. m., the range being between 
10,000 and 9,500 yards;" the Agincourt at 7.6 p. m. opened lire at 
11,000 yards on one of four battleships that showed clearly out of 
the mist, and judged that at least four of her salvoes "straddled " 
the target; the Revenge was engaging what were taken to be bat- 
tle cruisers, obtaining distinct hits on two of them; the Colossus 
from 7.12 to 7.20 p. m. was engaging a ship taken to be a battle 
cruiser, either the Derfflinger or Luetzow, at ranges between 10,- 
000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct hits, two being 
on the water line; whilst the Marlborough, as already men- 
tioned, "engaged a ship of the 'Koenig' class." Other vessels re- 
ported being in effective action during this period. The Royal 
Oak, the ship next astern of the Iron Duke, opened fire at 7.15 
p. m. on the leading ship of three vessels taken to be battle 
cruisers, at a range of 14,000 yards; this ship was hit and turned 
awav, and fire was shifted to the second ship which was lost to 
sight in the mist after a few rounds had been fired. It was dif- 
ficult to be certain of the class of vessel on which fire was 
being directed, but one or more of the enemy's battle cruisers 
had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 p. m., as a result of thi> 
heavy punishment they had received from our battle cruisers and 
the 5th Battle Squadron, and were engaged by ships of the Bat- 
tle Fleet. 

Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships of the 
1st Battle Squadron were afforded more opportunities for effec- 
tive fire than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and the fullest use wa'. 
made of the opportunities. This squadron, under the able com- 
mand of Sir Cecil Burney, was known by me to be highly e.' 
ficient, and very strong proof was furnished during the Jutland 
battle, if proof were needed, that his careful training had borne 
excellent results. The immunity of the ships of the squadron 
from the enemy's fire, whilst they were inflicting on his vessels 
very severe punishment, bears eloquent testimony to the offen- 
sive powers of the squadron. 

At 7.5 p. m. the whole battle line was turned together three 

•The Calliope reported at 7.18 p. m.: "Two enemy battleships, "Koenig" 
«lass. engaged by Orion's division, observed to be heavily on Are." 



132 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

more points to starboard to close the range further; immediately 
afterwards two ships ahead of the Iron Duke reported a sub- 
marine a little on the port bow; at 7.10 p. m. a flotilla of enemy 
destroyers, supported by a cruiser, was observed to be approach- 
ing on a bearing S. 50 W. from the Iron Duke, and the Fleet was 
turned back to south in order to turn on to the submarine and 
bring the ships in line ahead, ready for any required maneuver. 
A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges between 
10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the destroyers turned 
and passed towards the rear of the line in a heavy smoke screen. 
One destroyer was seen by several observers to sink from the 
effects of the gunfire. 

At a sufficient interval before it was considered that the tor- 
pedoes fired by the destroyers would cross our line, a signal \yas 
made to the Battle Fleet to turn two points to port by subdi- 
visions. Some minutes later a report was made to me by Com- 
mander Bellairs (the officer on my Staff especially detailed for 
this duty, and provided with an instrument for giving the neces- 
sary information) that this turn was insufficient to clear the tor- 
pedoes, as I had held on until the last moment; a further turn of 
two points was then made for a short time. As a result of this 
attack and another that followed immediately, some twenty or 
more torpedoes were observed to cross the track of the Battle 
Fleet, in spite of our turn, the large majority of them passing 
the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons at the rear of the 
line. It was fortunate that, owing to the turn away of the l«leet, 
the torpedoes were apparently near ^ the end of their run, and 
were consequently not running at high speed. They were al! 
avoided by the very skilful handling of the ships by their captains, 
to whom the highest credit is due, not only for their skill in 
avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in which the ships, by 
neighborly conduct towards each other, prevented risk of col- 
lision and kept their station in the line. The captains were n\ost 
ably assisted by the admirable look-out kept by the organisation 
that existed for dealing with this danger. 

I doubt, however, whether the skill shown would have saved 
several ships from being torpedoed had the range been less and 
the torpedoes consequently running at a higher speed. Frequent 
exercises carried out at Scapa Flow showed conclusively that the 
percentage of torpedoes that would hit ships in a line when 
fired from destrovers at ranges up to 8,000 yards was compara- 
tively high, even if the tracks were seen and the ships were man- 
euvered to avoid them. One very good reason is that torpedoes 
are always a considerable but varying distance ahead of the line 
of bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to judge the 
position of the torpedo from its track. Many ships experienced 
escapes from this and other attacks: thus the Hercules reported 
that she "turned away six points to avoid the torpedoes, one of 
which passed along the starboard side and 40 yards across the 
bow, and the other pased close under the stern"; the Neptune 
reported that "the tracks of three torpedoes were seen from the 
fore-top, one of which passed very close and was avoided by the 
use of the helm"; in the Agincourt's report, a statement occurred 
that "at 7.8 p. m. a torpedo just missed astern, it having been re- 
ported from aloft and course altered"; and again, "at 7.38 p. m. 
tracks of two torpedoes running parallel were observed ap- 
proaching; course altered to avoid torpedoes which passed ahead; 
and at 8^25 p. m. torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 133 

speed; torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the starboard 
bow"; the Kevenge remarked, "at 7.35 p. ni. altered course to 
port to avoid two torpedoes, one passed about ten yards ahead 
and the other about twenty yards astern, and at 7.43 p. m. al- 
tered course to avoid torpedoes, two passing astern"; the Colos- 
sus stated, "at 7.35 p. m. turned to port to avoid a torpedo coming 
from starboard side"; the Bar ham at this period reported that "at 
least four torpedoes passed through the iine close to the Bar- 
ham"; the Collingwood reported, "torpedo track was seen 20 
degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship; large 
helm was put on and the torpedo passed very close astern; at 
the same time another was seen to pass about thirty yards 
ahead." The captain of the Collingwood, in remarking on the 
destroyer attack, added, "the great vaiue of this form of attack 
on a iine of ships is, lo me, an outstanding feature of the Battle 
Fleet action." 

The first two-point turn was made at 7.23 p. m. and the Fleet 
was brought to a south by west course by 7.33 p. m. (that is, to a 
course one point to the westward of the course of the Fleet before 
the destroyer attack). The totat amount by which the range was 
opened by the turns was about l,7oO yards. 

The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the 4th and 11th Flotil- 
las had been delayed in reaching their action station at the van 
until about 7.15 p. ra., owing to the turns to the westward made 
by the Battle Fleet to close the enemy. In accordance with ar- 
rangments made previously to counter destroyer attacks, these 
vessels were ordered out to engage the enemy destroyers, which, 
according to the report of the Commodore Le Mesurier, com- 
manding the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, were steering towards 
the head of the division led by the King George V., the van ship 
of the Battle Fieet. Although not very well placed for the first 
attack for the reason given above, they were in a very favour- 
able position to counter the second destroyer attack, which took 
place at 7.25 p. m. The enem> s flotilla was sighted bearing 30 
degrees before the starboard beam of the Iron Duke at a range 
of 9,000 yards and was heavily engaged by the light forces and 
the 4ti), 1st, and 5th Battie Squadrons. During this attack three 
enemy destroyers were reported as sunk by the fire of the 
battleships, light cruisers and destroyers; one of them, bearing a 
Commodores pendanl. being sunk nt 7.50 p. m. by a division of 
the Pith Fiotilia, consisting ol the Obedient, Marvel, Mindful and 
Onslaught, which attacked them near the rear of our battle line. 
The Southampton and Dublin, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron, altackcd :md sank a second destroyer at this period. At 
least six torpedoes were observed to pass ahead of, or through 
the track of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron during their attack on 
the German flotilla. 

The destroyer attacks were combined with a retiring move- 
ment on the part of the enemy's Battle Fleet, the movement being 
covered with the aid of a heavv smoke screen. Although this 
retirement was not visible from the Iron Duke owing to the smoke 
and ni' t, and was, therefore, not known to me until after the ac- 
tion, it was cleariv seen from the rear of our line, as is indicated 
by the following citations: 

The Captain of the Valiant stated in his report: "At 7.23 
p. m. enemy's Battle F'eet now altered course together away 
from us and broke off the action, sending out a low cloud of 



134 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

smoke which effectually covered their retreat and obscured 
them from further view." 

The Captain of the Malaya reported, referring to this 
period: "This was the last of the enemy seen in daylight, ow- 
ing to their Battle Fleet having turned away." 

Sir Cecil Burney stated in regard to this period: "As the 
destroyer attack developed, the enemy's Battle Fleet in sight 
were observed to turn at least eight points until their stei:ns 
were towards our line. They ceased fire, declined further 
action, and disappeared into the mist." 

The Captain of the St. Vincent said: "The target was held 
closely until 7.26 p. m. (32 minutes in all), when the enemy 
had turned eight or ten points away, disappearing into the 
mist and with a smoke screen made by destroyers to cover 
them as well." 

Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas remarked: "After joining the 
Battle Fleet the 5th Battle Squadron conformed to the move- 
ments of the Commander-in-Chief, engaging the rear ships of 
the enemy's battle line, until they turned away and went out 
of sight, all ships apparently covering themselves with arti- 
ficial smoke." 

The Captain of the Revenge recorded: "A flotilla of des- 
troyers passed through the line and made a most efficient 
smoke screen. At this period the enemy's fleet turned eight 
points to starboard and rapidly drew out of sight." 

In the German account of the action at this stage, it is stated, 
in more than one passage, that the British Fleet during this ac- 
tion between the Battle Fleets was to the northward of the High 
Sea's Fleet. This is correct of the earlier stages. The account re- 
fers to the attacks on our line by the German destroyer flotillas, 
and states finally that in the last attack the destroyers did not 
«ight the heavy ships, but only light cruisers and destroyers to the 
north-eastward. The accuracy of this statement is doubtful, since 
the destrovers were clearly in sight from our heavy ships. But 
the account then proceeds to state that "the German Command- 
er-in-Chief turns his battle line to a southerly and southwesterly 
course on which the enemy was last seen, but he is no longer 
to be found." 

This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships bore 
north and north-east from the enemy and then that the enemy 
turned to south and south-west, that is, directly away from the 
British Fleet. Thus the fact that the German Fleet turned di- 
rectly away is confirmed by Germans. 

No report of this movement of the German Fleet reached me, 
and at first it was thought that his temporary disappearance was 
due to the thickening mist, especially as firing could be heard 
from the battleships in rear, but at 7.41 p. m., the enemy Bat- 
tle Fleet being no longer in sight from the Iron Duke, course was 
altered "by divisions" three points more to starboard (namely, 
to southwest) to close the enemy, and single line ahead was again 
formed on the Iron Duke on that course. 

At this period the rear of our battle line was still in action 
at intervals with one or two ships of the enemy's fleet, which 
were probably some that had drooped astern partially disabled, 
but by 7.55 p. m. fire had practically ceased. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 135 

At about 7.40 p. m. I received a report from Sir David Beatty 
stating that the enemy bore north-west by west from the Lion, 
distant 10 to 11 miles, and that the Lion's course was south-west. 
Although the battle cruisers were not in sight from the Iron Duke, 
I assumed the Lion to be live or six miles ahead of the van of the 
Battle Fleet, but it appeared later from a report received in re- 
ply to directions signalled by me at 8.10 p. m. to the King George 
V. to follow the battle cruisers, that they were not in sight from 
that ship either. 

At this time the enemy's Battle Fleet seems to have become 
divided, for whilst Sir David Beatty reported the presence of 
battleships north-west by west from the Lion, other enemy bat- 
tleships were observed to the westward (that is, on the star- 
board bow _of the Iron Duke), and the course of the Fleet \vas 
at once altered "by divisions" to west in order to close the en- 
emy; this alteration was made at 7.59 p. m. 

It will be observed that all the large alterations of course of 
the Battle Fleet during the engagement were made "by divisions" 
instead of "in succession from the van, or together." The reason 
was that in this way the whole Fleet could be brought closer to 
the enemy with far greater rapidity, and in a more ordered 
formation, than if the movement had been carried out by the line 
"in succession." 

The objection to altering by turning all ships together was 
the inevitable confusion that would have ensued as the result 
of such a maneuver carried out with a very large Fleet under ac- 
tion conditions in misty weather, particularly if the ships were 
thus kept on a line of bearing for a long period. 

The battleships sighted at 7.59 p. m. opened fire later on 
ships of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had moved out 
to starboard of the battle line to engage a flotilla of enemy des- 
troyers which were steering to attack the Battle Fleet. The Cal- 
liope, the flagship of Commodore Le Mesurier, was hit by a heavy 
shell and received some damage, but retained her fighting ef- 
ficiency and fired a torpedo at the leading battleship at a range 
of 6,500 yards; an explosion was noticed on board a ship of the 
"Kaiser" class by the Calliope.* The ships sighted turned away 
and touch could not be regained, although sounds of gunfire 
could be heard from ahead at 8.25 p. m., probably from our bat- 
tle cruisers, which obtained touch with and engaged some of the 
enemy's ships very effectively between 8.22 and 8.28 p. m. The 
Falmouth was the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in 
touch with the enemy, at 8.38 p. m.; the ships then in sight 
turned eight points together away from the Falmouth. 

At 8.30 p. m. the light was failing and the Fleet was turned 
"by divisions" to a south-west course, thus reforming single line 
.'igain. 

During the proceedings of the Battle Fleet described above, 
the bottle cruiserji were intermittently in action, as mentioned 
in Sir David Beatty's report. 

At first, touch with the enemy was lost owing to the lorge 
alterations of course carried out by the High Sea Fleet, but it 

*A1I our battle cruisers felt this heavy explosion which was clearly con- 
cussion under water, and may have been caused by the Calliope's torpedo 
obtaining a hit. 



136 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

was regained at 7.12 p. m., the battle cruisers opening fire at 
7.14 p. m., though only for two and a half minutes, and increas- 
ing speed to 22 knots. At this period the battle cruisers were 
steering south-west by south to south-west, and this course took 
them from the port to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet by 
7.12 p. m. The movements of our battle cruisers, which were 
at this time between four and five miles ahead of the van of the 
Battle Fleet could not be distinguished, owing partly to the fun- 
nel and cordite smoke from the battle cruisers themselves, but 
even more to the funnel smoke from the numerous cruisers, light 
cruisers and destroyers which were attempting to gain their po- 
sitions ahead of the van. 

The movements of the enemy's fleet could not be distinguished 
from our Battle Fleet owing again to their own funnel and cordite 
smoke, and also to the smoke screens which ships and destroyers 
were making to conceal their movements. 

It will be realised that these conditions, which particularly 
affected the Battle Fleet, did not apply to the same extent to our 
ships ahead of our Battle Fleet. They had little but the smoke 
of the enemy's leading ships to obscure the view. Farther to the 
rear, the Battle Fleet had the smoke of all our craft ahead of it 
as well as that of the enemy's long line of ships. 

Conditions which were perhaps difficult ahead of the Battle 
Fleet were very much accentuated in the Battle Fleet. Vice-Ad- 
miral Sir Martyn Jerram, in his report, remarked on this point: 
"As leading ship, in addition to the hazy atmosphere, I was much 
hampered by what I imagine must have been cordite fumes from 
the battle cruisers after they had passed us, and from other 
cruisers engaged on the bow, also by funnel gases from small 
craft ahead, and for a considerable time by dense smoke from 
the Duke of Edinburgh, which was unable to draw clear." 

The general position at 6.45 p. m. and again at 7.15 p. m. is 
shown in the plans to be found at the end of the text. 

At 7.10 p. m., according to remarks from the Minotaur, flag- 
ship of Rear-Admiral H. L. Heath, commanding the 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron, the position as seen from that ship was as follows: 
"The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was in single line ahead three to four 
miles on the port side of the King George V., gaining on her 
slightly, but with all the destroyers and light craft between &er 
and the King George V. The battle cruisers were about fgur 
miles distant on the starboard bow of the Minotaur; owing to 
their higher speed, the battle cruisers rapidly increased their 
distance from the Battle Fleet to some eight miles."* 

At 7.5 p. m. according to a report from the Shannon, of the 
2nd Cruiser Squadron, the Shannon's course was S. 10 W., "the 
2nd Cruiser Squadron endeavouring to take station on the en- 
gaged bow of the Battle Fleet; the Battle Fleet still engaged, the 
battle cruisers not engaged and tiu-ned slightly to port." And 
again at 7.22 p. m. a report says: "The Duke of Edinburgh had 
now taken station astern of the Shannon, the battle cruisers 
were engaged and had wheeled to starboard. Leading ships of 
the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were starting to cross the bows of the 
Battle Fleet from port to starboard. Battle cruisers firing inter- 



'Judged by reports from other cruisers the positions here described 
should be timed at about 6.50 to 7 p. m., and the diagrams show this accord- 
ingly. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 137 

mittently, light cruisers making their way through the destroyer 
flotillas to attack the enemy light cruisers." Rear-Admiral Heath 
stated: "At 7.11 p. m. I proceeded with the squadron at 20 knots 
to take up station astern of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was 
then engaged with the enemy." He added: "One salvo fell short 
on the starboard bow of the Minotaur and some others in close 
proximity"; and later savs, "even when the salvo referred to 
in the preceding paragraph fell, no more than the flashes of the 
enemy's guns could be seen." 

Further remarks from the Shannon, at a later stage, were: 
"At 8 p. m. Battle Fleet altered course to starboard to close the 
enemy, and by 8.15 was lost to sight, bearing about north by 
east." 

"At 8.15 p. m. Battle Fleet, out of sight from Shannon, was 
heard to be in action." 

"At 8.30 p. m. the visibilitv of grey ships was about 9,000 
yards." "At 8.45 p. m. King George V. again sighted, bearing 
north-north-east. Visibilitv had again improved, and her range 
was estimated at about 10,000 yards. Conformed to her course 
S. 75 W. to close enemy." 

At 7.20 p. m. the ships engaged by our battle cruisers turned 
away and were lost to sight. They were located for a moment 
at 8.20 p. m. with the aid of the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squad- 
rons, and, although they disappeared again at once, they were 
once more located and effectively engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 
p. m. at about 10,000 yards range. They turned away once more 
and were finally lost to sight by the 3rd Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron (the last ships to keep in touch) at 8.38 p. m., steammg to 
the westward. 

This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers had 
of putting the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon's work. They 
had, under the very able and gallant leadership of Sir David 
Beatty, assisted bv the splendid squadron so well commanded by 
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone far to crush out of existence 
the opposing Battle Cruiser Squadron. 

It will be seen from the above account that our battle crui- 
sers experienced great difficulty in locating and holding the 
enemy after 7.20 p. m., even when far ahead of the Battle Fleet, 
with "its small craft, and therefore in a position of freedom from 
the smoke of our own vessels and the enemy's line. After this 
time, 7.20 p. m., the battle cruisers were onlv engaged for some 
six minutes. The enemy turned away on each occasion when he 
was located and showed no disposition to fight. 

The visibilitv by this time had become very bad; the light 
was failing, and it became necessary to decide on the disposition 
for the night. 

III.— THE NIGHT ACTION 

The situation, which had never been really clear to me owing 
to the fact that I had not seen more than a few ships at a time, 
appeared to be as follows: 

We were between the enemy and his bases, whether he 
shaped a course to return via the Horn Reef, via Heligoland di- 
rect, or via the swept channel which he was known to use along 
the coast of the West Frisian Islands. 



138 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward of us. 
He had been turning on interior lines throughout. We had altered 
course gradually during the action from south-east by east to 
west, a turn of 13 points, or 146 degrees, in all, and the result 
must have been to place his ships well to the westward and 
ahead of us; although it was possible that ships which had 
fallen out owing to damage might be to the northward. 

The possibility of a night action was, of course, present to 
my mind, but for several reasons it was not my intention to 
seek such an action between the heavy ships. 

It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments against it. 

In the first place, such a course must have inevitably led to 
our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a very large des- 
troyer force throughout the night. No senior officer would will- 
ingly court such an attack, even if our battleships were equipped 
with the best searchlights and the best arrangements for the con- 
trol of the searchlights and the gunfire at night. 

It was, however, known to me that neither our searchlights 
nor their control arrangements were at this time of the best 
type. The fitting of Director-Firing gear for the guns of the 
secondary armament of our batleships (a very important factor 
for firing at night) had also only just been begun, although 
repeatedly applied for. The delay was due to manufacturing 
and labour difficulties. Without these adjuncts I knew well that 
the maximum effect of our fire at night could not be obtained, 
and that we could place no dependence on beating off" destroyer 
attacks by gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch with 
the heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with 
no corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were no effec- 
tive antidote at night, since, if they were disposed with this sole 
object in view, they would certainly be taken for enemy des- 
troyers and be fired on by our own ships. 

But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers, the 
result of night actions between heavy ships must always be very 
largely a matter of chance, as there is little opportunity for skill 
on either side. Such an action must be fought at very close 
range, the decision depending on the course of events in 
the first few minutes. It is, therefore, an undesirable procedure 
on these general grounds. The greater efficiency of Gernian 
searchlights at the time of the Jutland action, and the greater 
number of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships, combined with his 
superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the Germans the 
opportunity of scoring heavily at the commencement of such an 
action. 

The question then remained as to the course to be steered. 
The first desideratum was to keep the British Fleet between the 
enemy and his bases, so as to be in a position to renew the 
action at dawn. Daylight was rapidly disappearing; it was nec- 
essary to form the Fleet for the night as quickly as possible to 
avoid visual signalling after dark; and it was also necessary to 
place our destroyers in a position where the chances of their 
coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a mini- 
mum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attacking the en- 
emy's capital ships during the night. The Grand Fleet was 
formed at the time in practically a single line, steering approxi- 
mately west-south-west. I considered that a southerly course 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 



139 



would meet the situation and would enable me to form the Fleet 
very quickly, and, if I put the destroyers astern, they would ful- 
fil three conditions: first, they would be in an excellent position 
for attacking the enemy's fleet should it also turn to the south- 
ward with a view to regaining its bases during the night (which 
seemed a very probable movement on the part of the enemy) ; 
secondly, they would also be in position to attack enemy des- 
troyers should the latter search for our lleet with a view to a 
night attack on the heavy ships; finally, they would be clear of 
our own ships, and the danger of their attacking our battleships 
in error or of our battleships firing on them would be reduced to 
a minimum. 

Accordingly, at 9 p. m., I signalled to the Battle Fleet to alter 
course by divisions to south, informing the Flag officers of the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and 
the officers commanding destroyer flotillas of my movements in 
order that they should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed 
the Battle Fleet to assume the second organisation and to form 
divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to port, with the columns 
one mile apart. This had the effect of placing the Battle Fleet 
as shown in the diagram: 



I mWe 



tmile 



Imile 



2nd. 



4th; 1st. 

BATTLE SaUADRONS. 



1 

5+h 



My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was to 
ensure that adjacent columns should not lose sight of each other 
during the night, and that therefore they would not mistake our 
own ships for those of the enemy. 

As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly course 
the destroyer flotillas were directed to take station five miles 
astern of the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 p. m. a signal was made to the 
mine-laying flotilla leader Abdiel (Captain Berwick Curtis) to 
proceed to lay a mine-field in a defined area some 15 miles from 
the Vyl Lightship, over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet 
would pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during 
the night via the Horn Reef. The Abdiel carried out this opera- 
lion unobserved in the same successful manner as numerous other 
similar operations had been undertaken by this most useful little 
vessel; from the evidence of one of our submarines, stationed 
near the Horn Reef, which reported on return to her base having 
heard several underwater explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 a. m. 
on June 1st, it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines. 

At 10 p. m. the position of the Iron Duke was Lat. 56.22 N., 



140 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Long. 5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots, and the order of the 
Fleet from west to east was: 

Battle Cruiser Fleet (except 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron) ; 
Cruiser Squadrons: 

Battle Fleet; 

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle 
Squadron; 

4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet; 

11th, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from 
west to east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet. 

Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward for the 
night, a destroyer attack took place on the 2nd Light Cruiser 
Squadron at the rear of our battle line. This was reported to me 
shortly after 9 p. m., but immediately afterwards a further report 
stated that the enemy had been driven off to the north-west. 

At 10.4 p. m. Commodore Hawksley, in the Castor, command- 
ing the destroyer flotilles, after dropping astern, sighted three or 
more vessels at a range of 2,000 yards which he took to be enemy 
battle cruisers. If the German report is to be believed, the ships 
were light cruisers and included the Hamburg and Elbing. The 
enemy at once opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the Castor was 
hit and her bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged, making 
it impossible to signal to the 11th Flotilla, which the Castor was 
leading. The damage to the Castor was slight. The Castor, Magic, 
and Marne fired torpedoes at the enemy, but the remaining destroy- 
ers of the flotilla refrained from doing so, not being certain of 
the identity of the vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after 
a violent detonation, following on the discharge of the torpedoes, 
had been felt in the engine-rooms of the destroyers near the Castor. 

At 0.15 a. m. the Castor sighted a German destroyer on her 
starboard bow and opened fire with all guns at point-blank range. 
She was not seen again. 

At 10.20 p. m. the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted and 
engaged five enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with four light 
cruisers, probably of the 4th Scouting Group. The enemy again 
opened fire with great rapidity and accuracy, and concentrated his 
fire on our two leading ships, the Southampton and Dublin, at very 
short range. Both vessels suffered considerable damage during the 
15 minutes' engagement and there were fairly heavy casualties; 
three fires which broke out on board the Southampton were 
promptly extinguished by fine work on the part of the officers and 
men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had been much cut up by 
shell fire. 

The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but fierce 
engagement, and it is probable that the German light cruiser 
Frauenlob, whose loss was admitted by the enemy, was sunk dur- 
ing this action, which took place in that case between our own 2nd 
Light Cruiser Squadron and the German 4th Scouting Group. 

At 11.30 p. m. the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked enemy crui- 
sers steering a south-easterly course. Again the vessels sighted 
opened fire immediately, and the flotilla leader Tipperary, com- 
manded by Captain Wintour. the leader of the Fotilla, was severe- 
ly damaged by gunfire and set on fire forward; the Broke, leader of 
the 2nd half Flotilla, received injury to her steering-gear, rend- 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 141 

ering her temporarily unmanageable and causing her to ram the 
destroyer Sparrov/hawk, with the result that it became necessary 
to abandon the latter destroyer on the following morning after 
taking olf her crew. The destroyer Spitfire (Lieutenant-Com- 
mander C. W. E. Trelawny), next astern of the Tipperary, fired 
torpedoes at a four-funnelied cruiser which appeared to be hit 
and sinking, and the Spitfire then collided with a German light 
cruiser and, in scraping along her side, carried off some 29 feet 
of the skin plating of the German ship. 

The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engagement, wliiic 
steering to the south-eastward, came into contact at midnight 
with the enemy's 2nd Battle Squadron, and one ship (probably 
the Pommern) was torpedoed and sunk either by the Ardent 
(Lieutenant-Commander Marsden) or Ambuscade (Lieutenant- 
Commander G. A. Coles) or Garland (Lieutenant-Commander R. 
S. Goft). A heavy and accurate fire was opened by the enemy 
and the destroyer Fortune (Lieutenant-Commander F. G. Terry) 
was sunk. 

The flotilla was again in action a little later with some enemy 
battleships, and the Ardent attacked and fired a torpedo, but the 
result could not be observed as a very heavy fire was concen- 
trated on the Ardent, which sank with colours flying after a 
most gallant night's work. It is sad to record that Lieutenant- 
Commander Marsden and one man were the only survivors; they 
were picked up by a destroyer on June 1st after having been five 
hours in the water. 

The 12th Flotilla had formed astern of the 1st Battle Squadron 
after dark. The 1st Battle Squadron was somewhat astern of the 
remainder of the Fleet during the night, owing to the Marlbor- 
ough not being able to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the 
revolutions for this speed. Consequently the 12th Flotilla was 
also more than five miles astern of the main portion of the Bat- 
tle Fleet. At 11.30 p. m., also this flotilla was obliged for some 
little time to steer a south-easterly course, owing to the move- 
ments of another flotilla on the starboard hand, the identity of 
which cannot be determined with certainty. The result was that 
the 12th Flotilla was probably some ten miles to the north-east- 
ward of the 1st Battle Squadron by midnight. The incident was 
a fortunate one, since it brought the flotilla into contact with 
one of the enemy's battle squadrons. 

At 1.45 a. m., Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in the 
Faulknor, sighted on the starboard bow this battle squadron, 
consisting of six ships steering south-east. The leading ships 
were thought to belong to the "Kaiser" class. Captain Stirling 
altered his course to one parallel with that of the enemy and 
increased speed to 25 knots to draw ahead, with the intention of 
turning to attack on a north-westerly course (the reverse of the 
enemy's course), in order to give an opportunity of getting to 
close range. This attack was carried out at 2 a. m. at a range of 
about 3,000 yards, and all dCsStroyers fired their torpedoes at 
the second and third ships in the line. Some took effect on the 
third battleship in the line, the explosion being so violent and 
the flame reaching to such a height that it appeared to those in 
our destroyers that the explosion of the torpedoes must have de- 
tonated the magazine and destroyed the ship. 

Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the enemy 
light cruisers, which were in company with the battle squadron. 



142 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

The destroyer Maenad (Commander J. P. Champion) had, how- 
ever, not turned to the north-westward with the remainder of 
the flotilla, as it had been anticipated that the attack would have 
been made with torpedo tubes bearing to starboard, and her tuoes 
were not ready to fire to port. Commander Champion held on 
the south-easterly course and, turning later than the rest of the 
flotilla, fired one port tube, then, turned again to south-east, train- 
ed his tubes to starboard, and at 2.25 a. m. fired two torpedoes 
to starboard at the fourth ship in the line at a range between 
4,000 and 5,000 yards, one of which took effect. In this case, 
too, the flame of the explosion reached the mast head, and the 
ship was not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her 
were visible. 

It is of interest to note that at the time of the first attack 
on this squadron six battleships were visible. After the first 
attack only five were seen by Captain Stirling, and twenty-five 
minutes later five were sighted by the Maenad, and after the Mae- 
nad's attack only four were visible. The evidence that at least 
one of the battleships was sunk was considered at the time to be 
very strong, particularly as the reports from the Maenad and 
from Captain Stirling were sent to me quite independently, and 
Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that Captain Stir- 
ling had reported six ships as the original number in the battle 
squadron, and five as the nvunber remaining after his attack. 

"When Captain Stirling had located the enemy's battle squad- 
ron he reported the fact by wireless, but the signal was, unfortu- 
nately, not received by any ship owing, presimiably, to the strong 
interference caused by German wireless signalling at the time. 

The destroyers of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas took sta- 
tion astern of the Battle Fleet in company with the Champion 
(Captain Farie), leader of the 13th Flotilla; the Fearless, leader 
of the 9th Flotilla, had not been able to maintain touch with her 
flotilla. Many of the destroyers of these flotillas lost touch with 
the Champion during the night, and the flotillas became some- 
what scattered. 

At 12.30 a. m. a large vessel, taken at first for one of our own 
ships, crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed, passing close to 
the Petard and Turbulent. She rammed the Turbulent and opened 
a heavy fire on both the Tubulent and Petard; the Tubulent sank 
and the Petard was damaged. 

At 2.35 a. m. the destroyer Moresby, of the 13th Flotilla, 
sighted four battleships of the "Deutschland" class, and attacked,, 
firing one torpedo; an explosion was subsequently heard. 

It was impossible to state with certainty which of our des- 
troyers were actually successful in their attacks. The enemy, 
of course, denied that any marked success was obtained by our 
attacks, but information received after the action made it certain 
that at least four battleships of the "Dreadnaught" type were hit 
by torpedoes, in addition to the pre-Dreadnaugh battleship Pom- 
mern, which was admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was 
the light cruiser Rostock. 

Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot be at- 
tributed to particular destroyers, the work of the flotillas as a 
whole, and particularly of the 4th and 12th Flotillas, was charac- 
terised by the splendid dash, skill and gallantry for which our 
destroyers had been conspicuous throughout the War. They were 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 143 

most ably led and achieved magnificent work under very diffi- 
cult conditions. 

There is no doubt at all that the German organisation foj- 
night action was of a remarkably high standard. In the iU'sl 
place, the use of star shells, at that time unfamiliar to us, was o= 
the greatest service to them in locating our destroyers without 
revealing their own positions; and, secondly, their searchlights 
were not only very powerful (much more so than ours), bui 
their method of controlling them and bringing guns and search- 
lights rapidly on to any vessel sighted was excellent. It also 
appeared that some system of director-firing was fitted to the 
guns of their secondary armament. 

The increased oft'ensive power given by these devices did 
not, however, prevent our destroyers from inflicting great damage 
on the enemy during their night attacks, although they led to the 
loss of some valuable destroyers and still more valuable lives. 
Captain Wintour, leader of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide 
experience of destroyer work and a fine leader, was a very 
heavy loss, and other splendid officers perished with their gal- 
lant crews. Our destroyer service has, indeed, every reason to 
be exceedingly proud of the achievements of the flotillas, both 
during the day action of May 31st and during the night follow- 
ing that action. 

Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at intervals 
during the night, and, curiously enough, the under-water explo- 
sions, four or five in number, were quite clearly recorded on a 
barograph in the Malaya, a ship well placed for the purpose, as 
she was in the rear. There is little doubt that these records 
showed the explosion of our torpedoes against enemy ships. 

From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark that 
our destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired with great 
frequency by the enemy, and they produced a very brilliant il- 
lumination, leaving the enemy ships in complete darkness and 
not revealing their positions. 

At 11 p. m. the light cruiser Active, astern of the 2nd Battle 
Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern, and shortly 
afterwards saw searchlights switched on and a heavy fire opened 
against this vessel by a ship, or ships, on her starboard quarter. 
She appeared to be heavily hit and to sink. It is possible that this 
ship may have been the Black Prince, which had apparently lost 
touch with our fleet during the day action. 

Shortly after this incident the Active passed over some sub- 
merged object which she bumped heavily. Subsequent examina- 
tion showed that some 15 feet of her bilge keel had been torn 
away. It was not conceivable that the object struck could have 
been submerged wreckage from any ship which had taken part 
in the action, no fighting having occurred in the vicinitv, and it 
seemed possible that the Active had struck an enemy submarine. 
At 11.30 p. m. the Colossus also passed over some submerged ob- 
ject which was felt to scrape along the bottom of the ship. Sub- 
sequent examination showed damage to both starboard propel- 
ler blades. Again there is doubt as to what the obstruction could 
have been; it was certainly not wreckage from any ship that had 
been in action. 

At 2 a. m. on June 1st Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney informed 
me that the Marlborough could not maintain the Fleet speed of 



144 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

17 knots any longer, on account of the stress on the bulkheads, 
and that she had been obliged to ease to 12 knots. I directed him 
to order the ship to proceed to the Tyne or Rosyth, passing 
south of the German mined area. Sir Cecil Burney called the 
light cruiser Fearless alongside the Marlborough, and was trans- 
ferred in her, with his Staff, to the Revenge, the Fearless being 
then detached to escort the Marlborough. 

Some idea of the area covered by the different engagements 
which consiituted the Battle of Jutland will be gathered from a 
consideration of the distances steamed by our ships during the 
operations. 

The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between 3.48 p. 
m., the time of opening fire, and 6.17 p. m., the time that the Bat- 
tle Fleet commenced action, and a further distance of some 57 
miles to 9 p. m., when the Fleet turned to the southward for the 
night. The Battle Fleet steamed some 47 miles between the com- 
mencement of their engagement with the High Sea Fleet and the 
turn to the southward at 9 p. m. 

The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the period 
covered by the night action — 9 p. m. to 2 a. m. 

At 2.47 a, m., as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered course 
to north and formed single line ahead in the order — 2nd Battle 
Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron (less the 6th 
Division). The 5th Battle Squadron rejoined at 3.30 a. m. and 
took station ahead of the 2nd Battle Squadron. 

The weather was misty and the visibility even less than on 
May 31st, being only some three or four miles, and I considered 
it desirable under these conditions, and in view of the fact that 
I was not in touch with either my cruisers or destroyers, to form 
single line, accepting the danger of submarine attack on a Iqng 
line in order to be ready for the enemy's Battle Fleet, if sudden- 
ly sighted. The 6th Division of the Battle Fleet was not in sight 
at daylight, having dropped astern owing to the reduction in 
speed of the Marlborough and the change of flag from the Marl- 
borough to the Revenge. Partly on account of the low visibility 
and partly because of the inevitable difference in dead reckon- 
ing between ships, due to their many movements in course of the 
action and in the night, considerable difficulty was experienced 
in collecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to the destro;ver 
flotillas, as they had been heavily engaged, and their facilities 
for computing their positions under these conditions were 
only slight; but the same difficulty was experienced with all 
classes of ships, and, although awkward, the fact did not cause 
me any surprise. The cruisers were not sighted until 6 a. m., the 
detroyers did not join the Battle Fleet until 9 a. m., and the 6th 
Division of the Battle Fleet, with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st 
Battle Squadron, was not in company until the evening. 

The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet (particu- 
larly the destroyers), due to the above causes, rendered it unde- 
sirable for the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, as 
had been my intention when deciding to steer to the southward 
during the night. It was obviously necessary to concentrate the 
Battle Fleet and the destroyers before renewing action. By the 
time this concentration was effected it had become apparent 
that the High Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn Reef, had passed 
behind the shelter of the German minefields in the early morn- 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 145 

ing on the way to their ports. The presence of a Zeppelin, 
sighted at 3.30 a. m., made it certain that our position at that 
time would he known to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the 
information obtained from our wireless directional stations dur- 
ing the early morning showed that ships of the High Sea bleet 
must have passed the Horn Reef on a southerly course shortly 
after daylight. 

At 3 a. m. the destroyer Sparrowhawk, which was lying 
disabled in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted a German light 
cruiser two miles to the eastward, steaming slowly to the north- 
ward. After being in sight for about five minutes this vessel slow- 
ly heeled over and sank, bow first. The Sparrowhawk was sub- 
sequently sighted by the Marksman and others of our destroyers, 
and being too seriously damaged for towing back to a base, was 
sunk by Sie Marksman. 

Shortly after 3.30 a. m. the report of gunfire to the westward 
was audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38 Rear -Admiral Trevy- 
lyan Napier, commanding the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, re- 
ported that he was engaging a Zeppelin in a position tQ the west- 
ward of the Battle Fleet. Course was altered "by dmsions to 
west at 3.44 a. m., as it seemed that the presence of the airsmp 
might possibly indicate the presence also of the High Sea Fleet. 
At 3.50 a. m. a Zeppelin was in sight from the Battle Fleet, but 
nothing else; course was altered back again to north and fare 
opened on the airship, which, however, was too high for the fire 
to be effective. She disappeared to the eastward. She was 
sighted subsequently at intervals. 

At 4.10 a. m. the Battle Fleet was formed into divisions in 
line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, in order to widen the 
front and to reduce the risk of submarine attack. At 4.25 a. m. the 
cruiser Dublin reported by wireless that she had sighted an ene- 
my cruiser and two destroyers, and she gave her position. 

At 5.15 a. m. the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle Fleet 
in accordance with orders signalled, and was directed to locate 
the cruiser reported by the Dublin, whilst the Battle Fleet 
searched to the south-eastward for one of the enemy s battle 
cruisers which was thought to be in a damaged condition and 
probably, therefore, stiJl making for a German port. At 4.45 a. m. 
ffie BatUe Fleet was in Lat. 55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E; at 5 a, rn the 
Commodore of the fiotillas (Commodore Hawksley), with des- 
troyers, reported himself as being in Lat. 55.48 N., Long, b.22 t., 
at 5.48 a. m. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was in Lat 5o.45 N., Long. 
616 E., steering south-east at 18 knots, and at 6.15 a. m. altered 
course to south. At 6 a. m., not having met the destroyers, the 
Battle Fleet altered course to south-east, with the cruisers in 
company, steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course until 
7.15 a. m., at which time course was altered to north the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7.30 a. m. and to norUi at 
8 a. m. 

The Dublin was sighted at 7.55 a. m. and reported haying 
lost sight in a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N Long. 6 32 E., of.the crmser 
and torpedo-boat destroyers she had reported, and in reply to 
further inquiries she stated that the cruiser was apparently not 
disabled and was steaming fast. 

At 8.15 a. m. the Battie Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N., Long. 6.10 



146 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

E., steering north at 17 knots, turning at 8.52 a. m. to a south- 
west course. 

Between 8 a. m. and 9 a. m. a considerable amount of wreck- 
age was passed, and the bodies of dead German bluejackets were 
seen in the water. The wreckage of the destroyer Ardent was 
also passed. Drifting mines in considerable numbers were seen 
during the whole forenoon of the 1st June, and there were one 
or two reports of submarines being sighted. At 10 a. m. the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the Battle 
Fleet, and course was altered to north by west, the destroyers, 
V iiitti iiad HOW joined, being stationed to form a submarine 
screen. 

At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 
6.25 E., and at 12.30 p. m. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was in Lat. 
56.32 N., Long. 6.11 E. 

It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had either 
sunk or had passed inside the mine-fields en route to their bases. 
It had been evident since the early morning, from the definite 
information obtained by our directional stations, that the enemy's 
fleet was returning to port. All our own injured vessels were 
also en route for their bases, and I decided to return with the 
whole Fleet, and gave the necessary instructions to the Rosyth 
force to return independently. Diagram 4 shows the movement 
of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the forenoon of 
Xune 1st. 

The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had been 
kept in port by Admiralty orders on May 31st, and was despatched 
to sea on the morning of June 1st, when I was informed that it 
was being sent out to join me and to replace vessels requiring 
fuel. At 7 a. m. I instructed Commodore Tyrwhitt to send four 
of his destroyers to screen the Marlborough to her base; he in- 
folrhied me at 2.30 p. m. that he had sighted the Marlborough. 
At 10.40 a. m. I had reported to the Admiralty that I did not re- 
quire the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt to 
strengthen the Marlborough's escort and told him that I did not 
need his ships. They would have been of great use at daylight 
on June 1st had they been on the scene at that time, and it is 
needless to add how much I should have welcomed the partici- 
pation of the Harwich force in the action had circumstances ad- 
mitted of this. I knew well the extreme efficiency and the fine 
fighting spirit of this force which, under its gallant and dis- 
tinguished commodore, had rendered such splendid service 
throughout the War. 

The Marlborough reported at 11 a. m. that a torpedo had been 
fired at her and had missed. Some anxiety was felt about the 
ship on the morning of June 2nd, as bad weather set in and her 
pumps became choked; tugs were ordered out to meet her, but 
she arrived in the Humber at 8 a. m. 

The Warrior, which had been taken in tow by the sea-plane 
carrier Engadine, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 3.54 E. at 8 a. m. 
on the 1st June, but the crew was taken off by the Engtidine 
and the ship abandoned later in the day, as the weather had be- 
come bad and it was evident the ship could not remain aflqat. 
The work of rescue was very smartly carried out, the Engadine 
being skilfully placed alongside the Warrior in a considerable 
sea way by her Captain, Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson. 



ACCOUNT BY ADMIRAL JELLICOE 147 

and the large number of wounded transferred to her. The re- 
ports as to the condition of the Warrior were not clear, and it 
was feared that she might remain afloat, and later fall into the 
hands of the enemy. Therefore 1 detached the 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron, and subsequently the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, to 
search for her. The search continued until the evening of June 
23rd, no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a 
report received subsequently from the Captain of the Warrior 
that her condition was such that she must have sunk shortly 
after having been abandoned. During the search for the Warrior, 
one of the cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron sighted a sub- 
marine on the surface at dusk, opened fire, and tried to ram. If 
was reported quite definitely that the submarine had been sunk. 
Later evidence showed, however, that the submarine was one 
of our own vessels of this class, that she had a very narrow es- 
cape, but had dived in time to avoid injury. This was one in- 
stance, amongst others, of our own submarines being mistaken 
for an enemy, attacked by our own ships, and considered to be 
sunk. The difficulty of ascertaining definitely the result of an 
engagement with a submarine was thereby exemplified, and was 
one of the weighty reasons which led the Admiralty during the 
War to refrain from publishing any figures. 

Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the destroyer 
Broke, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was directed to search for 
that vessel also, assisted by two light cruisers. She, however ar- 
rived safely in the Tyne, having been delayed by bad weather. 
Other disabled or partially disabled destroyers requiring assis- 
tance to reach port were the Acasta, towed by the Nonsuch, and 
the Onslow, towed by the Defender. 

The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled, and was 
reported ready for sea at four hours' notice at 9.45 p. m. on that 
date. 

Note. — In the plans and diagrams connected with this chap- 
ter there are some slight departures from those which accom- 
panied my original despatch to the Admiralty. 

That despatch was sent in under constant pressure for its 
early receipt and at a time when I, in common with my Staff, 
was very fully occupied with the arrangements connected with 
the repair of damaged ships, the constructive alterations which 
the action had shown to be necessary in our ships, and the var- 
ious committees which I had formed to report on difTerent sub- 
jects in the light of our experience. I was not, therefore, able 
to give the personal attention to the reports which later oppor- 
tunities have afforded me, and the small modifications are the 
result of a close and prolonged study of these reports, .ind of the 
signals received during May 31st. 

One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to send to the 
King on the morning of June 3rd a mesage of humble duty and 
respectful and heartfelt wishes on His Majesty's birthday. 

The following reply was received from His Majesty, and 
communicated to the Fleet: 

"I am deeply touched bv the message which you have sent 
me on behalf of the Grand Fleet. It reaches me on the morrow 
of a battle which has once more displayed the splendid gallan- 
try of the officers and men under vour command. I mourn the 



148 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

loss of brave men, many of them personal friends of my own 
who have fallen in their country's cause. Yet even more do I 
regret that the German High Sea Fleet, in spite of its heavy losses, 
was enabled by the misty weather to evade the full consequences 
of an encounter they have always professed to desire, but for 
which when the opportunity arrived they showed no inclina- 
tion. Though the retirement of the enemy immediately after the 
opening of the general engagement robbed us of the opportunity 
of gaining a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday amp- 
ly justify my confidence in the valour and efficiency of the 
fleets under yoiu* command. 

"George R. I." 

The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gracious 
message, and I added in my telegram to His Majesty that it was 
"a matter of the greatest gratification to all ranks to receive such 
an expression of Your Majesty's approval and sympathy for the 
loss of our gallant comrades." 



i 



¥ 



I 



I* 



PLAN OF 

JUTLAND BATTLE 

BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT 



The position of our Battle Cruisers .it 6 O. P. M. is fixed 
by a report from ihe Marlborough and confirmed at 
6. 4. P. M. by a reporl from the Rear-Admiral 1st Battle 
Squadron in the Colossus. 

The position of the 5th Battle Squadron is fixed by 
a report from the Marlborough at 6. 6. P. M. taken 
in conjunction with the reports of the Rear-Admiral 
5th Battle Squadron. 

The courses of our Battle Cruisers are taken from 
the .eoorl of the Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser FI.et 
and from the Lion and Indomitable. 
The position of the Enemy Battle Cruisers at 6. 7. P. M. 
is fixed by a report from the Lion received at 6. 6. P. M.; 
this gave the bep.ring; the distance is obtained by a 
?ration of the ranges at which the Lion was f 




/)i<ufrti/ii I . 



The pojiiio-, of Ihe Enemy Battle Fleet is fixed M 6. 14. 
P. M. froB, ihr Lion and at 6. 15. P. M. from the Barham; 
Ihe lattei. being signalled by wirelees.an interval of four 
niinutes bnirg allowed between tranamiasion and 

receipt 

Subsequ*,! movements of Ihe Enemy Battle Cruisers 
are fixetjby the bearings on which our Battle Cruisers 
were firitg and the ranges given, and by a consideration 
of the G»man reports which show a 32 point turn 
between 16 and 6 15. PM 

Subsequsii movements of the Enemy Battle Fleet are 
fixed by ijearings and ranges given by the Marlborough 
at 6 17. |1 M.Jron Duke at 6. 31. P. M. and Monarch 

at e.aa, p M. 

The movanents of the Defence, Warrior and Warapite are 
fixed by reports and diagrams from the Warrior, Duke of 
Edinburgh and the Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron. 

In studyinf this diagram it should be borne In mind that 
only a few of the German ships were visible at a time due 



K<n</ CfMrtfe V. (6-31) 



•^/p Lion fe-7J^^^^^^' 

Lion, (eo) I .,2J^- '*^' -"! ' ""' \^ 



Barham.(6 ■ 7)2^- 



olnvirujhi^ 16/1 1 



IrwinaUe jitrA {6 331 



t^^Ini-inrihU (0 3) 



^l '^, 



lniintjt>Ln.1:Kl\ 







mr 



Diciffram. IT- 



K 



ie in mind that no information as to 

e Enemy Battle Fleet wa« received until 

kat the only reports received had been 

\, giving a bearing of the Enemy Battle 

le "Lion", and a report at 5. 60. P. M. 

.^ampton" to the effect that the Enemy 

'\t northeast from his Battle Cruisers 

>re presumably ahead of them and right 

le Fleet.) 

ore been no sufficient information on 
se the guides of columns; deployment 
wing column to meet an enemy before 
am v^ould necessarily be an awkward 
l^ould Involve a considerable alteration 
wing column to port and a very large 
jrse of the remaining columns when 



DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT 
HAVE ARISEN HAD THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYED ON 



Diagj-arrL H. 



THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN. 



tariff Gaorye V. 



Oriojt 



MarlhoroufffL 




Signal to dUjAoy 6-16 
("A'arcs rwt bearing) 



It (hould be borne in mind that no information as to 
the position of the Enemy Battle Fleet was received until 
6. 14. P. M., and that the only reports received had been 
one at 6. 6. P. M, giving a bearing of the Enemy Battle 
Cruisers from the "Lion", and a report at 5. 50. P. M. 
from the "Southampton" to the effect that the Enemy 
Battle Fleet bore north-east from his Battle Cruisers 
(and were therefore presumably ahead of them and right 
ahead of our Battle Fleet.) 

There had therefore been no sufficient information on 
which to re-dispose the guides of columns; deployment 
on the starboard wing column to meet an enemy before 
the starboard beam would necessarily be an awkward 
manoeuvre as it would involve a considerable alteration 
of the starboard wing column to port and a very large 
alteration of course of the remaining columns when 
coming into line astern of it. 

A torpedo attack during deployment would under these 
conditions throw the British Battle Fleet into great 
confusion and a concentration of gunfire on the turning 
point would be very effective; our own gunfire, owing to 
the large alterations of course and the consequent 
difficulty of obtaining correct fire control data would be 
correspondingly ineffective: our own destroyers had been 
spread ahead of the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen 
until 6. 8 P. M. and were moving across the front in an 
unformed condition to the two flanks. 

The movements that would probably have resulted and 
the number of ships on each side in action are shown in 
the diagram for each 3-minute interval from 6. 16 to 
6. 28 P.M, 

The three ships of the 6th. Battle Squadron would 
eventually have come into line ahead of the 6th. division, 
bnt would possibly have masked the fire of that division 
during the movement. 



(*l''isfvip Hri7ig)6J9 

(%hships Firing) 6^22 



6Z8 (*1X^ ships firing) 
(*8% ships firing/ 



* Itv some- of the- rear ships anfy Kalf thA brooLdsid^^ 
is bearing hence- the frcuctioTV. 



Destroyers attack 
..Battle Fletti 



6'6 German Biittle 
Cruisers 




6- Z8(17s)ups firing) 



&'29 (a arcs bearing)^ 
('isliips firing) / /— — ' 



6-ZS ( I3ships firing) 
"e-ZZ (9ships firing) 

iiprman JkslrVi^'s 
assu/ned hervalx"'^ 



Mm of Jiatfle Fleet OJ'P 



:d— r- 



Ml "7 1 



" ^J>^ ■■■'"■ 




'Os\ /...... nior.i. 



l^^^ 



DIAGRAM SHOWING 
ORDER OF THE BATTLEFLEET 

:jn' MAY i;»l() 



^- lilt,/.- „ri/ir/ln,i //„/.■,■' 

r/rrl 1,1 siiullr hnr nlli-nil 

I,;j,l^i:-fll>ni.^i„ii.-.'tliriinnl 

linns" triirk 





Track of H MS Iron Duke and Baltle Fleet 

Lion Diid Battle Cruiser Fleet 



TRACK OF SQUADRONS 

DURING NIGHT OF 
May 3l3t.:o June 1st ,ind 
Porenooii of Ju:i 



1916. 



BATTLE FUET. 



ingle line 



night, Battle Fleet in 3 columi 
disposed abeam. 

From 2. 45 A. M. to 3. 30 A. M., in 9 
From 3. 30 A. M. onward, in 6 colum 
disposed abe.Tm. 

POSITIONS OF CRUISERS ETC. 

Dublin .nt 4. 30 A. M. in Lat- Ss'sON 

Commodore of Flotillas al 5. O A. M. in 

Long. 6'22 E. 

Vice A<:-nir,^l 1st BattI" Squadron with Stii Division at 

8. 40 A. M. in L,it. 5Q° 55N., Long. 6*1B E. steering 

S. S E.1S knots. 

3 Subm.-.rines off Vyl Light Ship on bearing 270° 4 

miles, 12 miles and 20 miles respect 



6 30 E 
4r! N.. 




/,.■ 

/.;■'' 







CI Oatt7,? FU.i 



PLoji N? 7 






Operations of 

BATTLE CRUISER FLEET 

n00p.mtoVi!5p.m.3I^^May. 






yiihruaiiJihl.' X p. 



u:i-. I,.m 




LaX.56-'48'N. 
Lonij.4''48'E. 



SoulluxTnptJjn. 1J-3S> p.jn. 



mip.-m 








V-30pm 

Iruii'l'iilixjable 
sxitih.'^ app rnjc. 

Sl'u i:/. nniptnit 

CK^IVOO p 



?'.';' i..i:s.hi'Jni4^ 

h,iU:,-*-hips. 



37p.m- 

Sighted erunn-y BaUle VLaet 
^ JVHUp.m. ,, 
•^^Lai 56?33iT:I. 
^^Lonc,.5''49'E. 

IV-aSp.inX) 
i"}^L.C.S.altf-J-ed. 



IV-OTip 






ivjapjn x:> 

Hiwrny Baitlt! FliuU 

(approa- ! 



30 SEA MILES 



""\* 



i 



:v;',^"^,.- 



APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE 

GRAND FLEET AT 6-45. P. M. ON 

31st. MAY 1916. 



.XL.-. 



Qi SotuJi anipt/in 



^Vnliunt 



llath 









yw./,,,.,/,.,,- 
Q).v/,„„„„„ 



J'roha/jbi: afifjra : _ 

of 
High Sea,fUct 



Q rn//iopp. 



^InZ-l^nblr '-'lac- 

\Pr,n4-rsx K,ryal 



^ GlaiirrjftcT' 

^YlAl'UiOUUt 



m 



fe k 



Htii-wich y\ 

2"'° Liejht Cruiser f!cfundrrn\ 
Souilutmfjtvn\ 




r^"-'' FloHUxv 



IS'i'Flot.lla 



SDcu-hcun 

\ 6" - J)i\-ision 

y Mtwlborottifh 

k CdossJi.v 

\ 



APPROXIMATE POSITIOUs OF SHIPS OF THE 

GRAND FLEET 

At 7. 15 P. M. 31st May 1916. 

Probable approximate course of the German Battle Fleet, 

as evidenced by the positions of the ships engaged at the time. 

shown in Red. 



PLcuvN?B 



'.,--'•'/' 

"/;,,/,' 



The B^itllc Cro.itr, ..nj 3.l)'Uj|,i CruUcr Suu.dr 
h»v.- croitrd froTi thr port^tn thi lUrbonMj tjow i 
ihp BattJe Fl«el "n 

V- ri.>.r billlr snt.Oft 'llillVMn S «nd S m.lfj 
>i-KMl> o.. ihe tngis^a t.ow*jj|„ Von ol Ihr 

Th«.2nd Batlle Stiu^iriron s rormtng ahuj of the 
rron Don. 

Thp 4lh Lighl C. 



. 4th . 



cr SqUAd^*.. .» J?e»ii>B into lU 
or ihi> V«r> of 1116 8.<ttllt FItvt. 
Ith FtoilllAS arc fnuving lowjiMi thv 



St*nho\v 

3'- /)i\isuni 
Iron [h^kr 



Orion 



\l''l-itfhirr„ix,TS,/,uuljr 
^Inirn.sUuil 



!•' Ihv,.^,,',, 
lunq (..crrjc l ^ 

ll't'T-lotitla I 1 , , „ 

1 J I I '!"-• Flolillu 

4 -' Li/jht Criji.irr Mtfiuitirrn 
Ilnltl,' frui.wr.i 



I' ri, ■/,//, 



